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I. INTRODUCTION
The "Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act" ("CERCLA")' was passed as a compromise bill in the closing days of a
lame-duck session of Congress in 1980. CERCLA imposes strict liability for the
costs of responding to releases of hazardous substances on certain groups of
persons.' It also imposes joint and several liability for the costs of responding
to releases of hazardous substances on those groups of persons, in the absence
of a showing that the harm resulting from the releases of hazardous substances
is divisible3 or that a reasonable basis for determining the contributions of those
persons to the harm exists.4 CERCLA, however, did not indicate whether
persons who were liable for the costs of responding to releases of hazardous
substances ("potentially responsible parties" or "PRPs") might have any claims
for contribution against other PRPs in connection with those releases. The
statute was silent with respect to the rights of PRPs to seek contribution from
other PRPs.
The courts, however, held that PRPs who were held liable for response costs
did have the right to seek contribution from other PRPs under CERCLA. s The
courts also held that PRPs had the right to seek contribution from other PRPs as
a matter of federal common law, and that the existence of that right under
CERCLA was consistent with and furthered the policies and objectives of
CERCLA. The courts concluded the principles of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act' should be applied to determine each PRP's equitable share of the
response costs and the effect of partial settlements on the liability of the
nonsettling PRPs, whether those settlements were between the government and
PRPs or between PRPs themselves.7
I. See Pub. L. No. 96-510; 94 StaL 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995)).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1995) (CERCLA § 107(a)).
3. See. e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A (1995).
4. See, e.g., In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 894-95, 901-04 (5th Cir. 1993);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A (1995).
5. See generally Kristian E. Anderson, The Right To Contribution For Response Costs Under
CERCLA, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 345 (1985).
6. See the Unif. Comparative Fault Act, 12 U.L.A. 123 (1996) (hereinafter UCFA].
7. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 401-02 (W.D. Mo.
1985) ("Accordingly, the Court advises the parties of its view that the effect of settlements upon
nonsettling parties should be determined in accordance with the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act
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In 1986, Congress passed the "Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986" ("SARA").8 SARA made a number of changes in CERCLA.
Among other things, SARA expressly recognized the right of PRPs to seek
contribution from other PRPs for response costs under CERCLA.9 SARA also
adopted a number of new provisions concerning the settlement of claims for
response costs with PRPs.'0 One of those provisions was Section 113(0(2) of
CERCLA, the focal point of this article. Section 113(0(2) provides:
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a
State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be
liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the
settlement. Such settlement does not discharge any of the other
potentially liable persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the
potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement."
for the reason that the principles of that model act are the most consistent with, and do the most to
implement, the Congressional intent which is the foundation for CERCLA.").
8. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1), (g)(3) (1995) (C.ERCLA § 113(f)(1), (g)(3)).
t0. See 42 U.S.C. §§9604(aXl)(CERCLA § 104(a)(l)),9613(f)(2),(3)(CERCLA § 113(f)(2),
(3)), and 9622 (CERCLA § 122) (1995).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (1995). Language almost identical to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2)
is also found in 42 U.S.C. § 9622, the section of CERCLA, as amended by SARA, which deals with
settlements between the United States and PRPs. See id. § 9622(hX4) ("A person who has resolved
its liability to the United States under this subsection shall not be liable for claims for contribution
regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement shall not discharge any of the other
potentially liable persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others
by the amount of the settlement.").
In addition, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g), which deals with de minimis settlements, contains language that
is almost identical to that of 42 US.C. § 9622(h)(4), making it clear that the same scheme that
applies to major party settlements with the United States under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(h) also applies to
de minimis settlements under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g). See id. § 9622(gXS). The only difference
between 42 U.S.C. § 9622(hX4) and 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5) is that 42 U.S.C. § 9622(h)(4) refers
to "persons" who have resolved their liability to the United States, while 42 U.S.C. § 9622(gX5)
refers to "parties" who have resolved their liability to the United States. This distinction appears to
be insignificant.
The only real difference between 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 9622(hX4) and 42
U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5) is that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) applies to settlements between the United States
or a state and PRPs, whereas 42 U.S.C. § 9622(hX4) and 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5) only apply to
settlements between the United States and PRPs. There are other variations in the language of these
provisions which do not suggest any distinction was intended. 42 U.S.C. § 9613((2) indicates that
it only applies where persons have resolved their liability -to the United States or the state in
"administrative or judicially approved" settlements, while 42 U.S.C. § 9622(hX4) and 42 U.S.C. §
9622(g)(5) indicate that they apply only where persons have resolved their liability to the United
States "under this subsection." Those distinctions in language, however, are distinctions without a
difference. Settlements under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 9622(h) must be judicially or
administratively approved by incorporation into a consent decree or administrative order, and de
minimis settlements under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) must be judicially or administratively approved by
incorporation into a consent decree or administrative order. See Id. §§ 9622(d), (i), 9622(gX4), (i)
(1995).
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It is clear, under the provisions of Section i 13(f)(2), that contribution claims
against persons who have resolved their liability to the United States or a state
(i.e., the "government") in an administrative or judicially-approved settlement are
barred, if they arise out of matters addressed in the settlement.' 2 What is not
clear, however, is the effect of that contribution bar on the liability of nonsettling
PRPs for response costs and other matters addressed in a settlement. Section
113(0(2) provides that such a settlement "reduces the potential liability of the
[nonsettlors] by the amount of the settlement," but it is not at all clear:
(1) whether § 113(0(2) sets out the only mechanism or method by
which the liability of nonsettlors can be reduced in connection with such
a settlement;
(2) whether § 113(0(2) is inconsistent with the application of the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act approach to determining the effect of
partial settlements on the liability of nonsettlors, in light of the other
provisions of SARA and the objectives and legislative history of
CERCLA and SARA;
(3) whether the purpose of § 113(f)(2)'is to prevent the government
from receiving or obtaining a "windfall" or "double recovery" by
settling its claims against the settling PRPs for amounts which exceed
the total of the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at the site
and then pursuing the nonsettlors for their full equitable shares of the
response costs at the site; 3
12. Claims for contribution arising out of matters which are not addressed in or covered by a
settlement are not barred by that settlement. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) '(1995) (CERCLA §
113(f)(2)). Consequently, what contribution claims are barred by Section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA as
the result of a settlement between the government and PRPs depends, in the first instance, upon the
scope or reach of the settlement agreement.
This discussion of the effect of the contribution bar on the liability of nonsettling PRPs assumes
that the contribution claims under discussion arise out of matters addressed in settlement agreements
between the government and PRPs.
13. Such a conclusion is consistent with other provisions of CERCLA and SARA and the
intentions of Congress in passing SARA. Congress was concerned about the harshness of the scheme
that it had created under CERCLA and wanted to ensure that that scheme permitted the government
to take only those steps necessary to recover the costs of responding to and remedying releases of
hazardous substances. Congress did not want the government to receive any sort of "windfall" as
a result of that scheme or to recover more than the costs of responding to and remedying the releases
in question. See. e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) (1995) ("Any person who receives compensation for
removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to this chapter shall be precluded from recovering
compensation for the same removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to any other State or Federal
law. Any person who receives compensation for removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to any
other Federal or State law shall be precluded from receiving compensation for the same removal costs
or damages or claims as provided in this chapter."); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1995) ("The term
"person" means... [the] United States Government [or a] state ...."):
The provisions of Section 13(0(2) which declare that a settlement with the government reduces
the potential liability of nonsettlors by the amount of that settlement may simply be another
manifestation of that concern. Indeed, as shown Infra, that was the most likely purpose of that
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(4) whether § 113(0(2) constitutes an adoption of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act1 4 approach to determining the
effect of partial settlements on the liability of nonsettlors; or
(5) whether the purpose of § 113(0(2) is to ensure that the government
can recover any shortfall between the total of the settlors' equitable
shares of the response costs at the site and the amounts which the
settlors pay to the government in the settlement from the nonsettlors.
The answers to these questions depend upon the interpretation of Section
113(0(2) and the role it was intended to play within the scheme of CERCLA,
as amended by SARA. The resolution of these questions is not just a matter of
academic interest. The answers to these questions have had, and will continue
to have, an intensely practical effect upon the manner in which claims for
response costs are handled by the government, the manner in which those claims
are settled, and the manner in which response costs are ultimately distributed
among the PRPs at a site.
Because Section 113(0(2) addresses the effect of government settlements
upon the liability of nonsettling PRPs, the questions concerning its interpretation
and effect have frequently prompted references to, and analysis of, the provisions
of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA")" and the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act ("UCFA")."' The references to the UCATA
and the UCFA in connection with those questions are both natural and inevitable.
The UCATA and the UCFA, which were promulgated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1955 and 1977,
respectively,' 7 set out the two basic approaches to contribution that are followed
in American jurisdictions.1" The UCATA and the UCFA also set out, as
provision, when the other provisions of CERCLA and SARA and their objectives and legislative
history are considered with Section 113(0(2).
14. See Unif. Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1955 Revised Act), 12 U.L.A. 185 (1996)
(hereinafter UCATA].
15. Id.
16. See UCFA, 12 U.L.A. 123 (1996).
17. See UCATA, 12 U.L.A. 185, 194 (1996); UCFA, 12 U.L.A. 123, 126 (1996).
18. See UCATA, 12 U.L.A. 185-93 (1996); UCFA, 12 U.L.A. 123-25 (1996).
The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1939) and the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (1955 Revised Act) have been adopted, at least in part, in a number of jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-2501 to -2509 (1994 and Supp. 1996); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-
61-201 to -212 (Michie 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13.50.5-101 to -106 (1997); Del. CodeAnn. tit. 10,
§§ 6301-6308(1975); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.31 (West 1986); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 663.11-663.17 (1995);
Md. Code Ann., Gen. Prov. art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1994); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231 B, §§ 1-4 (Law. Co-op.
1986); Nev. Rev. Stat §§ 17.225-.305 (1979); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-3-1 to -3-8 (Michie 1996); N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ I B-I to -6 (1983); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 32-38-01 to -38-04 (1996); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 2307.3 1-.32 (Banks Baldwin 1994); Okla. Stat. Ann. it. 12, § 832 (West Supp. 1997); 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. §§ 8321-8327 (1982); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 10-6-1 to -6-11 (1985); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-38-
10 to -70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 15-8-11 to -22 (1984 and Supp.
1997); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-11-101 to -106 (1980). See also UCATA, "Table of Jurisdictions
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integral parts of their approaches to contribution, the two basic settlement
reduction rules-i.e., the rules for determining the effect of partial settlements
upon the liability of nonsettlors-that are used in American jurisdictions. 9
Under the UCATA approach, a jointly and severally liable tortfeasor's pro
rata share of the common liability does not depend upon that tortfeasor's degree
of fault or the extent to which that tortfeasor's fault caused or contributed to the
claimant's damages.20  A tortfeasor's pro rata share of the common liability
depends upon the number of jointly and severally liable tortfeasors, because the
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted," 12 U.L.A. 185 (1996); UCATA, "Prefatory Note (1955 Revision),"
12 U.L.A. 187 (1996); UCATA, "General Statutory Note," 12 U.L.A. 189 (1996). In addition, several
states have adopted pro tanto approaches to determining the effect of settlements upon the liability of
nonsettlors similar to the approach followed in the UCATA without expressly adverting to or adopting
provisions of the UCATA. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 875-880 (West 1980 and Supp. 1997); 740
Ill. Comp. Stat. 100/0.01-5 (West 1993 and Supp. 1997); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 600.2925a-
.2925d (West 1986 and Supp. 1997); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.060 (1988). See also American Chain and
Cable Co. v. Brunson, 278 S.E. 2d 719, 723 (Ga. 1981); Barker v. Cole, 396 N.E. 2d 964, 970 (Ind.
CL App. 3d Dist. 1979); Wadle v. Jones, 312 N.W. 2d 510, 512-14 (Iowa 1981).
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act (1977) has been adopted, at least in part, in two jurisdictions.
See Iowa Code Ann. §§ 668.1 to.16 (West 1987 and Supp. 1997); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4.22.005
to .925 (West 1988 and Supp. 1997). In addition, several states have adopted proportionate or
equitable share approaches to determining the effect of settlements upon the liability of nonsettlors
similar to the approach followed in the UCFA without expressly adverting to or adopting provisions
of the UCFA. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-50.5-103, 13-50.5-105 (1989); La. Civ. Code arts. 2323,
2324; La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812(c); Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So. 2d 975, 980-
81 (La. 1995); Garrett v. Safeco Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 209,210 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983). See also N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-I to -5 (West 1987). Finally, with the advent of comparative fault and its
emphasis on the equitable apportionment or allocation of liability, a number of states have moved
toward the UCFA or proportionate share approach to contribution by requiring that each party's
equitable share of an obligation be determined in accordance with its fault and by permitting
nonsettlors to seek contribution from settlors unless their settlements provide for a reduction in the
liability of the nonsettlors equal to the settlors' equitable shares of the obligation. See infra the cases
and authorities cited in note 40.
This movement towards the UCFA or proportionate share approach to contribution in states adopting
comparative fault principles was predicted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws when it promulgated the UCFA in 1977. It declared:
The NCCUSL has promulgated two Uniform Contribution Acts-the first in 1939,
superseded by a revised act in 1955. Both of these Acts provide for pro rata contribution,
which may be suitable in a state not applying the principle of comparative fault, but is
inappropriate in a comparative-fault state apportioning ultimate responsibility on the basis
of the proportionate fault of the parties involved.
It has therefore been decided not to amend the separate Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, 1955, but to leave that Act for possible use by states not adopting the
principle of comparative fault .... The 1955 Act should be replaced in any state that
adopts the comparative fault principle, and would be eventually replaced.
See UCFA, "Prefatory Note," 12 U.L.A. 125 (1996) (emphasis added).
19. See UCATA § 4, 12 U.L.A. 264 (1996); UCFA § 6, 12 U.L.A. 147 (1996). See the
statutes and authorities cited in supra note 18.
20. See UCATA § 2, 12 U.L.A. 246 (1996) ("In determining the pro iata shares of tortfeasors
in the entire liability ... their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered .....
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tortfeasors share equally in the liability."' A jointly and severally liable
tortfeasor who settles with the claimant in good faith is discharged from all
liability for contribution to the other tortfeasors,"2 and can not seek contribution
from another tortfeasor unless the settlement extinguishes the liability of the other
tortfeasor to the claimant,23 the amounts paid in the settlement are reasonable,24
and the amounts paid in the settlement exceed the settling tortfeasor's pro rata
share of the common liability.25 Furthermore, a settling tortfeasor who is entitled
to seek contribution from another tortfeasor can not recover more than the other
tortfeasor's pro rata share of the liability from that tortfeasor.2"
Finally, under the UCATA approach, a settlement in good faith between the
claimant and the settling tortfeasor reduces the liability of the other tortfeasors to
the claimant on a pro tanto or dollar-for-dollar basis-i.e., "to the extent of any
amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the
consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.",27 Consequently, the UCATA
or pro tanto approach places the risk that the claimant may settle with a tortfeasor
for less than that tortfeasor's pro rata share of the liability on the nonsettling
tortfeasors. If the claimant and the settling tortfeasor agree in good faith to settle
for an amount that is less than the settling tortfeasor's pro rata share of the
liability, the other tortfeasors will be stuck with the tab for the remainder of the
settling tortfeasor's share of the liability. Under the UCATA approach, they
remain jointly and severally liable to the claimant for the difference between the
full amount of the common liability and the amount of the settlement."
21. Id.
22. See id. § 4(b), at 264 ("When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment
is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same
wrongful death .... (b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
contribution to any other tortfeasor.").
23. See id. § I(d), at 195 ("A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not
entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful
death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which
is in excess of what was reasonable.").
24. Id. A settling tortfeasor can recover contribution from another tortfeasor only to the extent
that the amounts paid in the settlement were reasonable.
25. See id. § I(b), at 194 ("The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who
has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the
amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share.").
26. See id. § I(b), at 194 ("No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own
pro rata share of the entire liability.").
27. See id. § 4, at 264 ("When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment
is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same
wrongful death: (a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent
of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid
for it, whichever is the greater .... ").
28. Id. If, on the other hand, the claimant and the settling tortfeasor agree to settle for an
amount that is greater than the settling tortfeasor's pro rata share of the liability, the other tortfeasors
will receive a reduction in their liability to the claimant which exceeds the settling tortfeasor's pro
.19971
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Under the UCFA approach, a jointly and severally liable tortfeasor's share of
the common liability depends upon that tortfeasor's degree of fault and the extent
to which that tortfeasor's fault caused or contributed to the claimant's damages. 9
Ajointly and severally liable tortfeasorwho settles with the claimant is discharged
from all liability for contribution to the other tortfeasors,'0 and can not seek
contribution from anothertortfeasor unless the settlementextinguishes the liability
of the other tortfeasor to the claimant,3" the amounts paid in the settlement are
reasonable,3" and the amounts paid in the settlement exceed the settling tort-
feasor's equitable share of the common liability.33  Furthermore, a settling
rata share of the liability-i.e., a reduction equal to the amount specified in the settlement or the
amount paid for it-and will be liable to the claimant for an amount that is less than the total of their
pro rata shares of the liability. Consequently, the claimant can never recover more than the total
amount of the common liability, even if he settles with a tortfeasor for an amount which exceeds that
tortfeasor's pro rata share of the liability. Whether the difference between the amount of the
settlement and the settling tortfeasor's pro rats share reduces the other tortfeasors' ultimate liability,
however, depends upon whether the settling tortfeasor can pursue the other tortfeasors for that
difference in a contribution action.
29. See UCFA § 2(a)-(c), 12 U.L.A. 135-36 (1996):
(a) In all actions involving fault of more than one party to the action, including third-party
defendants and persons who have been released under Section 6, the court, unless otherwise
agreed by all parties, shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories or, if there is
no jury, shall make findings, indicating: (I) the amount of damages each claimant would
be entitled to recover if contributory fault is disregarded; and (2) the percentage of the total
fault of all of the parties to each claim that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-
party defendant, and person who has been released from liability under Section 6. For this
purpose the court may determine that two or more persons are to be treated as a single
party. (b) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the
nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between
the conduct and the damages claimed. (c) The court shall determine the award of damages
to each claimant in accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction under Section
6, and enterjudgment against each party liable on the basis of the rules ofjoint-and-several
liability. For purposes of contribution under Sections 4 and 5, the court also shall
determine and state in the judgment each party's equitable share of the obligation to each
claimant in accordance with the respective percentages of fault.
See also UCFA § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 142 (1996) ("The basis for contribution is each person's equitable
share of the obligation, including the equitable share of a claimant at fault, as determined in
accordance with the provisions of Section 2.").
30. See Id. § 6, at 147 ("A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by
a claimant and a person liable discharges that person for all liability for contribution, but it does not
discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides.").
31. See id. § 4(b), at 142 ("Contribution is available to a person who enters into a settlement
with a claimant only (I) if the liability of the person against whom contribution is sought has been
extinguished and (2) to the extent that the amount paid in settlement was reasonable.").
32. Id.
33. See id. § 2(c), at 136, quoted in supra note 29; id. § 4(a), at 142, quoted In supra note 29;
Id. § 5(a), (b), at 145 ("(a) If the proportionate fault of the parties to a claim for contribution has been
established previously by the court, as provided by Section 2, a party paying more than his equitable
share of the obligation, upon motion, may recover judgment for contribution. (b) If the proportionate
fault of the parties to the claim forcontribution has not been established by the court, contribution may
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tortfeasor who is entitled to seek contribution from another tortfeasor can not
recover more than the other tortfeasor's equitable or proportionate share of the
liability from that tortfeasor.34
Finally, under the UCFA approach, a settlement between the claimant and the
settling tortfeasor reduces the liability of the other tortfeasors to the claimant by
the amount of the settling tortfeasor's equitable or proportionate share of the
common liability.35 Consequently, the UCFA or equitable share approach places
the risk that the claimant may settle with a tortfeasor for less than that tortfeasor's
equitable share of the liability on the claimant. If the claimant and the settling
tortfeasor agree to settle for an amount that is less than the settling tortfeasor's
equitable share of the liability, the claimant will be out the difference between the
settling tortfeasor's equitable share of the liability and the amount of the
settlement. Under the UCFA approach, the liability of other tortfeasors is reduced
by the settlor's equitable share of common liability, regardless of the amount of
the settlement, and the other tortfeasors remain jointly and severally liable to the
claimant only for the total of their equitable shares of the liability.36
As noted above, the questions concerning the interpretation and effect of
Section 113(0(2) have prompted frequent references to the UCATA and the
UCFA. The UCATA and UCFA and their settlement reduction rules provide the
background against which the courts have approached Section 113(0(2), as well
as much of the framework for the courts' analysis of Section 113(0(2). Conse-
quently, a basic understanding of the UCATA and UCFA approaches helps one
understand the jurisprudence.
II. CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. UCA TA Approach
To date, the interpretation of Section 113(0(2) and its effect on the liability
of nonsettlors has been considered by only a few district courts," and only one
be enforced in a separate action, whether or not a judgment has been rendered against either the person
seeking contribution or the person from whom contribution is being sought.").
34. Id.
35. See id. § 6, at 147 ("A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by
a claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liability for contribution, but it does
not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim
of the releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount of the released person's
equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.").
36. Id. Under the UCFA approach, however, the claimant also receives the benefit of any
settlement between the claimant and a tortfeasor for more than that tortfeasor's equitable share of the
liability. The liability of the nonsettling tortfeasors is reduced by the settling tortfeasor's equitable
share of the liability, regardless of the amount of the settlement, and the nonsettling tortfeasors
remain jointly and severally liable, to the claimant for the total of their equitable shares of the
liability. Consequently, if the claimant settles with a tortfeasor for more than that tortfeasor's
equitable share of the liability, the claimant can recover more than the total amount of the liability.
37. See Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 731, 735-36 (W.D, Mich. 1991); United
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Court of Appeals-the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit." Most of the
States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 675-79 (D.NJ. 1989); United States v. Cannons
Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1047-49 (D.Mass. 1989); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford
Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1026-27 (D.Mass. 1989); United States v. Laskin, No. C84-2035Y, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4900 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 1989).
38. See Cannons Eng'g, 899 F.2d at 91-92. The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit is the only circuit that has squarely addressed and decided the proper interpretation and effect
of Section 113(0(2).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits have recently stated that
Section 113(0(2) creates a disproportionate liability scheme. See B. F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99
F.3d 505, 527 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1184-85 (3d
Cir. 1994). In each of those cases, however, the court's statements to that effect were obiter
dicta--the statements had nothing to do with the questions before the court, were unnecessary to the
court's decision, played no part in its ratio decidendi. See Betkoskl, 99 F.3d at 511-13, 527-30;
Alcan, 25 F.3d at 1178-79, 1186-87. Consequently, neither the Second Circuit nor the Third Circuit
can be listed as one of the circuits that has squarely addressed or decided the proper interpretation
and effect of Section I I3(0(2).
In Cannons Eng'g, the First Circuit cites Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851
F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1988), and asserts that the Third Circuit's opinion in Smith Land indicates that
Section 113(0(2) only permits nonsettlors to receive credit for the amount of the settlement. The
First Circuit's uncritical acceptance of the Smith Land dictum illustrates how bad law develops. In
Smith Land, the Third Circuit was not confronted with and did not decide any issue concerning the
interpretation or effect of Section 113(0(2). The questions before the Third Circuit in Smith Land
were whether the doctrine of caveat emptor was available as a defense in a contribution action under
CERCLA and whether liability for response costs under CERCLA could be imposed upon the
corporate successors of the seller of property.
The Smith Land court simply mentioned § 13(f)(2) in passing, and observed that the settlements
with the government appeared to give rise to a pro tanto reduction in the contribution claims of the
nonsettlors. Section 113(0(2) had absolutely no bearing on the questions before the Third Circuit
in Smith Land. The Third Circuit's observations with respect to Section 113(0(2) are nothing but
obiter dicta, and do not provide any support for the propositions for which Smith Land was cited by
the First Circuit. Accordingly, the Third Circuit still can not be listed as one of the courts which has
addressed or decided the proper interpretation and effect of Section 113(0(2).
The First Circuit's decision in Cannons Eng'g suffers from a number of other analytical
deficiencies. First, the court focuses upon the language of Section 113(0(2) and Congress' goal in
SARA of promoting or encouraging settlements to the exclusion of all else. The court does not
consider other provisions of SARA, such as Section 104(a)(1), Section .113(0(1) and (3), and
Section 122(e)(3XE), the scheme which those provisions establish for settlements between the
government and PRPs, or Congress' other goals in SARA in arriving at its conclusions. These
provisions are too pervasive to be coincidental and too conspicuous to be ignored.
In addition, the Cannons Eng'g court asserts that the pro tanto reduction rule contained in Section
113(0(2) precludes any conclusion that the liability of nonsettling PRPs can be reduced by any other
amounts, such as the total of the settling PRPs'. equitable shares of the response costs at a site. See
Cannons Eng "g, 899 F.2d at 92. There is absolutely no support for this assertion in Section 113(0(2)
or any of the other provisions of CERCLA or SARA, and it does not logically follow from the
language of Section 113(0(2) or any of the other provisions of CERCLA or SARA. Section
113((2) does not-state that it is the only mechanism or means by which the liability of nonsettling
PRPs can be reduced, or that nonsettling PRPs can not receive a reduction in their liability which
exceeds the amount of such a settlement. It merely declares that the nonsettling PRPs shall receive
a reduction in their liability equal to the amount of the settlement. That declaration does not preclude
a conclusion that the liability of the nonsettling PRPs can also be reduced by other means or other
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courts which have interpreted and applied Section 113(f)(2) have held that
Section 113(f)(2) bars claims for contribution by nonsettlors against settlors with
respect to matters addressed in the settlement-a proposition compelled by the
language of the statute itself. They have also held, however, that, umder Section
113(f)(2), the liability of nonsettlors for response costs at the site is reduced only
by the amount of the settlement.39 Some of those courts have gone so far as
to suggest that the adoption of a "pro tanto" rule in Section 113(f)(2), similar to
the one found in UCATA for use in determining the effect of partial settlements
on the liability of nonsettlors, indicates that Congress made "a conscious choice
in 1986 not to adopt UCFA principles for CERCLA purposes," but to adopt "the
approach... of the [UCATA]." 0
amounts, such as the total of the settling PRPs' equitable shares of the response costs at a site. See,
e.g., In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 957 F.2d 1020, 1030-32 (2d Cir. 1992). See also
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-61-202(4), 16-61-204, 16-61-205 (Michie 1987); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§
6302(d), 6304 (1975); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 663-12, -14, -15, -17 (1995); Md. Code Ann., Gen. Prov.
art. 50, §§ 19-20 (1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-3-2(D), 41-3-4, 41-3-5 (Michie 1996 Repl.); 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8326-8327 (West 1982); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 10-6-3, -7, -8 (1985). (These state
statutes all contain provisions that declare, in unqualified terms, that settlements reduce the liability
of the nonsettling defendants by "the amount stipulated in the [settlement] ... or the amount of the
consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater." Each of these provisions, however, is tempered
by another provision which declares that settlements do not bar claims for contribution against the
settling defendants, unless the settlements provide that the liability of the nonsettling defendants will
also be reduced by the settling defendants' equitable shares of the liability. Consequently, the settling
defendants cannot, by negotiating a favorable settlement, avoid ultimate responsibility for the full
amount of their equitable shares of the liability. Thus, these state statutes demonstrate that language
like that found in Section 113(0(2) does not mean that the ultimate liability of nonsettlin g parties can
not be reduced by other means or other amounts.).
39. See Cannons Eng'g, 899 F.2d at 91-92; Thomas Solvent, 790 F. Supp. at 735-36; Rohm
& Haas, 721 F. Supp. at 675-79; United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1047-49
(D.Mass. 1989); In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at 1026-27; New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F.
Supp. 677, 681, 681 n.5, 683, 689 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
40. See Cannons Eng'g, 720 F. Supp. at 1048. The court's assertion that Congress intended
to adopt the approach of the UCATA in Section I I3(f)(2) still does not answer all of the questions
that exist with respect to the meaning of Section 113(f(2) and its effect upon the liability of
nonsettlors.
Under the 1955 Revised Act, a "good faith settlement" bars all claims for contribution against the
settling parties and reduces the liability of the nonsettling parties by "the amount stipulated [in the
settlement] ... or ... the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater." See
UCATA § 4(b), 12 U.L.A. 264 (1996). However, with the advent of comparative fault and its
emphasis on the equitable apportionment or allocation of liability, a number of states either rejected
the UCATA or pro tanto approach to determining the effect of settlements upon the liability of
nonsettlors altogether, or limited the operation of the UCATA or pro tanto approach to ensure that
liability would be allocated or apportioned among defendants in a fair and equitable manner. See
Alaska Stat §§ 09.16.010-09.16.060 (Michie 1983), repealed by Initiative 87-2, effective March 5.
.1989; Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-5 (1972), repealed by L. 1989, c. 311, § 6, effective from July 1,
1989; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-1-110 to 1-1-113 (Michie 1977), repealed by L. 1986, c. 24, § 2,
effective June 11, 1986. (These states expressly repealed statutes utilizing the UCATA or pro tanto
approach.). See N.D. Cent. Code § 9-10-7 (1987 and Supp. 1995); Bartels v. Williston, 276 N.W.2d
113, 121-22 (N.D. 1979) (In Bartels, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that North Dakota's
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These decisions, however, have been based solely upon the courts' consider-
ation of the language of Section 113(0(2), which declares that settlements
between the government and PRPs "[reduce] the potential liability of [other
PRPs] by the amount of the settlement," and the fact that one of Congress' goals
comparative negligence statute [N.D. Cent. Code § 9-10-7] implicitly repealed the pro tanto approach
set out in that state's version of the UCATA [N.D. Cent Code §§ 32-38-01 to 32-38-04] and
established a proportionate or equitable share approach.). See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-50.5-103, -50.5-
105 (1989) (Although Colorado did not repeal its version of the UCATA in its entirety, it expressly
rejected the UCATA or pro tanto approach to determining the effect of settlements on the liability
of nonsettlors in favor of the UCFA approach. It did so by providing that settlements reduce the
liability of nonsettlors by the settlors' percentages of fault or equitable shares of the liability.). See
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-61-202(4), -61-205 (Michie 1987); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 6302(d), 6304
(1975); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 663.12, .14, .15, .17 (1995); Md. Code Ann., Gen. Prov. art 50, §§ 19-
20 (1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-3-2(D), 41-3-4, 41-3-5 (Michie 1996 Rep).); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. §§ 8326, 8327 (West 1982); RI. Gen. Laws §§ 10-6-3, 10-6-7, 10-6-8 (1985); S.D. Codified
Laws § 15-8-18 (Michie 1984 and Supp. 1997). (These states modified or limited the operation of
the contribution bar and the pro tanto credit rule contained in UCATA to ensure that disproportionate
liability would not fall on nonsettling defendants as a result of those provisions. These states did so
by adopting statutes which provide that settlements will not bar claims for contribution against
settlors unless the settlements provide for a reduction in the liability of the nonsettlors equal to the
settlors' percentages of fault or equitable shares of the liability.).
The modifications to the UCATA or pro tanto approach which began with the advent of
comparative fault were well under way by the time Congress considered and passed SARA, and raise
additional questions as to just what Congress intended in Section 113(0(2). For example, even if
one concludes that Congress intended to adopt the UCATA approach to determining the effect of
settlements on the liability of nonsettlors in Section 113((2), which UCATA approach did Congress
intend to adopt--the approach of the 1955 Revised Act, or the modified UCATA approach that was
being followed by the states which were using comparative fault to allocate or apportion
responsibility among defendants?
The fact that SARA adopted a comparative fault approach to allocating or apportioning
responsibility for response costs among defendants, and the fact that Section 104(aXl) of SARA
appears to impose limitations upon the settlements to which Section 113(f)(2) can be appli-
ed-limitations designed to ensure that each PRP, including those settling with the government, will
bear, at a minimum, the full costs of cleaning up or remediating the pollution caused by its
activities-suggest that it was the modified UCATA approach, or one similar to it, that Congress
intended to adopt in Section 113(0(2), if it intended to adopt a UCATA approach at all. Like the
UCFA approach, a modified UCATA approach is much more consonant with the equitable allocation
or apportionment of response costs among defendants than the UCATA approach. See McDermott,
Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 207-13, 217, 114 S. CL 1461, 1465-67, 1470 (1994). It eliminates
the possibility of disproportionate liability and ensures that each defendant bears the costs of
remedying the harm caused by its activities.
In addition, the structure of the provisions in SARA is very similar to the structure of the statutes
setting out the modified UCATA approach-i.e., the adoption of a pro tanto credit rule in one
provision, Section 113(0(2), and the adoption of a limitation upon the operation of that rule in
another provision, Section 104(a)(1). The only difference between the schemes is that instead of
denying the benefits of the contribution bar to settlors in connection with settlements which do not
provide that the liability of the nonsettlors will be reduced by the settlors' equitable shares of the
liability, Congress prohibited settlements between the government and PRPs for less than the total
of the settlors' equitable shares of the liability.
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in SARA was to promote or encourage settlements."' None of those courts
considered or cited any of the other provisions of SARA in arriving at their
conclusions as to the meaning of Section 113(0(2) and its effect on the liability
of nonsettlors. Moreover, none of those courts considered or cited any of the
-relevant legislative history or materials in arriving at those conclusions. The
courts' analysis in these cases is clearly incomplete; the cases do not take
sufficient account of the complexities of the issues or the statutes.
In addition, most of those courts have recognized that their interpretation of
Section 113(0(2) might compel the nonsettlors to "absorb any shortfall" between
the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs and the amounts paid by the
settlors under the settlement.42 In fact, some of those courts have asserted,
based upon the language of Section 113(0(2) alone, that Congress explicitly
intended to create a disproportionate liability scheme that would allow the
government and the PRPs settling with it to unilaterally shift much of the
settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at a site to the nonsettlors43
Those assertions are troubling for several reasons. SARA, the source of
Section 113(0(2), was intended to ameliorate the harshness of the statutory
scheme under CERCLA, not to exacerbate it."" In addition, although SARA
was intended to promote or encourage settlements, that was not its only goal."
Congress was also concerned with preventing "sweetheart deals"-i.e.,
settlements in which the government let PRPs out cheaply by settling with them
for less than the total of their equitable shares of the response costs-in SARA.
Furthermore, the legislative history of SARA does not contain any mention of,
or reference to, any desire on the part of Congress to create such a disproportion-
41. See the cases cited in supra note 39.
42. See. e.g., Cannons Eng'g, 899 F.2d at 91 ("The statute immunizes settling parties from
liability for contribution and provides that only the amount of the settlement-not the pro rata share
attibutable to the settling party-shall be subtracted from the liability of the nonsettlors. This can
prove to be a substantial benefit to settling PRP's-and a corresponding detriment to their more
recalcitrant counterparts."); Thomas Solvent, 790 F. Supp. at 736 ("'he amici's argument that the
consent decree should contain a provision that would reduce their liability by the amount of the
settlers' [sic] equitable shares, not by the amount of the settlement judgment is without statutory
support and inconsistent with [C]ongress' intent to promote early settlement. According to the
express terms of the statute, a settlement 'reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount
of the settlement."') (emphasis added); Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp.'at 675-76; Cannons Eng'g, 720
F. Supp. at 1048; In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at 1027 ("[l]f the settlor pays less than its
proportionate share of liability, the nonsettlors, being jointly and severally liable, must make good
the difference. In this respect, the words of the statute are clear: the potential liability of the others
is reduced 'by the amount of the settlement,' not by the settlor's proportionate share of any damages
ultimately determined to have been caused."); Exxon, 697 F. Supp. at 681, 681 n.5, 683.
43. See Cannons Eng'g, 899 F.2d at 91-92 (Congress purposed that all who choose not to
settle confront the same sticky wicket of which appellants complain."); In re Acushnet River, 712 F.
Supp. at 1026-27.
44. See supra note 9 and infra notes 140-144 and accompanying texts.
45. See infra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
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ate liability scheme." Finally, those assertions are troubling because the
disproportionate liability scheme embraced by those courts is a punitive or in
terrorem policy that invites collusion, "sweetheart deals," and arbitrary and
capricious government action."'
B. UCFA Approach
Under the UCFA approach, a settlement between the government and PRPs
reduces the potential liability of the nonsettlors by the settlors' equitable shares
of the response costs at a site, whatever those equitable shares may be."'
46. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
47. The disproportionate liability scheme which those courts have read into Section 113(0(2)
is much harsher than the UCATA, and contains none of the procedural safeguards or mechanisms
designed to assure fairness to nonsettlors which are contained in the UCATA. For example, the
UCATA does not permit settlors to pursue claims for contribution against nonsettlors unless the
settlement that was negotiated extinguishes the liability of the nonsettlors to the claimant. See
UCATA § I (d), 12 U.L.A. 194-95 (1996) ("A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant
is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or
wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement ...."). In addition, under the modified
UCATA approach that has been adopted in a number of states, a settlement does not bar contribution
actions by the nonsettlors against the settlors unless the settlement provides that it reduces the liability
of the nonsettlors by the settlors' equitable shares of the liability. See the authorities cited supra in
notes 38 and 40. Finally, under the UCATA approach, a court must hold a fairness hearing and
determine that the settlement was entered into in good faith. If the court is not satisfied at the
conclusion of the fairness hearing that the settlement is fair and was entered into in good faith by the
claimant and the settling parties, the settlement will not bar contribution actions by the nonsettling
parties against the settling parties.
Under CERCLA, as amended by SARA, however, settlors can pursue claims for contribution
against nonsettlors, even though the settlement does not extinguish the liability of the nonsettlors to
the government. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f(3)(B) (1995). Furthermore, the settlement bars all claims
for contribution by the nonsettlors against the settlors. Whether the settlement reduces the liability of
the nonsettlors by the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs or not. See 42 U.S.C. §
9613(0(2) (1995). Finally, under the scheme established by CERCLA, as amended by SARA, the
courts are required to consider the fairness of proposed settlements to nonsettlors before they can
enter consent decrees approving those settlements. In practice, however, the courts do nothing more
than pay lip service to the idea that such settlements should be fair to nonsettlors. See infra text
accompanying notes 175-177 and 186-190.
The courts are not required to hold evidentiary hearings on the fairness of the proposed settlements
or to allow nonsettlors to offer or introduce evidence in connection with the proposed settlements,
and have consistently refused to do so. See infra text accompanying notes 183-185. Consequently,
the nonsettlors' contribution rights are extinguished and their liabilities or exposures are increased
by agreements between third persons under which the nonsettlors are never afforded a meaningful
opportunity to challenge. Under the scheme of CERCLA, as amended by SARA, their rights and
liabilities are being determined by agreements to which they do not subscribe and which they are not
permitted to oppose by the presentation of evidence. Such a scheme offers great potential for abuse,
collusion, and sweetheart deals between the government and PRPs. Such a scheme may also serve
to frustrate, in large measure, some of the basic policies and principles of CERCLA and SARA, such
as the "polluter pays" principle. See infra text accompanying notes 136-146.
48. UCFA § 6, 12 U.L.A. 147 (1996).
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Section 113(0(2) declares that settlements between the government and PRPs
"reduce the potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement."
The language of that provision of Section 113(f)(2) is not necessarily inconsistent
with the UCFA approach, if the purpose of that provision is to ensure that the
government does not receive a "windfall" when the amount of a settlement
exceeds the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at a site. If no
provision of CERCLA limited the operation of the UCFA approach in situations
where the amount of a settlement exceeds the settlors' equitable shares of the
response costs at a site, the government could recover more than the total costs
of responding to the releases of hazardous substances at a site. It could do so by
settling with some of the PRPs for amounts which exceed their equitable shares
of the response costs, and proceeding against the remaining PRPs for the full
amounts of their equitable shares of the response costs. The UCFA approach
would only reduce the liability of the nonsettlors by the settlors' equitable shares
of the response costs at the site, even though the settlors had paid more than the
sum of their equitable shares of the response costs in order to settle the claims
against them. Section 113(f)(2) may have been intended to ensure that CERCLA
operated in the manner intended-i.e., as a cost recovery statute-by preventing
windfalls or double recoveriesunder the UCFA approach when the amount which
the government receives in a settlement exceeds the sum of the settlors' equitable
shares of the response costs at a site. It does so by ensuring that a settlement
between the government and PRPs reduces the liability of the nonsettling PRPs,
at a minimum, by the amount of the settlement.
At least one district court has found those views persuasive and has
embraced the UCFA approach.49 In United States v. Alvin Laskin, the court
held that settlements between the government and PRPs always reduce the
liability of nonsettlors by the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs, and
reduce the liability of the nonsettlors by the amount of the settlement, if that
amount exceeds the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs.
In Laskin, the government filed a motion for the entry of a consent decree
approving a settlement that had been negotiated between the government and
certain PRPs in connection with a site in Ashtabula, Ohio. A number of
nonsettling PRPs opposed the entry of the consent decree approving the
settlement on the grounds that the approval of that settlement might leave them
potentially liable for significantly more than their equitable shares of the response
costs at the site. The nonsettling PRPs emphasized the fact that they believed
they had valid and substantial defenses to liability for the response costs at the
site, and asked the court to either: (a) postpone the entry of any consent decree
until discovery on the issues of allocation and contribution at the site had been
completed and those issues had been tried and decided, so that the court could
determine whether or not the settlors were paying their equitable shares of the
49. See United States v. Laskin, No. C84-2035Y, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4900 (N.D. Ohio Feb.
27, 1989).
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response costs under the terms of the settlement; or (b) enter an order preserving
all of the nonsettling parties' rights, including their rights to seek contribution
against the settling parties.
The Laskin court rejected both of the nonsettling PRPs' requests. The court
held that it could not enter an order preserving the nonsettling parties rights to
seek contribution against the settling parties because such an order would be
directly contrary to the express provisions of Section -11 3(f)(2) and Section
113(0(3), which bar contribution claims against settling parties. The court also
held that it was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues of
contribution, allocation, and apportionment of liability or determine whether each
of the settling parties was paying its equitable share of the response costs at the
site in the settlement before it could enter a consent decree approving the
settlement."s The court found that such a hearing was not desirable at that point
in the litigation. The court concluded that the issues of apportionment and
allocation of liability would more properly be addressed at a later time in the
context of the claims for recovery of response costs against the nonsettling
parties.
The Laskin court was concerned, however, with the objections of the
nonsettling parties and the fact that they might be exposed to potential liability
far in excess of their equitable shares of the response costs at the site. The court
Was aware of the provision in Section 113(0(2) which declares that a settlement
between the government and PRPs "reduces the potential liability of the [other
PRPs] by the amount of the settlement." Indeed, the court quoted that language
in its opinion. Unlike the other courts that have considered the question,
however, the Laskin court recognized that that provision of Section 113(0(2)
could not be read in isolation or interpreted in a vacuum. Rather, it had to be
considered in the context of the other provisions of SARA and the overall
scheme which SARA establishes for settlements between the government and
PRPs. Thus, the court stated:
CERCLA, despite the foregoing provisions, does grant the Court
discretion in apportioning costs among the parties. CERCLA specifical-
ly provides that the court apportion responsibility under CERCLA
among parties in a fair and equitable manner by stating:
50. The Laskin court concluded that it was not necessary for it to hold an evidentiary hearing
or determine whether the settlors were paying their equitable shares of the response costs in the
settlement before approving the settlement because it was going to use the UCFA approach to
determine the effect of the settlement on the liability of the nonsettlors. The UCFA approach
obviates the need for such hearings or determinations, because it contains built-in assurances of
fairness to nonsettlors. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
The court's holding on this point may be incorrect, however, if Section 113(0(2) constitutes an
adoption of the UCATA approach to determine the effect of partial settlements on the liability of
nonsettlors and creates a disproportionate liability scheme. See infra notes 183-192 and accompany-
ing text.
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... In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate. 42 U.S.C. section 9613(f)(2)."1
The court concluded that it simply did not make sense for Congress to grant
the courts the authority to apportion response costs among parties in a fair and
equitable manner in the first paragraph of Section 1 13(f), and then rob the courts
of that authority in the very next paragraph of Section 113(f) by establishing a
"disproportionate liability scheme" which would render equitable apportionment
impossible and place PRPs at the mercy of the government.5 " Consequently,
the court held that the UCFA approach should control the effect of settlements
on the liability of nonsettlors because the principles of the UCFA continued to
be the most consistent with, and to do the most to implement, the Congressional
intent in CERCLA, notwithstanding the provisions of Section 113(f)(2). The
court also indicated that the provision of Section 113(0(2) which declares that
settlements "reduce the potential liability of [nonsettlors] by the amount of the
settlement" should be read as a statutory minimum designed to prevent
"windfalls" or double recoveries in situations where the government settled with
parties for more than their equitable shares of the response costs.53
51. See Laskin, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4900, at 09.
52. If Section 113(0(2) creates a "disproportionate liability scheme," the government can
unilaterally adjust or reallocate liability among PRPs by deciding which of the PRPs it wishes to
settle with on favorable terms and which of the PRPs it does not wish to settle with on favorable
terms.
53. Under the UCFA approach, "windfalls" or double recoveries by the government would be
possible, absent a provision like Section 113(0(2) establishing that nonsettlors are entitled, at a
minimum, to a reduction in liability equal to the amount of the settlement. Under the UCFA
approach, a settlement, release, or covenant not to sue between a claimant and a PRP discharges the
settling PRP from all liability for contribution and reduces the potential liability of the nonsettling
PRPs by the settling PRPs' equitable shares of the obligation. See UCFA § 6,12 U.L.A. 147 (1996).
Because a settlement with a PRP only discharges the settling PRPs' equitable shares of the obligation
and only reduces the potential liability of the nonsettling PRPs by the settling PRPs' equitable shares
of the obligation, regardless of the amount of the settlement, the claimant is free to pursue the other
PRPs for their full equitable shares of the obligation. Hence, if the claimant is able to settle his
claims against the settling PRPs for more than the settling PRPs' equitable shares of the obligation,
the claimant will receive a windfall--hc will receive more than the total amount of the obligation
owed, if he is able to recover the nonsettling PRPs' full equitable shares of the obligation from the
nonsettling PRPs.
The only way to prevent such windfalls under the UCFA approach is to modify that approach by
adopting a provision which provides nonsettlors with, at a minimum, a reduction in liability equal
to the amount of the settlement. The nonsettlors will then receive a credit equal to the settling
party's equitable share of the obligation or the amount of the settlement, whichever is greater. That
is what Section 113(0(2) was arguably intended to do.
Under such a modified scheme, settlors will receive full contribution protection, nonsettlors will
not be prejudiced by the extinction of their contribution rights against the settlors because they will
not be forced to bear any portion of the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs, and the
claimants can still recover the total of the nonsettlors' full equitable shares of the response costs from
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The Laskin court then spelled out exactly how it intended to apply the
UCFA approach in determining the effect of the settlements on the liability of
the nonsettlors. It declared:
This Court intends to apply similar factors in determining relative
fault of the parties and will also utilize the theories underlying the
provisions of the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act .... Special
attention is called to Section 6 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act
as to the effect of a settlement:
A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement
entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges that
person from all liability for contribution, but it does not
discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless
it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person
against other persons is reduced by the amount of the released
person's equitable share of the obligation, determined in
accordance with provisions of Section 2. (Emphasis added).
In applying this provision of the Comparative Fault Act and other
equitable concepts of contribution, the government's claim against any
non-settling defendant shall be reduced by the greater of the amount of
the settling defendants' combined equitable share of the obligation or
the amount of the settlement. In applying this provision, if the
government accepts a settlement of less than the combined equitable
share of the settling defendants, the government may not recover the
remaining portion of the settling defendant's equitable share from the
non-settling defendants. Accordingly, non-settling defendants will not,
through the effect of joint and several liability, be required to pay the
government any share of the costs properly attributable to acts of the
settling defendants. This Court will use its equitable powers to prevent
any grossly unfair allocation of liability and will utilize the concepts of
comparative fault of the parties where such application is reasonable.'
IIl. WHY THE UCFA APPROACH CONTINUES TO BE VALID AND SHOULD
PREVAIL
Despite the fact that the provision of Section 113(0(2) which declares that
settlements "reduce the potential liability of the others by the amount of the
the nonsettlors under a joint and several liability scheme. To the extent that a nonsettlor is forced
to pay more than its own equitable share of the response costs at the site after a settlement because
of the joint and several nature of nonsettlors' obligation to the claimants for the balance of the
response costs at the site, the nonsettlor can pursue the recovery of those amounts from the other
nonsettlors in contribution actions.
54. See Laskin, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4900, at 18-20.
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settlement" is very similar to the pro tanto or dollar-for-dollar approach that the
UCATA employs in determining the effect of settlements on the potential
liability of nonsettlors, that provision should not be interpreted as a rejection of
the UCFA approach to determining the effect of settlements on the liability of
nonsettlors or an adoption of the UCATA approach. The UCFA approach to
determining the effect of settlements on the potential liability of nonsettlors
continues to be valid and should prevail over the UCATA approach for a number
of reasons.
The courts which have concluded that the language of Section 113(f)(2)
precludes the application of the UCFA approach in determining the effect of
settlements on the potential liability of nonsettlors have focused on and considered
only a single clause in Section 113(f)(2)." It is not appropriate, however, to
analyze or interpret that provision of Section 113(f)(2) in a vacuum. It must be
considered and interpreted in light of the other provisions of SARA and the
scheme that SARA establishes for settlements. Section 113(f)(2) is, after all, only
a part of that scheme. Consequently, it is only by considering the scheme as a
whole that the courts can properly interpret and apply Section 113(0)(2).
When that scheme is considered, it is apparent that Section 113(0)(2) is not
inconsistent with the UCFA approach to determining the effect of settlements
between the government and PRPs on nonsettlors. In fact, the other provisions of
CERCLA, and the scheme which they establish, indicate that the UCFA approach
to determining the effect of settlements on the liability of the nonsettlors is the
approach that was contemplated by CERCLA and SARA. The pro tanto credit
rule of Section 113(f)(2) was simply intended to establish the minimum amount
by which the potential liability of the nonsettlors was to be reduced, in order to
promote fairness and equity in the allocation of liability among PRPs and prevent
windfalls or double recoveries by the government.' In addition, the objectives
55. See United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 91,91 n.5 (Ist Cir. 1990) ('The
statute. . . provides that only the amount of the settlement--not the pro rata share attributable to the
settling party--shall be subtracted from the liability of the nonsettlors."); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent
Co., 790 F. Supp. 731, 736 (W.D. Mich. 1991) ("According to the express terms of the statute, a
settlement 'reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement."') (emphasis
in original), United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp. 1027, 1047-48 (D.Mass. 1989);
United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 675-78 (D.N.J. 1989); In re Acushnet River
& New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1026-27 (D.Mass. 1989); New York v. Exxon Corp.,
697 F. Supp. 677, 681 n.5 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
56. CERCLA is, after all, a cost recovery statute. It was intended to permit the government
to recover the costs incurred in responding to releases ofhazardous substances. It was not intended
to allow the government to recover amounts in excess of the costs actually incurred in responding
to those releases.
CERCLA does authorize the recovery of natural resource damages by natural resources trustees
in circumstances where the recovery of such damages is appropriate. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX4XC)
(1995). This article, however, does not address the recovery of such damages, and the fact that those
damages may also be recoverable is not relevant to the point under discussion here. The government
should not be able to recover more for the costs of responding to releases of hazardous substances
than the costs that actually have been and will be incurred in responding to those releases.
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and policies of CERCLA and SARA establish that the UCFA approach, rather
than the UCATA approach, is the most consistent with the objectives and polices
of CERCLA and SARA, and should be followed under CERCLA and SARA.
Furthermore, notwithstanding judicial assertions to the contrary, the language
and history of Section 113(0(2) do not support the conclusion that Congress
intended to adopt the UCATA approach. In addition, the other provisions of
SARA and the legislative history of SARA as a whole do not support the
conclusion that Congress intended to adopt the UCATA approach in Section
113(0(2). Finally, the objectives and policies of CERCLA and SARA as a whole
do not support the conclusion that Congress intended to adopt the UCATA
approach to determining the effect of settlements on the liability of nonsettlors in
Section 113(0(2) or to establish a disproportionate liability scheme. For purposes
of convenience, each of these points is discussed separately below.
A. The Other Provisions of CERCLA and SARA Indicate That the UCFA
Approach is the Approach Contemplated by CERCLA and SARA
The provision of Section 113(0(2) which declaresthat settlements"reduce the
potential liability of others by the amount of the settlement" cannot be analyzed
in isolation or interpreted in a vacuum. It must be read and interpreted in light of
the other provisions of CERCLA and SARA and the scheme which they establish
for the recovery of response costs by the government.5 7 Several of the other
provisions of CERCLA have a bearing on the manner in which Section 113(f)(2)
should be interpreted and applied, and indicate that Section 113(0(2) was not
intended to bar the application of the UCFA approach to determine the effect of
settlements between the government and PRPs on the liability of nonsettlors.
Rather, Section 113(0(2) was intended to complement the UCFA approach and
prevent windfalls or double recoveries of response costs by the government under
the UCFA approach in situations where the amount of the settlement exceeds the
settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at the site.
The first of those provisions is Section 104(a)(1) of CERCLA.53 Section
Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to suggest that that was the purpose Congress had in mind
when it adopted that provision of Section 113(f)(2). Congress clearly intended to prevent windfalls
or double recoveries by resort to other state and federal laws. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9614(b), 9601(21)
(1995). It is logical to believe that Congress also intended to bar windfalls or double recoveries of
response costs by the government under CERCLA itself.
57. Unfortunately, most of the courts which have interpreted and applied Section 113(f)(2) to
date have done precisely that-they have analyzed and interpreted the language of that provision of
Section 113(f)(2) in a vacuum. See supra cases cited at note 39 and text accompanying supra note
41. That approach ignores the other provisions of SARA, the scheme which SARA establishes for
settlements, and the context in which Section 113(f)(2) should be viewed. See infra text
accompanying notes 118-119.
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1995). It provides, in pertinent part:
(I) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of
such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of
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104 of CERCLA is entitled "Response authorities." It is the first and most basic
provision of CERCLA. It addresses and defines the measures that can be taken
by.the President (or EPA)59 in responding to releases of hazardous substances.
Section 104(a)(1) permits the EPA to authorize or allow owners, operators, or
other responsible persons to implement the response actions or measures which
the EPA deems necessary at the site of a release, pursuant to settlement
agreements with those persons under Section 122 of CERCLA." Section
release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is
authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for
the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from any contaminated
natural resource), or take any other response measure consistent with the national
contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public health or
welfare or'the environment. When the President determines that such action will be done
properly and promptly by the owner or operator of the facility or vessel or by any other
responsible party, the President may allow such person to carry out the action, conduct
the remedial investigation, or conduct the feasibility study in accordance with section
9622 of this title.... In no event shall a potentially responsible party be subject to a
lesser standard of liability, receive preferential treatment, or in any other way, whether
direct or indirect, benefit from any such arrangements as a response action contractor,
or as a person hired or retained by such a response action contractor, with respect to the
release or facility in question.
(emphasis added).
This provision of Section 104(a)(l), like Section 113(f)(2), was added to CERCLA by SARA. See
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613,
1617-18 (1986), reprinted In I The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986: The
Legislative History 104-1 (The Inst. of Law and Public Health & Envtl. Inst. for Waste Management
Studies 1987) [hereinafter referred to simply as "SARA Notebook"]; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962,
at 6, 189 (Oct. 3, 1986) (Conference Report on H.R. 2005, Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986), reprinted In I SARA Notebook, at 104-3 ("The conference substitute
also provides that in no event shall a potentially responsible party be subject to a lesser standard of
liability or receive preferential treatment as a response action contractor or as a person hired or
retained by a response action contractor with respect to the release or facility in question.").
59. An executive order authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to take all
steps or actions which the President is authorized to take under CERCLA for and on behalf of the
President. See 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (1995); Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2,923 (1987), as
amended by Exec. Order No. 12,777, § 1(a), 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (1991) (delegating President's
authority under CERCLA, as amended by SARA).
60. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1), 9622(1995). Section 122 ofCERCLA sets out the terms and
conditions under which the EPA may enter into settlement agreements with PRPs.
Section 122(a) of CERCLA confirms the provisions of Section 104(aXl) which authorize the EPA
to allow owners, operators, or other responsible persons to implement or carry out response measures
pursuant to settlement agreements under Section 122 of CERCLA. It provides as follows:
The President, in his discretion, may enter into an agreement with any person (including
the owner or operator of the facility from which a release or substantial threat of a release
emanates, or any other potentially responsible person), to perform any response action
(including any action described in section 9604(b) of this title) if the President determines
that such action will be done properly by such person.
See id. § 9522(a).
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104(a)(1) also expressly provides, however, that no PRP who agrees to
implement or perform any such response measures or actions in a settlement
agreement under Section 122 shall "be subject to a lesser standard of liability,
receive preferential treatment, or in any other way, whether direct or indirect,
benefit from any such arrangements as a response action contractor... with
respect to the release or facility in question.""' Hence, the EPA is not entitled
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(aX1) (1995). The term "response action contractor" is not defined
in Section 104 of CERCLA, nor is that term defined for purposes of CERCLA generally. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9601 (1995 and Supp. 1997). Consequently, that term or phrase must be given its
ordinary or commonly understood meaning in interpreting Section 104(a)(1). If the term or phrase
"response action contractor" is given its normal or commonly understood meaning in the context in
which it is used in Section 104(a)(1), it must be interpreted as referring to and including any owner,
operator, or other responsible person who undertakes or agrees to perform, provide, or pay for any
response measures or actions in a settlement agreement with the United States under Section 122 of
CERCLA.
It is true that the term "response action contractor" is defined in Section 1 19(c)(2) of CERCLA,
but that term is defined in Section 119(e)(2) of CERCLA for purposes of Section 119 of CERCL4
only. See 42 U.S.C. § 9619(e)(2) (1995) ("For purposes of this section-... (the] term 'response
action contractor' means.., any person who enters into a response action contract with respect to
any release or threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant from a
facility .... ") (emphasis added). It is also clear, from the provisions of Section 119 of CERCLA
that deal with the liability of "response action contractors," as that term is defined in that section, that
Section 119 of CERCLA is not intended to limit and does not limit the liability of PRPs who
undertake or agree to perform response measures or actions in settlement agreements with the
government under Section 122 of CERCLA. Section 119 appears to be addressed to and to provide
limitations of liability for contractors who are hired by the government, PRPs, or others to perform
response measures or actions at a site, but who are not PRPs themselves and do not otherwise have
any liability with respect to the site. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9619(bXl), 9619(c)(1), (2), (5)(A), (5)(C),
9619(d) (1995). See also 132 Cong. Rec. H9591-9592 (Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Kindness),
reprinted in 2 SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at H9591:
In so doing, Mr. Speaker, I believe it absolutelycritical that for purposes of legislative
history, the language of the statement of managers be viewed as the best and most
accurate expression of the intent of the House and Senate on this matter. There can be
no doubt that the language of the conference report is the best evidence as to what it is
the Congress decided. Mr. Speaker, I single out the issue of response action contractor
liability for attention .... [Tihe statement of managers does reflect a strong realization
that response action contractors are differently situated than responsible parties in the
Superfund process .... Because they are in a fundamentally different position than
responsible parties and because responsible parties will always remain liable for the
injuries and damages their wastes create, it makes little sense to ask those who clean up
the sites to "bet the store" every time they clean up a site .... Superfund hai always
been based on the principal [sic] that the "'polluter pays." A negligence standard for
cleanup contractors in no way undermines that concept.
(emphasis added); 131 Cong. Rec. S 11860 (Sept. 20, 1985) (statement of Sen. Bentzen) reprinted
in 2 SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at SI 1860:
Last of all, I have clarified the definition of what constitutes a "response action
contractor" and excluded them from the parties that would otherwise be liable under this
law .... Similarly, a person who is already a potentially responsible party would not
be relieved of its liability by becoming a response action contractor. These provisions
will protect contractors from unusual financial exposure due to the unavailability of
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to enter into settlement agreements that would allow PRPs to pay less than the
total of their equitable shares of the response costs that have been and will be
incurred at the site. Any settlement agreement between the government and
PRPs for less than the total of the PRPs' equitable shares of the response costs
that have been and will be incurred at the site would clearly constitute
preferential treatment of those PRPs.
Similarly, the EPA is not entitled to offer PRPs discounts on their equitable
shares of the response costs at the site as an inducement to get them to come
forward and settle or as a reward for their cooperation. PRPs are expected, at
a minimum, to pay their equitable shares of the response costs at a site and to
cooperate in the cleanup, whether they do so through settlement or not. 2
environmental insurance. At the same time. it prohibits potentially responsible parties
from evading liability by developing response action capability of the corporation.
(emphasis added). Qr 42 U.S.C. § 9607(dXl), (3) (1995), quoted in Infra note 62.
62. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1), 9607(dXl), (3) (1995) ("Except as provided in paragraph (2),
no person shall be liable under this subchapter for costs or damages as a result of actions taken or
omitted in the course of rendering care, assistance, or advice in accordance with the National
Contingency Plan ('NCP') or at the direction of an onscene coordinator appointed under such plan,
with respect to an incident creating a danger to public health or welfare or the environment as a
result of any releases of a hazardous substance or the threat thereof. This paragraph shall not
preclude liability for costs or damages as the result of negligence on the part of such person ....
This subsection shall not alter the liability of any person covered by the provisions ofparagraph (1).
(2). (3). or (4) of subsection (a) of this section with respect to the release or threatened release
concerned.") (emphasis added).
The Gore Amendment would have permitted PRPs to receive reductions in their liability for the
response costs at a site or a credit for coming forward and settling or cooperating in the cleanup.
For a more thorough discussion of the Gore Amendment, see infra note 75. In addition, several
courts have also suggested that EPA can appropriately grant PRPs reductions in their equitable shares
of the response costs at a site or give those PRPs credit for coming forward and entering into
settlements or cooperating in the cleanup. See, e.g., United States v. DiBiase, 45 F.3d 541, 546 (1 st
Cir. 1995) ("In most instances, settlement requires compromise. Thus it makes sense for the
government, when negotiating, to give a PRP a discount on its maximum potential liability as an
incentive to settle. Indeed, the statutory scheme contemplates that those who are slow to settle ought
to bear the risk of paying more if they are eventually found liable."); United States v. Charles George
Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d 1081, 1087 (Ist Cir. 1994)("With this in mind, the proper way to gauge the
adequacy of settlement amounts to be paid by settling PRPs is to compare the proportion of total
projected costs to be paid by the settiors with the proportion of liability atributable to them, and then
to factor into the equation any reasonable discounts for litigation risks, time savings, and the like that
may be justified."); United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 99 F.2d 79 at 88 (1st Cir. 1990); In re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1032 (D.Mass. 1989).
The problem with these assertions is that they are contrary to the express mandate of Section
104(a)(l), the "polluter pays" principle, and Congress' goal of eliminating "sweetheart deals." The
Gore Amendment does not provide any support for a conclusion that the EPA or the government can
give settling PRPs discounts on their equitable shares of the response costs at a site. It was rejected
by Congress, and can not possibly supersede or contradict the express language of Section 104(a)(1),
which was adopted by Congress. The courts' assertions that the EPA or the government can grant
settling PRPs discounts on their equitable shares of the response costs at a site are similarly
unavailing-those assertions simply can not stand in light of the express language of Section
104(a)(1).
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Section 104(a)(1) therefore recognizes and ensures that one of the central
objectives or goals of CERCLA-the "polluter pays" principle-will be
vindicated. It ensures that the persons who are responsible for releases of
hazardous substances will, at the very least, be required to pay their equitable
shares of the costs incurred in responding to those releases. They are not entitled
to a discount or to avoid paying their full equitable shares of the response costs
by simply coming forward and cooperating.
In addition, Section 113(0(3) of CERCLA also supports the conclusion that
neither the United States nor the states are supposed to enter into settlements
with PRPs which require those persons to pay less than their full equitable shares
of the response costs at the site. Section 113(f)(3)(B) expressly reserves the
rights of settling parties to seek contribution from nonsettlors. It provides:
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a
State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs
of such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement
may seek contribution from any person who is not a party to a
settlement referred to in paragraph (2).
This provision assumes that the settling parties have paid more than their
equitable shares of the response costs. Obviously, there is no need to preserve
the rights of settling parties to seek contribution from nonsettlors, unless the
settlors pay more than their full equitable shares of the response costs at the site
to the government. The settlors are not entitled to seek contribution from the
nonsettlors under either the UCFA approach or the UCATA approach, unless the
amounts they pay to the government in the settlement exceed their full equitable
shares of the response costs.63 Under the scheme of CERCLA, as amended by
SARA, the government is not supposed to settle with PRPs for less than their
equitable shares of the response costs at a site. The government is expected to
enter into settlements with PRPs for amounts which exceed their equitable shares
of the response costs at the site, and the threat of joint and several liability and
the other enforcement tools available to the government under CERCLA are
designed to produce that result. That is why Congress deemed it necessary to
63. See UCFA § 4, 12 U.L.A. 142 (1996) ("A right of contribution exists between or among
two or more persons who are jointly and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same
injury, death, or harm, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or any of them. It
may be enforced either in the original action or by a separate action brought for that purpose. The
basis for contribution is each person's equitable share of the obligation, including the equitable share
of a claimant at fault, as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2."); id. § 5, at
145-46 ("(a) If the proportionate fault of the parties to a claim for contribution has been established
. . ., a party paying more than his equitable share of the obligation . may recover judgment for*
contribution."); UCATA § 1(b), 12 U.L.A. 194-95 (1996) ("(b) The right of contibution exists only
in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his
total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is
compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability.").
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preserve the contribution rights of settling parties against nonsettlors-so that a
fair allocation or apportionment of response costs could be obtained through
subsequent actions by the PRPs for contribution. Consequently, Section 113(0
itself supports the conclusion that the government cannot settle with PRPs for
less than their equitable shares of the response costs at a site, and will usually
settle with PRPs for amounts which exceed their equitable shares of the response
cost at a site.
Furthermore, Section 122(e) of CERCLA reinforces the conclusion that the
government should not settle with PRPs for less than their equitable shares of the
response costs at a site. Section 122(e)(3)(E) provides, in pertinent part:
Where the President, in his discretion, has provided a nonbinding
preliminary allocation of responsibility and the potentially responsible
parties have made a substantial offer providing for response to the
President which he rejects, the reasons for the rejection shall be
provided in a written explanation."
Section'122 of CERCLA does not specify what constitutes a "substantial
offer providing for response" for purposes of that provision. The Conference
Report on SARA does elaborate on the meaning of that phrase, as used in the
scheme for nonbinding preliminary allocations of responsibility, however. The
Conference Report declares:
Section 122(e)(3)(E) provides that when the President has issued a
non-binding preliminary allocation of responsibility, and a potentially
responsible party has made a substantial -offer for a response action
which the president rejects, the President shall provide a written
explanation of such rejection.
In implementing this provision, the President will establish
threshold-percentage criteria governing situations when the explanation
needs to- be provided. A substantial offer is one which represents a
commitment by the potentially responsible parties to undertake or
finance a predominant portion of the total remedial action. Any
substantial offer must provide for response or.costs of response for an
amount equal to or greater than the cumulative total, under the [non-
binding preliminary allocation of responsibility], of the potentially
responsible parties making the offer. For a substantial offer to exist, all
other terms must be agreed to.6'
This language demonstrates that Congress contemplated in CERCLA, as
amended by SARA, that the government would not enter into any settlements
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(c)(3XE) (1995).
65. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 256-67 (October 3, 1986) (Conference Report on H.R.
2005, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986). reprinted In I SARA Notebook,
supra note 58, at 122-4 (relating to Section 122 of CERCLA) (emphasis added).
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with PRPs for amounts less than the total of those persons' equitable shares of
the response costs at a site. That is why the government is not required to
explain its decision to reject offers of settlement for less than those amounts
under Section 122(e)(3)(E). The government is not authorized to enter into
settlements with PRPs for less than those amounts, and would be violating the
mandates of the statute if it did so. The government is only required to explain
its decisions to reject offers of settlement for amounts which equal or exceed the
cumulative total of the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at the site
and which represent a commitment by those parties to undertake or finance a
predominant portion of the total response measures that will be required at the
site-i.e., substantial offers providing for response.
In addition, the EPA has expressly rejected suggestions that it should
negotiate or enter into "fair share" settlements with major PRPs, and has
consistently taken the position, under both CERCLA and CERCLA as amended
by SARA, that it will only enter into settlements with PRPs when the amounts
to be paid pursuant to those settlements exceed the total of the settlors' equitable
shares of the response costs at a site and which constitute a "substantial
proportion" of the response costs at the site. Thus, the EPA's own approach and
policy with respect to settlements supports the conclusion that it does not believe
that it can or should enter into settlements with major PRPs under CERCLA
unless the amounts to be paid pursuant to those settlements equal or exceed the
settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at a site.
When considered against the backdrop of this scheme, the provision of
Section 113(f)(2) which declares that a settlement between the government and
PRPs "reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the
settlement" is not inconsistent with the UCFA approach to determining the effect
of settlements upon the potential liability of the nonsettlors, and cannot possibly
be viewed as the linchpin of any "disproportionate liability scheme." The reason
is quite simple. The amounts of the settlements should equal or exceed the
equitable shares of the settling parties. If they do not, the government is not
authorized to enter into those settlements by the statute.
That fact also strongly suggests that the purpose of that provision in Section
113(0(2) was not to embrace or adopt the UCATA approach, but to prevent
windfalls or double recoveries by the government in situations where the amount
of the settlement exceeds the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at
the site. The provision accomplishes that purpose by reducing the potential
liability of the nonsettlors by the full amount of the settlement, rather than the
settlors' equitable shares of the response costs, when the amount of the settlement
exceeds the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs-a result that would
not otherwise follow under the UCFA approach. By doing so, that provision of
Section 113(0(2) limits the government's claims against the nonsettlors to that
portion of the response costs at the site which have not yet been paid, rather than
the nonsettlors' equitable shares of the response costs at the site. Additional
support for that view of Section 113(f)(2) can be found in the other provisions
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of CERCLA which prohibit windfalls or double recoveries by any persons,
including the government."
Finally, the other provisions of CERCLA and SARA establish that the
government will seldom, if ever, be liable for any shortfalls if it settles with
PRPs for less than their equitable shares of the liability. Consequently, the
government's interests and enforcement authority should not be significantly
limited or impaired as a result of the fact that it may occasionally be forced to
bear the risks of its own settlements-mi.e., the risks that the amounts for which
it settles with PRPs may be less than the equitable shares of those PRPs-under
the UCFA approach. This conclusion is buttressed by several considerations.
Generally speaking, the government does not have any difficulty in
negotiating settlements with PRPs for more than the total of the settlors'
equitable shares of the response costs at a site. The tools granted the government
under CERCLA and the threat of joint and several liability for all of the response
costs at the site ensure that it will have no trouble doing so."' The government
routinely negotiates settlements with major parties (as opposed to de minimis
parties) which require those parties to pay more than their equitable shares of the
response costs. In fact, the government usually will not even consider entering
into a settlement with a major party or group of major parties that only requires
that party or group of parties to pay their equitable shares of the response costs
at a site; it is not worth the government's time or trouble to do so.6 ' The
66. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9614(b), 9601(21) (1995). The pertinent portions of these provisions are
quoted in supra note 13.
67. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), (bX1), 9607(cX3), 9604(aXI),9607(a) (1995). These provisions
are discussed in greater detail in infra note 131.
68. See, e.g., Letter from Courtney Price and Lee Thomas, Assistant Administrators, EPA, to
EPA Regional Personnel (Dec. 12, 1983) [hereinafter referred to as the "1983 Guidance"] (outlining
EPA's Hazardous Waste Case Settlement Policy), reprinted in Hazardous Waste Litigation 1984, at
94-103 (Practicing Law Institute, Litigation Course Handbook No. 251, 1984) (In the 1983 Guidance,
EPA indicated that it would allow mixed funding settlements only in extremely narrow circumstanc-
es, and that it would accept settlement offers from PRPs only if those offers were for 80% or more
of the total response costs at a site); EPA Hazardous Waste Enforcement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034,
5036, 5038 (1985) [hereinafter referred to as the "1985 Policy"] (In the 1985 Policy, EPA stated that
it would only be willing to negotiate with PRPs if their initial offer was adequate to cover "a
substantial portion of the costs of cleanup at a site or a substantial portion of the needed remedial
action." EPA also affirmed the fact that it would only be willing to enter into settlements with PRPs
which required them to pay more than their allocable shares of the response costs at a site where it
appeared that collection of all of the response costs at the site would otherwise be impossible).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 9622(eX3)(E) (1995). ("Where the President, in his discretion, has provided
a nonbinding preliminary allocation of responsibility and the potentially responsible parties have
made a substantial offer providing for response to the President which he rejects, the reasons for the
rejection shall be provided in a written explanation."). Under 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(E) (1995), the
EPA need only provide a written explanation of the rejection of a settlement offer if that offer was
a "substantial" one. An offer is considered to be "substantial" under Section 9622(eX3)(E) only if:
(1) it provides for "response or costs of response equal to or greater than the cumulative
total (liability], under the NBAR, of the ... parties making the offer;"
(2) it is for a "predominant portion of the total remedial action"; and
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government is usually willing to enter into settlements with major parties at a site
only if those settlements will provide for or cover a major portion of the overall
remedial actions that are needed or the response costs that will be incurred at the
site.6 9
Consequently, such settlements almost always require the settling parties to
pay more than their equitable shares of the response costs at the site. That is
why Section 113(0(3) expressly preserves the settlors' rights to seek contribution
against nonsettlors. Therefore, there is very little risk that the government will
settle with PRPs for less than their equitable shares of the response costs at a
site, and very little risk that there will be any shortfalls between the settling
PRPs' equitable shares of the response costs and the amounts of their settlements
with the government. Accordingly, the government should be able to recover all
of the costs it incurs in responding to releases of hazardous substances in almost
all cases, even if the UCFA approach is followed.
Furthermore, settlements between the government and major PRPs under
CERCLA are materially different from the types of settlements that can give rise
to problems with shortfalls under the UCFA approach. Section 122 of CERCLA
authorizes the government to include provisions allowing future enforcement
actions against the settling PRPs in connection with known conditions or
problems in such settlements,"0 and requires the government to include an
exception to any covenants not to sue contained in settlements with PRPs for
unknown or unanticipatedconditions or problems at the site, unless extraordinary
circumstances exist.7' As a result, settlements between the government and
(3) it is acceptable, in all its terms, to EPA.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 254 (Oct. 3, 1986) (Conference Report on H.R. 2005, Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3343.
69. Id.
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(c), (f)(6)(C) (1995). Section 9622(0(6)(C) declares:
(C) The President is authorized to include any provisions allowing future enforcement
action under section 9606 or 9607 of this title that in the discretion of the President are
necessary and appropriate to assure protection of public health, welfare, and the
environment.
71. See id. § 9622(f)(6)(A), (B). Those sections of Section 9622(0(6) declare:
(A) Except for the portion of the remedial action which is subject to a covenant not to
sue under paragraph (2) or under subsection (g) of this section (relating to de minimis
settlements), a covenant not to sue a person concerning future liability to the United States
shall include an exception to the covenant that allows the President to sue such person
concerning future liability resulting from the release or threatened release that is the
subject of the covenant where such liability arises out of conditions which are unknown
at the time the President certifies under paragraph (3) that remedial action has been
completed at the facility concerned.
(B) In extraordinary circumstances, the President may determine, after assessment of
relevant factors such as those referred to in paragraph (4) and volume, toxicity, mobility,
strength of evidence, ability to pay, litigative risks, public interest considerations,
precedential value, and inequities and aggravating factors, not to include the exception
referred to in subparagraph (A) if other terms, conditions, or requirements of the
agreement containing the covenant not to sue are sufficient to provide all reasonable
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major parties under CERCLA, unlike ordinary settlements, do not usually
preclude further action by the government against the settlors for response
actions or costs in connection with the known conditions or problems at a site
(although such settlements may limit or specify the parameters of such action),
and almost never preclude further action by the government against the settlors
for response actions or costs in connection with unknown or unanticipated
conditions or problems at a site. Those "reopener" provisions of the settlements
eliminate, for the most part, the danger that the government might be forced to
absorb any significant shortfalls between the settling PRPs' equitable shares of
the response costs and the amounts of the settlements-especially where
unknown or unanticipated conditions and problems are concerned.
Thus, the only cases in which the government might not be able to recover
all of its response costs under the UCFA approach are those in which the
government underestimates the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs in
connection with the known conditions or problems at a site, agrees to settle for
less than the settlors' equitable shares of those response costs, and is able to
demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the court which approves the settlement, that
the available evidence supports the conclusion that the equitable shares of the
settlors are smaller than those shares subsequently prove to be. Situations of that
type may sometimes arise when the government has received inaccurate,
incomplete, or misleading information or evidence. In those cases, which should
not occur often,72 it is not unfair to require the government to bear the risks of
its settlement and absorb any shortfalls, rather than the nonsettlors. The
government usually has better and more extensive information than the PRPs, has
superior bargaining power, and negotiates and agrees to the settlement. The
nonsettling PRPs may not be involved in the settlement negotiations at all, do not
consent or agree to the settlement, and usually are not afforded a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the settlement, even though it will, by operation of law,
bar their claims for contribution.73 Consequently, the government's interests
and enforcement authority should not be significantly limited or impaired by the
use of the UCFA approach.7 '
assurances that public health and the environment will be protected from any future
releases at or from the facility.
72. Given the requirements of Section 104(aXI), the government should not even attempt to
enter into any settlements with PRPs until it has sufficient information to determine, with a
reasonable degree of certainty, the response costs which have been and will be incurred in connection
with a site and the settling PRPs' equitable shares of those costs.
73. See infra notes 174-191 and accompanying text
74. It is also unlikely that the use of the UCFA approach will have any adverse effect upon the
negotiation and approval of de minimis settlements under Section 122(g) of CERCLA (i.e., 42 U.S.C.
§ 9622(g) (1995)). The reason, again, is simple. The use of the UCFA approach, rather than the
UCATA approach, to determine the effect of de minimis settlements upon the liability of nonsettlors
will not, as a practical matter, alter the effect of de minimis settlements upon the liability of
nonsettlors.
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B. The UCFA Approach is the Approach That is Most Consistent With the
Objectives and Policies of CERCLA and SARA
The objectives and policies of CERCLA and SARA also indicate that the
UCFA approach is the approach that is most consistent with CERCLA and
SARA, and should be followed in determining the effect of settlements between
the government and PRPs on the liability of nonsettling PRPs. In fact, the
overwhelming weight of authority under CERCLA and SARA establishes that
this is the case.
In order to fully and finally resolve their liability for the problems at a site, de minimis parties
must usually agree to pay an amount equal to the past and projected response costs at the site
attributable to their volumetric shares of the waste at the site, plus a substantial premium to cover
any uncertainty that may exist with respect to their volumetric shares of the waste at the site, their
shares of any cost overruns that may occur, and their shares of any additional response actions that
may be necessary at the site. See "Interim Guidance on Settlements with De Minimis Waste
Contributors under Section 122(g) of SARA," 52 Fed. Reg. 24,333, 24,338 (1987). See also United
States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85, 88-89 (1st Cir. 1990). Because the amounts which
de minimis parties must pay in order to fully and finally resolve their liability for the problems at
a site will usually equal or exceed the total of their equitable shares of the liability, de minimis
settlements will almost always reduce the liability of the nonsettlors by the amounts of those
settlements under the UCFA approach, as modified by Section 113()(2). Thus, nonsettlors will not
receive a greater reduction in their liability under the UCFA approach, as modified by Section
113((2), than they will under the UCATA approach in connection with de minimis settlements. In
fact, nonsettlors will receive the same reduction in liability under the UCFA approach, as modified
by Section 113((2). that they would receive under the UCATA approach where de minimis
settlements are concerned. Accordingly, it does not appear that the use of the UCFA approach to
determine the effect of de minimis settlements upon the liability of the nonsettlors will have any
adverse impact or effect upon de minimis settlements-it will not alter any of the considerations
which apply to such settlements or the effect of such settlements on the liability of the nonsettlors.
The EPA expressly recognized that any premium payments which de minimis settlors might be
required to make would reduce the liability of the nonsettlors in its "Interim Guidance on Settlements
with De Minimis Waste Contributors under Section 122(g) of SARA," 52 Fed. Reg. 24,333, 24,338
(1987). That guidance provides in pertinent part:
In addition to the volumetric share of past and projected response costs, the Agency
generally will require payment of a premium from each settling de minimis party in
exchange for granting a covenant not to sue which does not include reopeners for cost
overruns and future response action .... [I]f the major PRPs are assuming the
responsibility for conducting the cleanup, then the premium amounts may be made
available to those PRPs rather than to the Agency. In this situation, the premium amounts
may be negotiated between the major PRPs and the de minimis settlors .... The
premium payment reduces the liability of the nonsettling PRPs in the amount of the
premium, unless otherwise provided in the settlement agreement.
Id. at 24,338, 24,338 n.9. It should be noted, however, that the last portion of the statement from
the guidance is incorrect. Under Section I I3((2), the premium payment will reduce the liability
of the nonsettling PRPs by the amount of that premium payment, whether the settlement agreement.
provides otherwise or not. The erroneous statement in the guidance is simply another reflection of
the EPA's attempts to incorporate UCATA and the UCATA approach irto CERCLA, as amended
by SARA, even though Congress rejected the EPA's efforts to do so in Section 113(0(2). See infra
text accompanying notes 89-113.
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Almost every court that has considered the effect that settlements between
private parties7 should have on the liability of nonsettlors under CERCLA, both
pre-SARA and post-SARA, has concluded that the UCFA approach is most
consistent with the objectives and policies of CERCLA and should be followed
in determining the effect of those settlements on the liability of the non-
75. Settlements between private parties and their effect on the potential liability of nonsettlors
under CERCLA are not expressly addressed in CERCLA. Section 113(0(2) of CERCLA only
addresses and applies to settlements between "the United States or a state' and PRPs under Section
122 of CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2), (3) (1995).
Section 11 3((l) and Section 11 3(g)(3) are the only sections of CERCLA that appear to apply to
settlements between private parties. Section 113(0(1) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially
liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under section
9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in
accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be
governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate.
(emphasis added).
Several courts have held that it is appropriate for them to utilize the "Gore factors" in allocating
or apportioning response costs among liable parties under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1995). See, e.g.,
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Western
Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 938 (W.D. Wash. 1990); Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F.
Supp. 78, 86 (D.Me. 1988), afftd, Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dingwell, 884 F.2d 629 (lst Cir. 1989);
United States v. Hardage, 116 F.R.D. 460, 465-66 (W.D. Okla. 1987); United States v. A&F
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1256-57 (S.D. Ill. 1984). The "Gore factors" are a set of criteria
for allocating or apportioning liability among PRPs from an amendment to CERCLA which Congress
rejected. The amendment, known as the "Gore Amendment," would have allowed the courts to
allocate or apportion liability among PRPs according to the following equitable factors, instead of
imposing joint and several liability upon them:
(i) each PRP's ability to prove that its contribution is distinguishable from that of the
other PRPs;
(ii) the amount of hazardous waste attributable to each PRP;
(iii) the toxicity of each PRP's waste;
(iv) each PRP's involvement in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or
disposal of the waste;
(v) the degree of care that each PRP exercised in those activities; and
(vi) the extent to which each PRP cooperated with government officials in preventing
further harm.
See H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. § 3071(3)(BXi)-(vi) (1980).
Consideration of the extent to which PRPs cooperated with government officials in preventing
further harm in allocating costs among jointly and severally liable PRPs is not only inappropriate but
contrary to the express terms of Section 104(a)l). Section 104(aXl) declares that no PRP "shall be
subject to a lesser standard of liability, receive preferential treatment, or in any other way, whether
direct or indirect, benefit from" its cooperation in or conduct of any cleanup. See 42 U.S.C, §
9604(aXI) (1995). A criterion from a rejected amendment can not possibly prevail over the express
language of Section 104(a)(l).
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settlors.7' Those courts have held that the UCFA approach is the approach that
is most consistent with the objectives and policies of CERCLA because:
(1) the UCFA encourages settlements in complex multi-defendant
CERCLA actions by relieving the settlors from any liability to
nonsettlors (the UCFA approach allows a settlor to buy its peace from
the claimant in the action and thereby free itself completely from claims
for contribution or further involvement in the litigation);"
(2) the UCFA approach offers the advantage of a built-in assurance of
fairness to nonsettlors (the UCFA approach protects nonsettling
defendants by ensuring that their liability will reflect only their
responsibility for the cleanup costs-i.e., their equitable shares of the
cleanup costs as finally determined at the close of the litiga-
76. See, e.g., Steams & Foster Bedding v. Franklin Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp. 790, 813
(D.NJ. 1996); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer and Lake Erie R. Co., 936 F. Supp. 1274, 1278-79
(E.D. Va. 1996); Hillsborough County v. A & E Road Oiling Serv., Inc., 853 F. Supp. 1402, 1408-
10 (M.D. Fla. 1994). (In this case, the court held that the UCFA approach was the approach most
consistent with the objectives and policies of CERCLA and the approach that should be applied to
determine the effect of private party settlements on the potential liability of nonsettlors. The court
declared: "[Tlhe intent of Congress and the purposes of CERCLA are inextricably intertwined: To
achieve 'the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste sites,' and fairly allocate the costs of the clean-up
to those responsible for the contamination.' ... UCFA effectively embraces both prompt clean-up
and fair allocation."); Barton Solvents, Inc. v. Southwest Petro-Chem, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 342, 346
(D.Kan. 1993); United States v. SCA Servs. of Indiana, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 526, 533-36 (N.D. Ind.
1993); American Cyanamid Co. v. King Indus., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D.RIJ. 1993); Western
Processing, 756 F. Supp. at 1430-32; Lyncott Corp. v. Chemical Waste Mgt., Inc., 690 F. Supp.
1409, 1417-19 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., Case No. 85-
Cl 142, 1987 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11961, at *4-8 (N.D. II1. Dec. 2, 1987). See also New York v. Exxon
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 683, 683 n.9, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Marc L. Frohman, Rethinking the
Partial Settlement Credit Rule in Private Party CERCLA Actions: An Argument in Support of the
Pro Tanto Credit Rule, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 711, 748-49 (1995); Lynette Boomgaarden and Charles
Breer, Surveying the Superfund Settlement Dilemma, 27 Land & Water L. Rev. 83, 111-12 (1992).
A small minority of the courts that have considered the question have held that the UCATA
approach is the approach that should be followed in determining the effect of private party
settlements on the potential liability of nonsettlors. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines,
Inc., 836 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Okla. 1993); Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. 340 (D. Colo.
1993); Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626 (D.N.J. 1990). See also Frohman, supra, at 760, 760
n.21 1.
. 77. See UCFA § 6. 12 U.L.A. 126, 147 (1996) ("A release, covenant not to sue, or similar
agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges the person liable from all liability
for contribution .... ").
Under the UCATA, settlors can still be sued for contribution, if it is subsequently found that the
settlement was not negotiated and executed in "good faith" and is unfair to the nonsettlors-i.e., that
the settlement was the product of collusion or was arrived at without due consideration or regard for
the interests of the nonsettlors. See UCATA § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 264 (1996) ("When a release or a
covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons
liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death: ... (b) It discharges the tortfeasor to
whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.").
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tion-regardless of the amounts paid by the settling defendants to the
claimant); 7
(3) the UCFA approach relieves the courts of the need to conduct good
faith or fairness hearings in connection with the settlements (there is no
need for good faith or fairness hearings because the proportionate credit
approach of the UCFA is not based upon the amount of the settlement);
(4) settlements involving non-monetary consideration, such as
agreements to implement or perform response actions which do not
limit or specify the costs or value of those actions, are more easily
handled under the UCFA approach, since the proportionate credit
approach of the UCFA is not based upon the amount of the settlement;
(5) complex partial settlements involving multiple parties, claims, or
theories are more easily handled because the court does not have to
allocate or divide the credit that will be received as the result of such
a settlement among those parties, claims, or theories before trial, as it
would under the UCATA approach; and
(6) total settlement is encouraged after partial settlement because a
culpable nonsettlor cannot escape responsibility for the full amount of
his equitable share of the response costs when settlors pay more than
their equitable shares of the response costs and cannot gamble on a jury
verdict in view of a guaranteed credit. 9
78. See UCFA § 6, 12 U.L.A. 147 (1996) ("The claim of the releasing person against other
persons is reduced by the amount of the released person's equitable share of the obligation .... );
UCFA § 2(c), 12 U.L.A. 135-36 (1996) ("The court shall determine the award of damages to each
claimant in accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction under Section 6, and enter
judgment against each party liable on the basis of the rules of joint-and-several liability.").
Under the joint and several liability scheme of the UCFA, a nonsettling defendant may be held
liable to a claimant who is not a PRP-i.e., a claimant who is pursuing a cost recovery action, rather
than a contribution action-for more than his equitable share of the response costs at a site. In fact,
he may be held liable to the claimant in a cost recovery action for all of the nonsettlors' equitable
shares of the response costs at the site. The nonsettling defendant who is held liable for more than
his equitable share of the response costs at the site in a cost recovery action, however, retains his
contribution rights against the other nonsettlors, and can recover any amounts that he is forced to pay
in order to satisfy the other nonsettlors' equitable shares of the response costs from those nonsettlors.
A claimant who is a PRP with respect to a site and is pursuing a contribution action, rather than
a cost recovery action, cannot recover more than a nonsettlor's equitable share of the response costs
at the site from that nonsettlor. See UCFA § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 142 (1996) ("A right of contribution
exists between or among two or more persons who are jointly and severally liable upon the same
indivisible claim for the same injury, death or harm .... The basis for contribution is each person's
equitable share of the obligation ... as determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.").
79. See, e.g., SCA Serv., 827 F. Supp. at 535-36 ("The UCFA will better promote CERCLA's
policy of encouraging settlements, while securing equitable apportionment of liability for Non-
settlors. No good faith hearing to evaluate the settlement agreements is required under the UCFA
because its comparative fault rule is not based upon the amount of the settlement. Since SCA bears
the risk that the Settlors' share of the remediation costs could be greater than the settlement amount,
it is in SCA's best interest to negotiate a settlement which closely proximates the Settlors' reasonable
share of the cleanup costs."); King Indus., 814 F. Supp. at 218; Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvent
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At first glance, Section 113(0(2) appears to defeat one of the advantages of
the UCFA approach to determining the effect of settlements on the liability of
nonsettlors-the fact that total settlement is encouraged after partial settle-
ment-where settlements between the government and PRPs are concerned. It
appears to do so because Section 113(0(2) provides that settlements between the
government and PRPs reduce the liability of the nonsettling PRPs to the
government by the amount of the settlement. Accordingly, if the settlors pay
more than their equitable shares of the response costs in the settlement, the
nonsettlors, who will receive a guaranteed reduction in their liability to the
government equal to the amount of the settlement, may be tempted to gamble on
a verdict, since they will avoid responsibility for at least a portion of their
equitable shares of the response costs, even if they lose.
In reality, however, Section 113(0(2) does not eliminate or defeat that
advantage of the UCFA approach with respect to settlements between the
government and PRPs. Under the UCFA approach, total settlement is still
encouraged after partial settlement, despite the language of Section 113(f)(2), for
several reasons. First of all, the mere fact that the nonsettlors will receive a
guaranteed reduction in their potential liability to the government does not mean
that they have an incentive to litigate the question of their liability for the
remainder of the response costs at the site. It probably still will not make sense
for them to do so, in light of the fact that they could be held jointly and
severally liable for the remainder of the response costs and will, in all likelihood,
be held so liable."0 In addition, the fact that nonsettlors receive a guaranteed
Reclaiming, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 219, 223 (N.D. II. 1990) ("Another advantage of the comparative
fault rule is that it does not require that the court conduct a hearing to determine the settlement's
fairness to non-settling defendants .... In a complex case such as this one, a fairness hearing would
be long and arduous. Holding a hearing in this case would negate the benefits, such as finality and
reduced costs, which a settlement otherwise offers to the settling parties .... The comparative fault
rule protects non-settling defendants by assuring them that they will not be liable for more than their
equitable share as finally determined at the close of the litigation. Thus, the need for a fairness
hearing is negligible, especially relative to its potential harm to the settlement process."); Comerica
Bank-Detroit v. Allen Indus., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 1408, 1414-15 (E.D. Mich. 1991) ("This court adds
its voice to the growing chorus of federal courts which have applied the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act to CERCLA settlements .... By protecting settling defendants from claimants for contribution,
it advances CERCLA's policy of encouraging settlements. It does not, however, hang the non-
settling defendants out to dry, and [it] negates the need for an evidentiary hearing to determine the
fairness and good faith of the settlement. Since the claimant bears the risk that the settling
defendant's proportionate share of the clean-up costs may be greater than settlement amount, it will
be in the best interest of the claimant to obtain a settlement that is closely related to the probable
proportionate shale for which the settling defendant would have been responsible."); Western
Processing, 756 F. Supp. at 1432 ("The UCFA, on the other hand, avoids the inequity of nonsettlors
having to absorb shares of responsibility not allocable to solvent responsible parties, and solves
problems of settlements involving nonmonetary consideration."); Exxon, 697 F. Supp. at 683; 683
n.9, 689; Chemical Waste Management, 690 F. Supp. at 1417-18;'Vulcan Materials, 1987 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 11961, at *4-8.
80. The courts which have suggested that nonsettlors may be tempted to litigate or gamble on
a jury verdict in light of the fact that they will receive a guaranteed credit as a result of the settlement
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reduction in their potential liability to the government equal to the amount of the
settlement does not mean that their ultimate liability is limited to the difference
between the respdnse costs atthe site and the amount of the settlement, or that
they will be able to avoid responsibility for any portion of their eqiaitable shares
of the response costs. If the settlors pay more than the total of their equitable
shares of the response costs in the settlement, the settlors can seek recovery of
the difference between the amount of the settlement and their equitable shares of
the response costs from the nonsettlors in contribution actions.s Consequently,
nonsettlors do not receive a guaranteed credit or a guaranteed reduction in their
ultimate liability as the result of a settlement under Section 113(f) of CERCLA;
they only receive a guaranteed reduction in their liability to the government.
Finally, where litigation costs are high, the plaintiff has sufficient bargaining
power, and the PRPs' equitable shares are sufficiently different-factors which
are almost always present when the government seeks recovery of response costs
from nonsettling PRPs-the UCFA approach does at least as much to encourage
total settlement (permitting prompt remedial action) as the UCATA approach,
and may do more to encourage total settlement than the UCATA approach. s2
under the UCATA approach are probably wrong. The assertions to that effect appear to be based
upon an oversimplification of the factors affecting the nonsettlors' decisions to litigate or settle and
a lack of appreciation for or understanding of the strategic situations of those parties. See, e.g.,
Lewis A. Komhauser and Richard L. Revesz, Settlements Under Joint And Several Liability, 68
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 427, 434, 487-88 (1993).
8). See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)3)(B) (1995) ("A person who has resolved its liability to the
United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such
action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from any person
who is not a party to a settlement .... ).
Section 113(f)(3XB) represents a marked departure from the UCATA. The UCATA does not
permit settlors to pursue claims for contribution against nonsettlors who are released from any further
liability to the claimant in the settlement. See UCATA § I(d), 12 U.L.A. 194-95 (1996) (A
tortfeasor who enters into settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from
another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the
settlement .... ). That is why nonsettlors are usually able to treat the amount of the settlement as
a "guaranteed .credit" under the UCATA approach-settlements do not usually release nonsettlors
from any further liability to the claimant.
. 82. See Komhauser and Rcvesz, supra note 80, at 434, 466-69, 485-87, 488-91, 492-93;
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 214-16, 216 n.24, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1468-69, 1469 n.24
(1994). In AmClyde, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted the UCFA approach to determining the
effect of settlements upon the liability of nonsettlors in admiralty cases, rather than the UCATA
approach. The Court declared that the UCFA or proportionate share approach was more consistent
with the proportionate fault rule it had adopted for admiralty matters in United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397,409, 95 S. Ct. 1708,1714 (1975); that the pro tanto approach had no clear
advantage in promoting settlements; that it was not necessary to risk the inequitable apportionments
of liability that might result from adoption of the pro tanto approach in order to promote settlements;
and that any additional incentive to settle that might result from adoption of the pro tanto approach
would come "at too high a price in unfairness." AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 213-16, 114 S. Ct. at 1467-69.
All of these considerations apply with equal force to settlements between the government and PRPs
under CERCLA, and are relevant to the manner in which Section 113(0(2) should be interpreted,
given the goals of CERCLA and the statutory scheme for achieving those goals.
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Consequently, Section 113(0(2) will not prevent the realization of any of the
advantages which the UCFA approach offers with respect to private party
settlements in connection with settlements between the government and PRPs.
However, Section 113(0(2) will help eliminate most, if not all, of the
disadvantages of the UCFA approach that have been identified in the context of
private party settlements. The disadvantages of the UCFA approach which the
courts have identified in the context of private party settlements are the
following:
(1) the fact that recovery of the exact amount of the damages or costs
fixed by the trier of fact will be entirely fortuitous when there has been
a partial settlement, as the nonsettlors will be required to pay only their
fair share of those damages or costs, regardless of the amounts of the
settlements;
(2) the fact that the nonsettlors will only be required to pay their fair
share of the damages or costs, regardless of the amounts of the
settlements, may impair the claimant's willingness to settle because of
the uncertainty as to the amount of the credit that the nonsettlors will
receive for the settlements; and
(3) the fact that, at trial, the claimant must not only advocate its own
freedom from fault or responsibility, but convince the trier of fact of the
settlors' minimal fault or responsibility. 3
CERCLA's prohibition on settlements between the government and PRPs for
less than their equitable shares of the response costs at a site, coupled with
Section 1 13(0(2)'s mandate that settlements between the government and PRPs
reduce the potential liability of nonsettlors by the amounts of the settlement,
eliminate each and every one of these disadvantages. First of all, the amounts
by which such settlements will reduce the potential liability of the nonsettlors to
the claimant is not uncertain-it should always be the amount of the settlement
because the amount of the settlement should always equal or exceed the total of
the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at the site. 4 In addition,
because the amounts of such settlements must always equal or exceed the total
Section 113(0(2) will limit or restrict the application of the UCFA approach, where the amount
of a settlement between the government and PRPs exceeds the total of the settling PRPs' equitable
shares, and will prevent windfalls or excess recoveries by the government in such situations. That
fact will limit the operation of the UCFA approach to some extent, and will reduce its ability to
promote or encourage total settlement. It is doubtful, however, that this fact means that the UCATA
approach will do more than the UCFA approach to promote or encourage total settlement in
CERCLA actions. In addition, it is clear that the UCFA approach is more consistent with the
comparative fault approach employed by CERCLA for apportioning response costs, and that it will
do far more to promote CERCLA's goal of allocating response costs among PRPs in an equitable
manner. Id.
83. See, e.g., SCA Serv., 827 F. Supp. at 534-35.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66.
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of the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs, the claimant need not
worry about convincing the trier of fact of the settlors' minimal fault or
responsibility at trial. Finally, because such settlements must always be for
amounts which equal or exceed the cumulative total of the settlors' equitable
shares of the response costs at the site, the recovery of the exact amount of the
damages or costs which will be incurred at a site is not fortuitous. The
nonsettlors will remain jointly and severally liable for the difference between the
total costs that will be incurred in responding to the releases at the site and the
aggregate amount of any such settlements. That difference will always be less
than or equal to the cumulative total of the nonsettlor's equitable shares of the
response costs at the site, and will always be the exact amount which the
government needs to recover in order to receive the total costs incurred in
responding to the releases at the site.
Furthermore, prior to the adoption of SARA, the EPA was willing, in some
situations, to structure settlements between the United States and PRPs under
CERCLA in such a manner as to make those settlements and their effect on the
potential liability of nonsettlors consistent with the approach that would obtain
under the UCFA. The EPA found it necessary to structure settlements with
major parties in that manner in those situations in order to provide the parties
with the assurances of finality necessary to induce them to enter into the
settlements. The EPA's Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy provided, in
pertinent part:
Contribution among responsible parties is based on the principle
that a jointly and severally liable party who has paid all or a portion of
a judgment or settlement may be entitled to reimbursement from other
jointly or severally liable parties. When the Agency reaches a partial
settlement with some parties, it will frequently pursue an enforcement
action against non-settling responsible parties to recover the remaining
costs of cleanup. If such an action is undertaken, there is a possibility
that those nonsettlors would in turn sue settling parties. If this action
by non-settling parties is successful, then the settling parties would end
up paying a larger share of cleanup costs than was determined in the
Agency's settlement. This is obviously a disincentive to settlement.
Contribution protection in a consent decree can prevent this
outcome. In a contribution protection clause, the United States would
agree to reduce its judgment against the non-settling parties, to the
extent necessary to extinguish the settling party's liability to the non-
settling third party. 5
Thus, the practice in settlements between the United States and PRPs under
CERCLA, prior to the adoption of SARA, was to structure those settlements in
85. See Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034, 5043 (1985).
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a manner that would yield the same results as the UCFA approach, where it was
necessary to do so in order to obtain settlements.
Finally, both the courts and the commentators who addressed the effect of
settlements between the government and PRPs on the liability of the nonsettlors
prior to the adoption of SARA found that the UCFA approach was the approach
most consistent with the objectives and policies of CERCLA and the approach
that should be followed to determine the effect of those settlements on the
liability of the nonsettlors. The court in United States v. Conservation Chemical
Company, 6 the first case to address the issue, expressly held that the effect of
a settlement between the United States and PRPs on the liability of nonsettlors
should be determined under the UCFA approach, because the principles of the
UCFA "[were] the most consistent with, and [did] the most to implement, the
Congressional intent which is the foundation for CERCLA." s7 Furthermore, at
least one commentator concluded, after an exhaustive analysis of the rights to
contribution for response costs under CERCLA, as that statute existed prior to
the adoption of SARA, that the UCFA approach should be followed in
determining the effect of settlements between the government and PRPs on the
potential liability of nonsettlors."
86. 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
87. See United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 402 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
When the EPA published its Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy on February 5, 1985, and
indicated that it would provide the contribution protection described above in settlements between
the government and PRPs where it was necessary to do so in order to effect a settlement, the EPA
noted that it believed the UCATA should apply to such settlements and provide contribution
protection to the settling parties as a matter of law. The EPA expressly noted, however, that whether
the approach of the UCATA would be adopted as the federal rule of decision with respect to such
settlements was still an open question. See Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, 50 Fed. Reg. 5034,
5043 (1985).
The decision in United States v. Conservation Chemical Co. on December 12, 1985, answered that
question for settlements between the government and PRPs executed prior to the adoption of SARA.
Conservation Chem., 628 F. Supp. at 391. It expressly rejected the EPA's argument that the UCATA
approach should be adopted as the federal rule for such settlements, and adopted the UCFA approach
as the federal rule in determining the effect of such settlements on the potential liability of
nonsettlors. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 361-63.
88. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 364-65 ("Once a court has decided that a right to
contribution exists under CERCLA, it must then address the question of apportioning that
contribution. Presently, there is no uniform American rule on how to equitably apportion
contribution. Some states have used the rule that 'equality is equity' and require that each tortfeasor
pay an equal pro rata share. Other states use comparative fault to determine the amount that each
tortfeasor should pay. Under that approach, each person pays an amount based on his percentage of
fault for a given result. The comparative fault approach represents the trend in the area of
contribution. The legislative history and the aims of the Act indicate that courts should opt for the
comparative fault approach in CERCLA cases. Court decisions and the recent proposed amendments
to CERCLA adopted by the House support such an approach. These sources suggest that a court
should use its broad equitable powers to determine the fair share' owed by each party.") (emphasis
added).
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Accordingly, the great weight of authority indicates that the UCFA approach
is the approach that is most consistent with the objectives and policies of
CERCLA, and the approach that should be followed in determining the effect of
private party settlements on the liability of nonsettlors, both pre-SARA and post-
SARA. It was also the approach that was used to determine the effect of
settlements between the government and PRPs on the liability of nonsettling
PRPs under CERCLA prior to the adoption of SARA.
The only question that remains is whether the adoption of Section 113(0(2)
alters that result for settlements between the government and PRPs executed after
SARA's effective date. Analysis of the history and language of Section
113(0(2), the other provisions of SARA, the scheme which the other provisions
of SARA establish for settlements between the government and PRPs, and
congressional intent in SARA indicates that Section 113(0(2) was not intended
to and does not displace or prevent the use of the UCFA approach to determine
the effect of settlements between the government and PRPs on the liability of
nonsettlors.
C. The Language and History of Section 113(0(2) Do Not Support the
Conclusion That Congress Intended to Adopt the UCA TA Approach in
Section 113()(2)
The history and language of Section 113(0(2) do not support the conclusion
that Congress intended to adopt the UCATA approach in Section 113(f)(2). It
is true, as all of the courts who have considered the question have observed, that
Section 113(0(2) adopts a pro tanto or dollar-for-dollar rule for use in
determining the effect of settlements between the government and PRPs on the
liability of the nonsettling PRPs-one with language that is similar to the pro
tanto or dollar-for-dollar rule employed by the UCATA. Section 113(f)(2)
declares, in pertinent part, that such a settlement "reduces the potential liability
of the others by the amount of the settlement." 9 That Congress adopted a pro
tanto or dollar-for-dollar rule in Section 113(f)(2) that is similar to the pro tanto
or dollar-for-dollar rule used in the UCATA, however, does not mean that
Congress meant to adopt the UCATA approach to determine the effect of
settlements between the government and PRPs on the liability of nonsettling
PRPs, or that Congress meant to preclude the use of the UCFA approach to
determine the effect of those settlements on the liability of nonsettling PRPs.
If Section 113(0(2) had been intended to adopt the UCATA approach or to
bar the UCFA approach which the courts were using prior to SARA, the "matter
would not have been left so at large" by Congress, as Judge Hand observed in
NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp." In fact, the language and the history of
Section 113(f)(2) indicate that Congress did not intend to adopt the UCATA
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (1995).
90. 179 F.2d 749, 752 (2d Cir. 1950).
1997]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
approach to determine the effect of settlements upon the liability of nonsettlors
when it adopted the pro tanto rule found in Section 113(0(2).
This conclusion rests primarily upon two considerations. First, and most
important, the language of the pro tanto rule in Section 113(0(2) differs in
several significant respects from the language of Section 4(a) of UCATA, the
provision which sets out the UCATA approach to determining the effect of
settlements upon the liability of nonsettlors. Section 4(a) of UCATA provides,
in pertinent part:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment
is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for
the same injury or the same wrongful death:
(a) ... it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of
the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater .... 91
Section 113(0(2), on the other hand, states that "[s]uch [a] settlement ...
reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement."'92
If Congress had intended to adopt the approach of the UCATA to deternine the
effect of government settlements upon the liability of nonsettlors in Section
113(0(2), it is reasonable to believe that Congress would have pointed us in that
direction. Congress might have referred to the UCATA in the text of the statute
or in the debates and conference reports on Section 1 13(0(2). Or it could have
incorporated the language of the UCATA in Section 1 13(f)(2)."' In actuality,
however, Congress did not do any of these things. The fact that Congress did
not do so indicates that it did not intend to adopt the approach of UCATA to
determine the effect of government settlements upon the liability of nonsettlors,
or to reject the approach of the UCFA, when it enacted Section 1 13(0(2).
Second, the legislative history of Section 113(0(2) establishes that the
differences in the language of the pro tanto rule found in Section 1 13(0(2) and
the language of Section 4(a) of UCATA-i.e., Section 1 13(f)(2)'s use of the
term "potential liability," rather than the term "claim," and Section 1 3(f)(2)'s
use of the phrase "amount of the settlement," rather than "'any amount stipulated
by the release or covenant or ... the amount of the consideration paid for it
whichever is the greater"-were intentional, and were designed to ensure that
nonsettlors would not be forced to absorb any shortfalls between the settlors'
91. See UCAT Act § 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 264 (1996) (emphasis added).
92.. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f(2) (1995) (emphasis added).
93. See Barry S. Neuman, No Way Out? The Plight of the Superfund Nonsettlor, 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10,295, 10,30) (July 1990) ("On the other hand, §1 13()(2) of CERCLA is not identical to the
key provision of the UCATA. If Congress had clearly intended to rely on the latter, the best way
to manifest that intent would have been to use its language. Instead, Congress provided that a
settlement would reduce the potential liability against nonsettlors by the amount of the settlement.");
Elizabeth F. Mason, Contribution. Contribution Protection, and Nonsettlor Liability Under CERCL4:
Following Laskin's Lead, 19 B.C. Envti. Aff. L. Rev. 73, 124 (1991).
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equitable shares of the response costs at a site and the amounts paid by the
settlors to the government in a settlement. When Congress began considering the
reauthorization of CERCLA, the EPA proposed legislation containing language
almost identical to that found in Section 4(a) of UCATA for use in determining
the effect of settlements between the government and PRPs upon the liability of
nonsettlors. The legislation proposed by the EPA provided, in pertinent part:
[such a] settlement does not discharge any of the potentially liable
persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the claim against the
others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the settlement.94
Following the introduction of the legislation proposed by the EPA in the
Senate, it was referred to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works for consideration. After a hurried mark-up session, the Committee on
Environment and Public Works approved the legislation proposed by EPA with
only a few changes.9" It then amended the provisions of Senate Bill 5 1, another
94. See S. 494, 99th Cong. § 202 (1985) (proposing new Section 107(k)(3)); H.R. 1342, 99th
Cong. § 202 (1985) (proposing new Section 107(k)(3)). S. 494 was introduced in the Senate on
February 22, 1985 (legislative day of February 18, 1985). H.R. 1342 was introduced in the House
on February 28, 1985.
95. See S. 51, 99th Cong. § 126 (1985) (proposing CERCLA § 107(l)(3)), reprinted in I
SARA Notebook, supra note 58, 113-57.
When H.R. 2817 was introduced in the House it contained language that was similar, if not
identical, to that of the legislation proposed by the EPA, and tracked the language of Section 4(a)
of UCATA much more closely than Section 113(0(2) does. H.R. 2817, 99th Cong. § 2 (June 20,
1985) (proposing a new CERCLA § II 3(g)2)), reprinted In I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at
113-54. Consequently, most of the committees in the House which considered H.R. 2817 produced
bills containing language that was very similar, if not identical, to the language quoted above, and
which tracked the language of UCATA much more closely than Section 1]3((2) does. H.R. Rep.
No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 13 (1985) (H.R. 2817 as reported by the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce (proposing a new CERCLA § 11 3(g)2)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58,
at 113-28; id., pt. 5, at 186 (1985) (as reported by the House Committee on Public Works and
Transportation (proposing a new CERCLA § I I 3(f)(2)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note
58, at 113-30.
The lone exception was the House Committee on the Judiciary. Its version of Section 113
contained language that is almost identical to the language that was ultimately adopted. That is not
surprising, in light of the fact that its version of Section 113 is the one that was contained in H.R.
3852 (i.e., H.R. 2817 as agreed upon by the House committees for purposes of floor consideration)
and its version of Section 113 is the one that was adopted by the House in H.R. 2005 and by the
Committee of Conference (with certain technical and clarifying changes). See H.R. Rep. No. 99-253,
pt. 3, at 2 (1985) (H.R. 2817 as reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary(proposing a new
CERCLA § 11 3(g)(2)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-33; H.R. 3852, 99th
Cong. (1985) (H.R. 2817 as agreed upon by the House Committees for purposes of floor
consideration (proposing new CERCLA § 113(0(2) and (3)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra
note 58, at 113-23; H.R. 2005, 99th Cong. § 2 (1985) (H.R. 2005 as passed by the House(proposing
new CERCLA § 113(f)(2)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-5; H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 99-962, at 42, 224-25 (Oct. 3, 1986) (Conference Report on H.R. 2005, Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at
113-2 to 113-3.
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bill that had been introduced and was being considered by the Senate, by striking
out everything in Senate Bill 51 following the enacting clause and replacing the
former text of Senate Bill 51 with the Committee on Environment and Public
Works' marked-up version of the legislation proposed by the EPA."
Two of the changes that the Senate Committee on Environment And Public
Works made in the legislation proposed by the EPA, however, involved the
contribution'provisions of that legislation. 7 In the first of those changes, the
Committee substituted the term "potential liability" for the term "claim" in the
contribution provisions proposed by the EPA." In the second of those changes,
the Committee added a clarification to the contribution provisions that was more
consistent with the EPA's preferences. The clarification declared:
Where the United States or a State has obtained less than complete
relief from a person who has resolved its liability to the United States
or State in a good faith settlement, the United States or a State may
bring an action for the remainder of the reliefsought against any person
who has not so resolved its liability."
Following the introduction of the legislation proposed by the EPA in the
House, the House amended the contribution provisions of House of Representa-
tives Bill 2817, a bill that had previously been introduced in the House and was
already being considered by it, by substituting the term "potential liability" for
the term "claim" in those provisions."ir Thus, both the House and the Senate
96. See S. 494, 99th Cong. (1985) (introduced in the Senate by Senator Stafford at the
administration's request and referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works on
February 22, 1985 (legislative day of February 18, 1985)); S. 51, 99th Cong. (1985) (reported by
Senator Stafford, with an amendment, on March 7, 1985 (legislative day of February 18, 1985)).
97. See S. 494, 99th Cong. § 202 (1985) (proposing new Section 107(k) of CERCLA); S. 51,
99th Cong. § 126 (1985) (proposing new Section. 107(l) of CERCLA).
98. See S. 494, 99th Cong. § 202 (1985) (proposing new Section 107(k)(3)); S. 51, 99th Cong.
§ 126 (1985) (proposing new Section 1070X3)). See also S. 51, 99th Cong. (1985) (S. 51 as
introduced on Jan. 3, 1985), reprinted In I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-64; S. 51, 99th
Cong. § 126 (1985) (S. 51 as reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
on March 7, 1985 (proposing a new CERCLA § 1070X3)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra
note 58, at 113-57; H.R. 2005, 99th Cong. § 135 (1985) (H.R. 2005 as passed by the Senate
(proposing a new CERCLA § 1070)(2)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-16;
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 42 and 225 (Oct. 3, 1986) (conference Report on HR. 2005,
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986), reprinted In I SARA Notebook, supra
note 58, at 113-2 to 113-3.
99. S. 51, 99th Cong. § 126 (1985) (Section 113 as reported by the Senate Committee on the
Environment and Public Works (proposing a new CERCLA § 107(IX4)), reprinted in I SARA
Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-57 (emphasis added). .
100. H.R. 2817, 99th Cong. § 2 (1985) (H.R. 2817 as introduced on June 20, 1985 (proposing
a new CERCLA § 113(g)(2)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-54; id. (as
reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary on Oct. 31, 1985), reprinted in 1 SARA
Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-33; H.R. 3852 (H.R. 2817 as agreed upon by the House Committees
for purposes of floor consideration on Dec. 4, 1985), 99th Cong. § 113(0(2) (1985), reprinted in I
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expressly rejected the use of the term "claim"-the language from Section 4(a)
of UCATA proposed by the EPA-in the contribution provisions of the bills that
were passed by the House and the Senate and ultimately became Section
113(0(2). Both the House and the Senate chose, instead, to use the term
"potential liability" in the contribution provisions of those bills.
Consequently, the use of the term "potential liability" rather than the term
"claim" in those contribution provisions cannot be dismissed or ignored. It was
deliberate and purposeful. And its purpose was to eliminate the possibility that
the size of the government's claims against nonsettlors would be governed solely
by the terms of earlier settlement agreements.'' Congress sought to achieve
that purpose by making it clear, through the use of the term "potential liability"
rather than the term "claim," that the potential liability of the nonsettlors in
connection with the site might be less than the total response costs at the site,
and that settlements might operate to reduce the liability of the nonsettlors by
more than the amounts stipulated in the settlements or the amounts of the
settlements, precluding the government from recovering the difference between
the total response costs at the site (i.e., the amount of the government's "claim")
and the amounts stipulated in the settlements or the amounts of the settlements
from the nonsettlors." 2
SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-23; H.I 2005, 99th Cong. §113(b) (1985) (H.R. 2005 as
passed by the House (proposing a new CERCLA § 113(f)(2)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra
note 58, at 113-5; H.L Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 42, 225 (Oct. 3, 1986) (Conference Report on
H.L 2005, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986), reprinted in I SARA
Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-2 to 113-3.
101. See Mason, supra note 93, at 124-26; Alfred R. Light, The Importance of "Being Taken
To Clarify and Confirm the Litigative Reconstruction of CERCL4 's Text, 18 B.C. Envtl. Aft. L Rev.
1. 25, 34-35 (1990) [hereinafter The Importance of "Being Taken"; Neuman, supra note 93, at
10,300-10,301; Alfred RL Light, Sweetheart, Goodnight?, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 659, 659-60
(1989); Alfred P- Light SARA's Consequences: The Emerging Legal Debate Over Liability,
Contribution, And Administrative Law, in Hazardous Waste Litigation after the RCRA and CERCLA
Amendments 1987, Litigation Course Handbook Series-Number 326, at 57, 65-66 (Practicing Law
Institute 1987) [hereinafter SARA s Consequences).
102. Id. See also 131 Cong. Rec. SI 1855 (1985) (statement of Sen. Stafford), reprinted in 2
SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at S 11855. ("Also, where the United States or a State has secured
a partial settlement, it may seek relief for any of the remaining response action or costs for which
the nonsettlors are liable.") (emphasis added). That statement suggests that the Senate recognized,
and the contribution provisions were intended to recognize, that the nonsettlors might not be liable
for all of the response costs at a site, that the liability of the nonsettlors might be reduced by more
than the amount of the settlement, or both.
The phrase "to the extent of any amount stipulated by the settlement" was not deleted from the
EPA's proposed contribution provision by any of the amendments in question. It was carried forward
in the amended contribution provisions of S. 5 1, and was adopted with those provisions in S. 51, the
Superfund bill passed by the Senate. [After 7 days of debate, the Senate passed S. 51 on September
26, 1985. Because of the constitutional requirement that tax bills originate in the House, the text of
S. 5 I, as amended during the debate, was inserted in a House-passed measure, H.R. 2005, a bill that
originally proposed minor amendments to the Social Security Act.) See S. 51, 99th Cong. § 126
(1985) (proposing a new CERCLA § 1070)(3)); H.R. 2005, 99th Cong. § 135 (September 26, 1985)
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Furthermore, in subsequent hearings, senators from the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary criticized other aspects of the contribution provisions of Senate
Bill 51, including the clarification that had been added by the Committee on
Environment And Public Works, because those aspects of the contribution
provisions appeared to be inequitable and inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.' 3 Thereafter, members of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary sponsored a set of amendments on the Senate floor that changed the
language of the proposed contribution provisions in two significant respects.'°4
First, language allowing defendants in cost recovery actions to seek contribution
from other PRPs inimediately was substituted for language prohibiting defendants
in cost recovery actions from seeking contribution until the actions against them
had been concluded by judgment or settlement in what is now Section 113(0(1)
of CERCLA.'05 Second, the phrase "for the remainder of the relief sought"
(H.R 2005 as passed by the Senate (adding a proposed new Section 107(1)(2) to CERCLA)),
reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-16. It does not appear in Section 113(0(2),
however, because the Superfund bill passed by the House contained different language. It provided
that settlements between the government and PRPs reduced the potential liability of nonsettling PRPs
"by the amount of the settlement," rather than "to the extent of any amount stipulated by the
settlement." H.L 2005, 99th Cong. § 113(b) (1985) (H.R. 2005 as passed by the House (adding a
proposed new Section 113(0(2) to CERCLA)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at
113-5. The substitute provision that was agreed upon by the Senate and the House at the conference
to reconcile the differences between the two bills adopted Section 113(0 from the House bill, with
certain clarifications and modifications. CERCLA § 113(f)(2), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra
note 58, at 113-1; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 42, 224-25 (Oct. 3, 1986) (Conference Report on
H.R. 2005, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986), reprinted in I SARA
Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-2 to 113-3. The adoption of the phrase "by the amount of the
settlement" over the phrase "to the extent of any amount stipulated by the settlement" in the
conference substitute was consistent with the Senate's intent, in its earlier amendments, to move away
from the language of Section 4(a) of UCATA and eliminate any implication that the size of the
government's claims against nonsettlors would be governed exclusively by the terms of earlier
settlements. See the authorities cited in supra note 101. It therefore appears to provide further
support for the proposition that Congress did not intend to adopt the UCATA approach to determine
the effects of settlements between the government and PRPs on the liability of nonsettling PRPs.
In fact, it appears to indicate, like the Senate's earlier amendments to the contribution provision
proposed by the EPA, that the pro tanto rule adopted by the Senate and by the Congress in Section
S13(0(2) was intended to prevent windfalls or double recoveries by the government under the UCFA
approach by establishing that the nonsettlos were entitled, at a minimum, to a reduction in their
liability equal to the amount of the settlement.
103. See Insurance Issues And Superfund: Hearing on S. 99-61 Before the Senate Comm. on
Env't and Public Works, 99th Cong. 20-22 (1985); Superfund Improvement Act of 1985, Hearing
on S. 99-415 Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 74, 77-78, 91-93, 99-101 (1985).
104. 131 Cong. Rec. S11854-11858 (1985) (statement of Sen. Stafford), reprinted in 2 SARA
Notebook, supra note 58, at S1 1854-11858.
105. See Id.; S. 51, 99th Cong. § 126 (1985) (proposing new Sections 1070)(1) and (2) of
CERCLA); H.R. 2005, 99th Cong. § 135 (1985) (H.R.2005 as passed by the Senate (adding a.
proposed new Section 107(l)(1) to CERCLA)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at
113-16; H.R 2005, 99th Cong. § 113(b) (1985) (H.R. 2005 as passed by the House (adding a
proposed new Section 113(0(1) to CERCLA)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at
113-5; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 41-42, 224-25 (Oct. 3, 1985) (Conference Report on H.L
[Vol. 58
J. WHITNEY PESNELL
that had been added to the EPA's proposed contribution provisions by the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works was deleted."0'
The purpose of the amendments, which were negotiated with and agreed to
by both the EPA and the Departient of Justice,"0 7 was to: (a) ensure that the
2005, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986), reprinted in I SARA Notebook,
supra note 58, at 113-2 to 113-3; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1995).
Under the legislation proposed by the EPA, defendants in cost recovery actions would have been
precluded from seeking contribution from other PRPs until the cost recovery actions had been
concluded by judgment or settlement. See H.R. 1342, 99th Cong. § 202 (1985) (proposing new
Section 107(k)(1), (2)); S. 494, 99th Cong. § 202 (1985) (proposing new Section 107(kXl), (2)).
The EPA wanted to prevent the PRPs it chose to target in cost recovery actions from complicating
and delaying the progress of those actions by bringing in a number of other PRPs as third party
defendants in those actions. The EPA felt that a provision delaying the assertion of contribution
claims by the PRPs it chose to target until after it had obtained a judgment against those PRPs or
settled its claims against those PRPs would enable it to obtain judgments against or settlements from
the target PRPs much more quickly and force the target PRPs to clean up sites more quickly.
Both the Senate and the House rejected the provisions of the legislation proposed by the EPA that
would have delayed the assertion of contribution claims by PRPs in cost recovery actions. Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, Superfund Improvement Act of 1985, S. Rep. No.
99-11, at 43-45 (March 18, 1985; S. 51, 99th Cong. § 126 (1985) (S. 51 as reported by Senate
Committees on May 24, 1985 (adding a proposed new Section 107(l)(1) to CERCLA)); H.RL 2005,
99th Cong. § 135 (1985) (H.R. 2005 as passed by the Senate (adding a proposed new Section
107(l)(1) to CERCLA)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-16; H.R. 2817, 99th
Cong. § 113(b) (1985) (proposing a new Section 113(g)(1) of CERCLA), reprinted in I SARA
Notebook, supra note 58, at 13-54; H.R. 3852,99th Cong. § 113(b) (1985) (proposing a new Section
113(0(1) of CERCLA), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-23; H.R. 2005, 99th
Cong. § 113(b) (1985) (H.R. 2005 as passed by the House (adding a proposed new Section 113(0(1)
to CERCLA)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-5; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962,
at 4-42, 224-25 (Oct. 3, 1986) (Conference Report H.R. 2005, Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, at 113-2; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(l)
(1995). They recognized, as the Senate Committee on the Judiciary had, that delaying the assertion
of contribution claims in such actions would require the PRPs who were identified as defendants in
the cost recovery actions to shoulder or bear disproportionate liability for the response costs incurred
at the sites, at least temporarily (i.e., until their contribution claims could be asserted and established),
and believed that that result was both inequitable and inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See supra the authorities cited in note 103.
106. 131 Cong. Rec. S 1854.11858 (1985), reprinted in 2 SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at
S11854-SI 1858; H.R. 2005, 99th Cong. § 135 (1985) (H.R. 2005 as passed by the Senate (adding
a proposed new Section 107(1X3) to CERCLA)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at
113-17.
107. See 131 Cong. Rec. S11856-11857 (1985) (statement of Sen. Thurmond), reprinted in 2
SARA Notebook,, supra note 58, at S111856-11857:
Mr. President, I thank the able Senator, the chairman of the Committee on Environment
and Public Works for accepting these amendments. These amendments are not technical.
They go to the merits.... In the 18 days after the Committee on Judiciary had the bill,
we held 2 days of hearings. The hearings explored many aspects of the Superfund
Program... that had not previously been examined by the committee. Expert witnesses
from the administration, as well as from the business and environmental communities,
appeared before the committee to discuss S.51 and the Superfund Program. As a result
of these hearing [sic], I met with officinls from the Environmental Protection Agency and
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defendants in cost recovery actions could seek contribution from other PRPs prior
to the conclusion of those actions, thereby eliminating or minimizing the
possibility that the defendants in those actions might be required to shoulder the
burden of disproportionate liability for the response costs at a site for even a short
period of time; and (b) eliminate the possibility that the size of the government's
claims against nonsettlors would be governed exclusively by the terms of an
earlier settlement agreement.°'0 The amendments accomplished the first purpose
by allowing PRPs who are identified as defendants in cost recovery actions to seek
contribution from other PRPs in the early stages of those actions, pursuant to and
in accordance with the Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure.'" The amendments
attempted to further the second purpose-one which had arguably already been
addressed and accomplished by the substitution of the term "potential liability" for
the term "claim" in the mark-up session held by the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works-by deleting the phrase "for the remainder of the
relief sought" from the provision of Senate Bill 51 that ultimately became Section
113(f)(3). The deletion of that phrase from the contribution provisions, like the
earlier substitution of the term "potential liability" for the term "claim," was an
attempt to make it clear that settlements might reduce the liability of the
nonsettlors by more than the amounts stipulated in the settlements or the amounts
of the settlements, and prevent the government from recovering "the remainder of
the relief sought-i.e., the difference between the response costs at the site and the
amounts stipulated in the settlements or the amounts of the settlements-from the
nonsettlors. "' Thus, the legislative history of Section 113(0(2) shows that its
the Department of Justice to formulate an amendment package to address several of the
key issues which had surfaced during the Judiciary Committee review of this bill. Once
we were able to agree on the language for the amendments and the language to be used
in the explanatory statement--and Mr. President, I can assure my colleagues that each
word was painstakingly selected-I sought cosponsorship from the other members of the
Judiciary Committee. Ten members of the committee--a majority of the commit-
tee--joined together to support what came to be known as the Thurmond-EPA-DOJ
package.
(Emphasis added); Light, The Importance of"Being Taken, " supra note 101, at 10-11, 12-14; Light,
Sweetheart, Goodnight?, supra note 101, at 659-60.
108. See supra authorities cited in notes 101-106.
109. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. Congress believed that the imposition of
disproportionate liability on nonsettling PRPs for even short periods of time in order to simplify cost
recovery actions and expedite settlements and cleanups was unfair and inequitable, and rejected a
provision in Section 113(f)(1) that would have delayed the assertion of contribution claims by
nonsettling PRPs in cost recovery actions (resulting in the imposition of disproportionate liability on
those PRPs for short periods of time) for those reasons. It is highly unlikely that the same Congress
that rejected the temporary imposition of disproportionate liability on nonsettling PRPs in Section
113(f)(1) intended to adopt an approach that might result in the permanent imposition of
disproportionate liability on nonsettling PRPs in Section 113(0(2).
110. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. But see 131 Cong. Rec. S1855 (1985)
(statement of Sen. Stafford), reprinted in 2 SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at SI 1855. In his
remarks, Senator Stafford stated that the phrase "for the remainder of the relief sought" was being
deleted from the contribution provisions because those provisions expressly declared that the
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language does not support the conclusion that Congress meant to adopt the
UCATA approach to determining the effect of settlements between the govern-
ment and PRPs on the liability of nonsettling PRPs.
It is true that the amendments to EPA's proposed contribution provisions are
not models of draftsmanship or clarity, and that they may not adequately express
Congress' intentions with respect to the pro tanto rule in that provision and the
manner in which it was to operate. Indeed, it is the very language of the pro
tanto rule in Section 113(0(2), as amended, which the courts have seized upon
to justify their conclusion that Congress meant to adopt UCATA's approach to
determining the effect of settlements between the government and PRPs upon the
liability of the nonsettling PRPs."' The legislative history of that provision
simply does not permit such a conclusion, however. The legislative history
demonstrates that Congress started with the EPA's proposed rule, which closely
nonsettlors' liability would be reduced by the amount of the settlement, and the phrase "for the
remainder of the relief sought" was therefore redundant and unnecessary. He also characterized the
deletion of that phrase from the contribution provisions as a technical, rather than a substantive,
amendment. Id.
However, Senator Stafford's remarks concerning the nature of that amendment are suspect for
several reasons. First of all, Senator Stafford was not a member of the Committee on the Judiciary,
the committee which proposed and developed the amendment deleting the phrase "for the remainder
of the relief sought," and did not participate in the development of that amendment. He was a
member of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, and simply presented the amendments
to the Senate during the debate as a courtesy to Senator Thurmond, the Chaiman of the Committee
on the Judiciary. Id. at S11854 and 11856. Second, Senator Stafford's assertion that the deletion
of the phrase "for the remainder of the relief sought" was a technical, rather than a substantive,
amendment is directly contrary to the statements of Senator Thurmond, the chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary, who was personally involved in and oversaw the development of that
amendment. Indeed, the amendment was part of a set of amendments that came to be known as the
"Thurmond-EPA-DOJ package." Id. at S11857. Senator Thurmond expressly declared: "These
amendments are not technical. They go to the merits." Id. at S11856.
The argument made here, based upon the history and changes in the language of the provision that
ultimately became Section 113(f)(2), was rejected by the court in United States v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
721 F.. Supp. 666. 679 n.14 (D.N.J. 1989):
Rohm & Haas argues that by using the words "potential liability" rather than "judgment"
in § I 13(f)(2), Congress did not limit a court's inherent power in adjudicating a CERCLA
claim to award the Government less than the full amount of its claim minus the amount
of the settlement." Rohm & Haas Supp. Brief at 12. This is suggested, Rohm & Hans
says, by Section 113(0(3) which states that the United States "may" as opposed to
"shall," seek relief from other PRPs if it has obtained less than "complete relief" from a
settlement with other parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(3). "The fact that.. . § 113(0(3) did
not require EPA to recover 100% of its costs from nonsettlors suggests that Congress also
did not intend to diminish the court's power to award less than 100% of the claim."
Rohm & Haas Supp. Brief at 13 (emphasis in original). The problems with these
assertions are numerous. Suffice to say that we are not persuaded that § 113(0(2) is
merely some congressionally mandated minimum benefit to nonsettlors, upon which courts
may improve as they wish.
I 11. See supra notes 41 and 55 and accompanying text But see United States v. Laskin, No.
C84-2035Y, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4900, at "16-20 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 1989); Frohman, supra
note 76, at 760 n.21 1.
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tracked Section 4(a) of UCATA, rejected that rule (and the UCATA approach)
because it was unfair and inequitable, and amended it to produce the pro tanto
rule currently found in Section 113(0(2).
However, even if the legislative history of Section 113(f)(2) is rejected as
inconclusive, as at least one commentator has done,"' 2 the fact remains that
there are significant differences between the language of the pro tanto rule in
Section 113(0(2) and Section 4(a) of UCATA." Those differences make it
difficult to view the adoption of the pro tanto rule in Section 113(0(2) as an
adoption of the UCATA approach to determining the effect of settlements
between the government and PRPs on the liability of nonsettling PRPs-especi-
ally where, as here, the statutory scheme requires the equitable allocation or
apportionment of response costs among PRPs," the statutory scheme had, to
that point, been interpreted as requiring application of the UCFA approach to
determine the effect of both government and private party settlements on the
liability of the nonsettlors,"' and neither SARA nor its legislative history
contain any references to the adoption of the UCATA approach or the creation
of any disproportionate liability scheme.'
All of those considerations combine to make it far more likely that the pro
tanto rule contained in Section 113(0(2) was not intended as a rejection of the
UCFA approach or an adoption of the UCATA approach. Instead, it was
intended to limit the UCFA approach by providing that nonsettlors were entitled,
at a minimum, to a reduction in their liability equal to the amount of the
settlement, in order to prevent windfalls or double recoveries by the government
in situations where the amount of the settlement exceeds the total of the settlors'
equitable shares of the response costs at a site." 7
112. See Neuman, supra note 93, at 10,301, 10,301 nn.82 and 84.
113. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1); Laskin, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4900, at 016-20. Cf.
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 207-17, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1465-70 (1994). In AmClyde,
the United States Supreme Court concluded that the proportionate share approach of the UCFA was
the approach most consistent with the equitable allocation or apportionment required in admiralty
cases where both parties to a collision are at fault, pursuant to the Court's decision in United States
v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411, 95 S. CL 1708, 1715-16 (1975). The Court declared,
"(W]e are persuaded that the proportionate share approach is superior, especially in its consistency
with Reliable Transfer." See AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 217, 114 S. Ct. at 1470.
115. See generally United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (w.D. Mo. 1985)
(concerning government settlements).
116. See anfra note 124 and accompanying texL.
117. After all, Section 113(0(2) provides that a settlement between the government and PRPs
"reduces the potential liability of the [other PRPs] by the amount of the settlement." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f)(2) (1995). It does not provide that such a settlement can only reduce the potential liability
of the [other PRPsJ by the amount of the settlement, or that Section 113(f)(2) is the exclusive.
mechanism through which, or means by which, the potential liability of other PRPs can be reduced
as the result of a settlement. See supra discussion in note 38. See also Light, The Importance of
"Being Taken," supra note 101, at 25; Light, Sweetheart, Goodnight?, supra note 101, at 660. Cf
In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 957 F.2d 1020, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1992).
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D. The Other Provisions of SARA Do Not Support the Conclusion That
Congress Intended to Adopt the UCA TA Approach in Section 113()(2)
Even if one ignores the differences between the language of Section
113(f0(2) and the language of Section 4(a) of UCATA, the language of Section
113(0(2) still does not support the conclusion that Congress intended to adopt
the UCATA approach to determining the effect of settlements between the
government and PRPs on the liability of nonsettlors in Section 113(0(2). It is
possible to reach that conclusion if and only if the language of Section 113(0(2)
is the only thing considered.
The problem, of course, is that the language of Section 113(0(2) cannot
properly be considered standing alone and can not be interpreted in a vacuum.
It must be considered and interpreted in the context of the other provisions of
CERCLA and SARA and the scheme which those provisions establish for
settlements between the government and PRPs. When the language of Section
113(0(2) is considered in the context of the other provisions of CERCLA and
SARA and the scheme which those provisions establish for settlements between
the government and PRPs, the conclusion that that language constitutes an
adoption of the UCATA approach must be rejected. That conclusion simply does
not make sense in the context of those provisions and the scheme which they
establish for such settlements.
The other provisions of CERCLA and SARA establish that the government
cannot enter into a settlement with PRPs for less than the cumulative total of the
PRPs' equitable shares of the response costs which have been and will be
incurred at a site."' In addition, CERCLA and SARA clearly contemplate that
the government will ordinarily settle with PRPs for much more than the total of
those PRPs' equitable shares of response costs at a site, given the threat of joint
and several liability and the powerful tools available to the government in
responding to releases of hazardous substances." 9  Accordingly, under the
scheme of CERCLA, as amended by SARA, the government can only settle with
PRPs for amounts which equal or exceed the total of their equitable shares of the
response costs at a site.
When viewed against the backdrop of that scheme, the provision of Section
113(0(2) which declares that settlements between the government and PRPs
"reduce the potential liability of nonsettlors by the amounts of those settlements"
cannot reasonably be construed as an adoption of the UCATA approach or as the
linchpin of any "disproportionate liability scheme." The reason, again, is simple.
The amounts of the settlements should equal or exceed the equitable shares of
118. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1), 9613(f)(3XB), 9622(cX3XE) (1995). Those provisions and
the scheme which they establish are discussed in greater detail in the text accompanying supra notes
57-66.
119. See Id. §§ 9606(a), (b)(1), 9607(cX3), 9604(a)(1), 9607(a) (1995).
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the settling parties. If they do not, the government is not authorized to enter into
those settlements.
Furthermore, the pro tanto rule of Section 113(f)(2) is not inconsistent with
the use of the UCFA approach to determine the effect of settlements between the
government and PRPs on the liability of nonsettling PRPs. Under the UCFA
approach, the potential liability of nonsettlors is reduced by the settlors' equitable
shares of the response costs, regardless of the amount of the settlement. '
Consequently, if the government settles with PRPs for an amount which exceeds
their equitable shares of the response costs, the government is still entitled to
proceed against the nonsettlors for their full equitable shares of the response
costs. Thus, under the UCFA approach, the government may be able to recover
more than the total costs which are incurred in responding to the release of
hazardous substances at a site.12
Such windfalls or double recoveries of costs can be prevented, however,
through the adoption of a provision establishing that the nonsettling parties are
entitled, at a minimum, to a reduction in their liability equal to the amount of the
settlement. Under such a modified UCFA approach, settlements between the
government and PRPs would reduce the potential liability of the nonsettlors by
the greater of: (a) the total of the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs;
or (b) the amount of the settlement.
These considerations strongly suggest that the purpose of the pro tanto rule
in Section 1 13(0(2) was not to embrace or adopt the UCATA approach, but to
prevent windfalls or double recoveries by the government under the UCFA
approach in situations where the amount of the settlement exceeds the settlors'
equitable shares of the response costs at the site.' The provision accomplish-
es that purpose by reducing the potential liability of the nonsettlors by the full
amount of the settlement, rather than the settlors' equitable shares of the response
costs, when the amount of the settlement exceeds the settlors' equitable shares
of the response costs. This view of Section 113(f)(2) is also supported by the
other provisions of CERCLA, in which Congress expressly prohibited windfalls
or double recovery of costs by any person, including the government.' 23
120. See UCFA § 6, 12 U.L.A. 147 (1996). ("A release, covenant not to sue, or similar
agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liability for
contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so
provides. However. the claim ofthe releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount
of the released person's equitable share of the obligation .... ) (emphasis added).
121. See, e.g., Komhauser and Revesz, supra note 80, at 467-68.
122. See Mason, supra note 93, at 124-26; Light, The Importance of "Being Taken, " supra note
101. at 34-35; Neuman, supra note 93, at 10,300-10,302; Light, Sweetheart, Goodnight?, supra note
101, at 659-60; Light, SARA's Consequences, supra note 101, at 57, 65-67.
123. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9614(b), 9601(21) (1995). In 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b), Congress prohibits
persons who recover response costs under CERCLA from recovering for the same costs under any
other state or federal law, and prohibits persons who recover response costs under other state or
federal laws from recovering for the same response costs under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)
makes it clear that the prohibitions of 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) extend to the United States and states as
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E. The Legislative History of SARA as a Whole Does Not Support the
Conclusion That Congress Intended to Adopt the UCA TA Approach in
Section 113()(2)
The legislative history of SARA as a whole does not support the conclusion
that Congress intended to adopt the UCATA approach in Section 113(0(2) or to
create a "disproportionate liability scheme" in Section 113(0(2). The Conference
Report on SARA, the bills which were considered by the House and Senate prior
to the adoption of SARA, and the committee reports on those bills do not contain
any references to the UCFA, the UCATA, or any "disproportionate liability
scheme."'24 The fact that the UCFA and the UCATA were not mentioned in
any of these legislative background materials makes it highly unlikely that
Congress intended to reject the UCFA approach with respect to settlements
between the government and PRPs or to embrace the UCATA approach in
Section 113(f)(2). If Congress meant to reject one of those approaches or adopt
one of those approaches in lieu of the other in Section 113()(2), that fact would
have surely been noted in the committee reports on the bills that led to the
passage of SARA, the House and Senate debates on SARA, or the Conference
Report on SARA. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Congress intended to
create a "disproportionate liability scheme" in Section 113(0(2) when the bills,
amendments, and committee reports leading to the passage of SARA, the House
and Senate debates on SARA, and the Conference Report on SARA do not
mention, much less discuss, any such scheme.
In addition, the bills, amendments, and committee reports leading to SARA,
the House and Senate debates on SARA, and the Conference Report on SARA
indicate that Congress was at least as concerned, if not more concerned, with
preventing collusion and sweetheart deals,'25 vindicating the "polluter pays"
well as private parties.
The only measure necessary to complete the clear statement of policy against the double recovery
of response costs is a measure which prohibits persons from recovering for the same response costs
more than once under CERCLA. Section I 13(0(2) may be that measure.
124. See I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-2 to 113-64; id. at 122-4 to 122-68; 131
Cong. Rec. S11658-11677, 11679-11786, !!81I-11812, 11830-11868, 11898-11902, 11918-11920,
11926-11946,11955,11995-12034, 12054-12058 (1985), reprintedin 2 SARA Notebook, supra note
58,atSI 165S-11677,11679-11786,11811-11812,11830-11868,11898-11902,11918-11920,11926-
11946, 11955, 11995-12034, 12054-12058 (Debate on Senate passage); 131 Cong. Rec. HI 1069-
11122, 1 1143-11176, 11186-11207.11229-11233,11241-11246,11503-11504,11572-11595 (1985),
reprinted in 2 SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at H11069-11122, 11143-11176, 11186-11207,
11229-11233,11241-11246,11503-11504,11572-11595 (Debateon House passage); 132 Cong. Rec.
S14895-14938, 14943 (1986), reprinted in 2 SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at S14895-14938,
14943 (Senate Debate on Conference Report); 132 Cong. Rec. H9561-9634 (1986), reprinted In 2
SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at H9561-9634 (House Debate on Conference Report). See also
Neuman, supra note 93, at 10,302 n.87.
125. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Superfund Amendments of 1985, H.R. Rep. No.
99-253, pt. 1, at 59 (1985), reprinted In I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-44 ("Sweetheart
deals of the sort exposed by the Committee's investigations of earlier Superfund management abuses
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principle by making certain that settlements between the government and PRPs
required those persons to pay at least their equitable shares of the response costs
at sites,' requiring approval of such settlements by the courts to make certain
would be prevented, by requiring all voluntary agreements to be filed as consent decrees with a
Federal District Court. Further, the court could review the agreement, with citizen participation, to
insure that it is in the public interest."); 131 Cong. Rec. HI 1079 (1985) (statement of Rep. Roe),
reprinted in 2 SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at HI 1079 ("The EPA is given specific authority to
enter into settlement agreements with potentially responsible parties .... To avoid the so-called
sweetheart deals which may occur if the settlement process is abused, settlement agreements under
the section must be entered as consent and decrees and must be open for public review and
comment.").
126. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1), 9613(f)(3)(B), 9622(e)(3)(E) (1985); H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
99-962, at 256-57 (Oct. 3, 1986) (Conference Report on H.R. 2005, Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986), reprinted In I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 122-4:
Section 122(eX3)(E) provides that when the President has issued a non-binding
preliminary allocation of responsibility, and a potentially responsible party has made a
substantial offer for a response action which the President rejects, the President shall
provide a written explanation of such rejection. In implementing this provision, the
President will establish threshold percentage criteria governing situations where the
explanation needs to be provided. A substantial offer is one which represents a
commitment by the PRPs to undertake or finance a predominant portion of the total
remedial action. Any substantial offer must provide for response or costs of response for
an amount equal to or greater than the cumulative total, under the NBAit of the
potentially responsible parties making the offer. For a substantial offer to exist, all other
terms must be agreed to.
(emphasis added).
See also 132 Cong. Rec. S14918-14919 (Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Mitchell), reprinted in
2 SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at S14918-14919; 132 Cong. Rec. H9587 (Oct. 8, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Florio), reprinted In 2 SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at H9587:
The settlement provisions of the legislation are premised on the current Superfund
Liability System, which imposes strict, joint and several liability on those found
responsible under section 106 or 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act [CERCLA]. The importance of placing the settlement
procedures established under section 122 in the context of Superfund's liability scheme
cannot be underestimated. Settlements are an alternative to full prosecution of strictly,
jointly and severally liable parties and must always be evaluated in relation to the relief
the Government could have obtained by litigating the case. Because Superfund imposes
liability without regard to fault, and holds that when the harm is indivisible, each party
is jointly and severally liable for the full costs of cleanup, settlements for only a portion
of cleanup costs must be measured against a high standard. When a liability scheme is
as strong as the scheme contained in Superfund, recoveries of amounts less than full costs
are disfavored and may only be justified by exceptional circumstances.
See also 132 Cong. Rec. H9624 (Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Kolbe), reprinted in 2 SARA
Notebook, supra note 58, at H9624 ('liJt is not expected that the Agency will use mixed funding as
a quid pro quo for settlement, nor is mixed funding authority a device for obtaining fair share
settlements. The legislation maintains the strict, joint and several liability standards of current law,
as enumerated in the leading case, United States versus Chemdyne Corporation, as the principal
mechanism to obtain complete site cleanup by private parties.") (emphasis added); H.R. 2005, 99th
Cong. § 122, at 80-81 (H.R. 2005 as passed by the Senate on September 26, 1985 (proposing the
addition of a new Section 104(-)(7)(B) to CERCLA)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note
58, at 122-25 to 122-26:
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that they are adequate," 7 and fairness in the allocation or apportionment of
response costs among PRPs'" as it was with promoting or encouraging
Where potentially responsible parties offer to provide payment or the undertaking of
remedial action exceeding 50 per centur of the total shares as estimated by the President
in the Nonbinding Preliminary Allocation of Responsibility, and such offer provides for
response or costs of response for an amount equal to or greater than the cumulative total,
under the Nonbinding Preliminary Allocation of Responsibility, of the potentially
responsible persons making the offer, such an offer will be considered to be in "good
faith" and the Federal district court in the district in which the facility is located may
order the President to accept the offer.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d), (gX4) (1995). See also United States v. Charles George
Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d 1081, 1084-89 (Ist Cir. 1994); United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899
F.2d 79, 84, 85-92 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 680, 685-
86, 687, 694-97 (D.NJ. 1989).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1995); House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Superfund
Amendments of 1985, H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 79 (August I, 1985), reprinted in 1 SARA
Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-41 ("This section clarifies and confirms the right of a person held
jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties,
when the person believes that it has assumed a share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than
its equitable share under the circumstances."); House Comm. on Judiciary, Superfund Amendments
of 1985, H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 19 (October 31, 1985, reprinted in I SARA Notebook,
supra note 58, at 113-48:
The Judiciary Committee amendment to new subsection 113(g)(2) of CERCLA also
clarifies that entry into a judicially approved settlement with the government protects a
party only against the contribution claims of other potentially liable parties, and not
against indemnification claims. Contribution is a statutory or common law right available
to those who have paid more than their equitable share of an entire liability. Indemnity
is a right arising from a contract or a special relationship between parties. Settlement with
the government under CERCLA should not abrogate independently existing rights of
persons to indemnity.
See also 131 Cong. Rec. S 11857 (1985) (statement of Sen. Thurmond), reprinted In 2 SARA
Notebook, supra note 58, at S 11857
It is the belief of a majority of the Judiciary Committee that the [Thurmond-EPA-DOJ]
package of amendments provides for significant improvement of S 51 by striking a fair
and equitable balance between the need to quickly clean up toxic waste sites and the need
to preserve due process and the integrity of our judicial system.
See also 131 Cong. Rec. S11857 (1985) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 2 SARA
Notebook, supra note 58, at S11857 ("Mr. President, I am happy to co-sponsor the amendments to
sections 126, 132, and 133 offered by the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary Committee. In my
view, these amendments strike the right balance between the need for rapid clean up of hazardous
waste sites across the Nation, and the need for potentially liable parties and the general public to
receive a full and fair review of their concerns."); Neuman, supra note 93, at 10,305:
The "valid legislative purpose" that the court had in mind was Congress' intent to
"encourage early settlement, particularly by de minimis parties .... As noted, this was
unquestionably a primary purpose behind SARA. However, Congress was concerned with
.the fairness of settlements. During the early years of Superfund implementation, Congress
held oversight hearings on the settlements reached in United States v. Seymour Recycling
Corp. and several other cases, which had been widely criticized as sweetheart deals.
During consideration of the Superfund amendments, Senator Stafford, a primary sponsor
of SARA, expressed concern that absent judicial review, the "pressure to produce
settlements" could lead EPA to negotiate settlements that would be unfair to nonsettlors.
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settlements at an early stage of the process.' 9 All of those concerns indicate
that Congress did not contemplate and did not intend to create a disproportionate
liability scheme.
F. The Objectives of CERCLA and SARA and Sound Public Policy Do Not
Support the Conclusion That Congress Intended to Adopt the UCA TA
Approach or a Disproportionate Liability Scheme in Section 113(W(2)
The objectives of CERCLA and SARA and sound public policy do not
support the conclusion that Congress intended to adopt the UCATA approach or
a disproportionate liability scheme in Section 113(0(2). First, neither the
UCATA approach nor any resulting disproportionate liability scheme are needed
to promote or induce settlements. 30 If the prospect of joint and several,
liability for all of the response costs which have been and will be incurred at a
site and the tools that the EPA has been given to force PRPs to clean up
sites' 3' are not enough to induce PRPs to enter into early settlements with the
government, a disproportionate liability scheme which may require nonsettlors
In short, Congress was not only concerned that EPA settle quickly, but that it settle fairly.
129. All of the courts which have held that Section 113(0(2) creates a "disproportionate liability
scheme" have emphasized the fact that Congress was concerned with promoting or encouraging
settlements at an early stage of the process in arriving at the conclusion that Congress intended to
create a disproportionate liability scheme in Section 113(0(2). See United States v. Cannons Eng'g
Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92 (1 st Cir. 1990); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 731, 736 (W.D.
Mich. 1991); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 678 (D.N.J. 1989); In re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 (D.Mass. 1989); New York v.
Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
130. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 215, 114 S. Ct 1461, 1468 (1994):
By disadvantaging the party that spurns settlement offers, the pro tanto rule puts pressure
on all defendants to settle. While public policy wisely encourages settlements, such
additional pressure to settle is unnecessary. The parties' desire to avoid litigation costs,
to reduce uncertainty, and to maintain ongoing commercial relationships is sufficient to
ensure nontrial dispositions in the vast majority of cases. Under the proportionate share
approach, such factors should ensure a similarly high settlement rate
See also Neuman, supra note 93, at 10,302:
Nor is it clear that allowing comparative fault principles to govern cost recovery actions
against nonsettlors will adversely affect the CERCLA settlement process, as the federal
government fears. First, it is doubtful that limiting the liability of nonsettlors to their fair
share would significantly encourage PRPs to avoid settling with the government. The
incentive to settle would remain powerful because of the desire to minimize transaction
costs and the statutory contribution protection awarded to settlors.
131. The EPA can simply order the PRPs to clean up sites and force them to run the risk that
they will be held liable for civil penalties of $25,000 per day and punitive damages of one to three
times the amount of the costs that may be incurred by Ihe PPA as a result of their failure to comply
with the order, if they do not comply with the order; file suit *against the PRPs for an injunction
directing them to clean up the site in the manner which the EPA has determined is appropriate; or
clean up the site itself and file a cost recovery action against the PRPs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a),
(b)(1), 9607(c)(3), 9604(a)(1), 9607(a) (1995).
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to pay more than their equitable shares of the response costs at the site will
certainly not do so.
Second, as shown above, no such disproportionate liability scheme is
possible tinder CERCLA. CERCLA prohibits settlements between the
government and PRPs for less than the total of the PRPs' equitable shares of the
response costs that have been and will be incurred at a site,"' and contemplates
that settlements between the government and PRPs will usually be for signifi-
cantly more than the PRPs' equitable shares of the response costs at the site.",
In fact, CERCLA contemplates that settlements between the government and
PRPs will provide for a major portion of the response measures that are
necessary at the site. Otherwise it is not advantageous to the government to
enter into the settlements. " Under that type of scheme, disproportionate
liability can never be imposed upon nonsettlors as the result of a settlement. The
liability of the nonsettlors will always be reduced by an amount which equals or
exceeds the total of the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at the site,
because the amount of the settlement will always equal or exceed the total of the
settlors' equitable shares of the response costs.' 3'
In addition, the "polluter pays" principle-a core principle of both CERCLA
and SARA-does not support the application of the UCATA approach or any
type of disproportionate liability scheme. According to the First Circuit and
most of the other courts that have had occasion to consider the question, Section
113(f)(2) creates a disproportionate liability scheme which encourages or
promotes early settlements between the government and PRPs by:
(1) allowing PRPs who come forward and settle with the government
to receive a discount on their liability and settle with the government
132. See § 9604(aXI) and supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
This requirement of the statute appears to be one which the courts have either been unaware of
or have ignored in reviewing and evaluating settlements between the government and PRPs under
CERCLA. It is submitted that the courts cannot determine whether a settlement between the
government and PRPs is fair, reasonable, and consistent with the public interest and the requirements
of the statute without first determining that the amounts being paid under the settlement represent,
at the very least, the total of the saettlors' equitable shares of all of the response costs that have been
and will be incurred at the site. The statute expressly requires that settlements meet that test.
133. See supra text accompanying note 63.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
135. This statement will be true except in those cases where the government underestimates the
equitable shares of the settlors, agrees to settle for less than the equitable shares of the settlors, and
is able to demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the court which approves the settlement, that the
available evidence supports the conclusion that the equitable shares of the settlors are smaller than
those shares ultimately prove to be. In those cases, which should not occur often, it is not unfair to
require the government, which usually has better and more extensive information and superior
bargaining power, and which negotiates and agrees to the settlement, to bear the risks of its
settlement and absorb any shortfall, rather than the nonsettlors, who may not be involved in the
negotiations, do not consent or agree to the settlement, and are not afforded a meaningful opportunity
to challenge the settlement, even though it will, by operation of law, bar their claims for contribution.
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for less than the total of their equitable shares of the response costs at
a site; and
(2) requiring the PRPs who do not settle to shoulder or assume liability
for the difference between the settlors' equitable shares of the response
costs at a site and the amount which the settlors pay to the government
in a settlement, in addition to their own equitable shares of the response
costs at the site.1
36
One of the problems with this approach, however, is that it undermines the
"polluter pays" principle. The persons who will have the greatest incentive to
enter into settlements with the government at any site are the persons who were
the greatest contributors to the problems at the site and are clearly liable for the
contamination at the site. Those persons have nothing to lose by entering into
settlements with the government and may be able to secure significant advantages
by doing so. The persons with the least incentive to enter into settlements at a
site and who have the greatest amount to lose by entering into settlements with
the government are the persons whose contributions to the problems with
contamination at a site were small'37 or who may have valid defenses to
liability. The disproportionate liability scheme which the First Circuit and some
other courts have read into Section 113(0(2) would allow the largest polluters
at a site to obtain discounts or avoid paying significant portions of the costs of
cleaning up the pollution they caused, and shift the burden of paying for the
clean up of that pollution to persons whose contributions to the problems were
small or subject to dispute."' The scheme creates the risk that the persons
136. See United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 89, 91-92 (Ist Cir. 1992); Kelly
v. Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 731, 735-36 (W.D. Mich. 1991); United States v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 675-76, 677-79 (D.N.J. 1989); In re Acushnet River & New Bedford
Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1026-27 (D.Mass. 1989).
137. This statement assumes that the parties in question are "major parties"--.e., parties whose
contributions to the site were not so small that they qualify as "de minimis" contributors. See 42
U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1995).
138. See, e.g., In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1259, 1259 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1988):
The pro tanto rule promotes settlement by placing [the risk of a bad settlement] on the
nonsettling defendant. But it also provides incentive for attempts by "guiltier defendants
to get off cheaply by settling first .... " Because their ultimate monetary recovery would
be unaffected, plaintiffs have no incentive to ensure that a settlement approximates the
defendant's share of liability. Indeed, it is arguable that the only settlements the pro tanto
rule would promote would be bad.settlements; i.e., those in which settling defendants pay
less than their share of liability.
See also Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1181 (7h Cir. 1985); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d
465,468, 468 n.3 (3d Cir. 1968); Komhauser and Revesz, supra note 80, at 447-48, 455-56, 463-64,
469, 472, 480. The authors make several particular telling points:
[If the plaintiff's chances of success against the defendants are sufficiently correlated, and]
[if] the defendants' shares of the liability [are] sufficiently different, ... the plaintiff
[will] settle with the defendant that [has] the greater fault.. ., and litigate against the
other. In summary, when the plaintiff's probabilities of success are [sufficiently]
correlated, the problem is quite different than when the probabilities are independent.
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most responsible for the pollution at the site will be allowed to escape their full
burden and transfer at least a portion of that burden to those least responsible.
Consequently, such a scheme could seriously jeopardize the "polluter pays"
principle.
To be sure, one of SARA's primary goals was to encourage settlements
under CERCLA, but not at the expense of the "polluter pays" principle. The
"polluter pays" principle-the idea that polluters should not be permitted to
escape liability for the damage or harm caused by their activities-remains one
of the fundamental tenets of CERCLA." 9 Indeed, one of SARA's goals was
Whereas in the latter case, the plaintiff litigates against both defendants, in the former
case it does not. Instead, the plaintiff settles with both defendants if their shares of the
liability are sufficiently similar, and it settles with one defendant-the one with the larger
share of the liability-and litigates against the other if the defendants' shares of the
liability are sufficiently different.
Id. at 455-56.
The preceding discussion assumed that the defendants' shares of the fault are equal.
Recall, however, that if these shares are sufficiently different, the pro tanto set-off rule
leads to settlement with only one defendant and to litigation with the other.
Id. at 469.
Second, recall that under joint and several liability, where [the plaintiff's chances of
success against the defendants are sufficiently correlated and] the defendants' shares of
the liability are sufficiently different, the plaintiff settles with the defendant that is
responsible for the larger share of the liability, and litigates against the other. The
plaintiff's expected recovery from this outcome is higher than its expected recovery from
litigating against both defendants or settling with both defendants. Thus, joint and several
liability has the effect of promoting settlements with the defendant responsible for the
larger share of the liability and discouraging settlements with the defendant responsible
for the smaller share of the liability.
Id. at 472. See also Mason, supra note 93, at 123:
In practical terms, the UCATA approach actually undercuts CERCLA's goal of promoting
settlements, because it encourages partial settlements while discouraging "global"
settlements. The approach allows the government to pursue non-settling PRPs for the
remainder of the cleanup costs at a site, and reduces the amount that the government may
seek from a nonsettlor only by the amount it received from the settling PRPs. The
UCATA approach thus enables and even invites the government strategically to "split its
bets," as one commentator has described it, by settling with one PRP for any amount it
chooses, while continuing to seek the full amount of the remaining cleanup costs from the
non-settling PRPs. It encourages the government to use the settling PRPs to insure that
the government will recover a definite sum, while using the non-settling PRPs to try to
get a complete recovery.
139. Congress expressly recognizes the "polluter pays" principle in 42 U.S.C. § 9604(aXl)
(1995), which provides, in pertinent part:
In no event shall a potentially responsible party be subject to a lesser standard of liability,
receive preferential treatment, or in any other way, whether direct or indirect, benefit from
any such arrangements as a response action contractor, or as a person hired or retained
by such a response action contractor, with respect to the release or facility in question.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(dXl)-(3) (1995); Cannons Eng'g, 899 F.2d at 90-91 ("We have recenUy
described the two major policy concerns underlying CERCLA: First, Congress intended that the
federal government be immediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective response to
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to ensure that polluters would be required to pay for the damages or harm caused
by their activities. It sought to achieve that goal through provisions expressly
recognizing PRPs' rights to seek contribution and requiring the courts to allocate
response costs among PRPs in an equitable manner. As one commentator
has noted:
The burdensomeness of cost recovery litigation, together with other
difficulties ... ultimately led to the inclusion in SARA of several
provisions specifically aimed at facilitating settlement .... [One of] the
primary goals of both SARA and the proposed amendment is increased
settlement. However, although SARA and -the proposed amendments
increasingly emphasize settlement, CERCLA 's original emphasis on the
equitable notion that responsible parties should take responsibility for
their conduct has not been abandoned. Indeed, Section 113(f)(1),
which was added by SARA, reemphasized the importance of equitable
results in its instruction to courts to "allocate response costs among
liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are
appropriate."''
Furthermore, the potential for collusion and sweetheart deals between the
government and PRPs associated with the application of the UCATA approach
and the operation of a disproportionate liability scheme cannot be ignored. The
potential risk of these evils surely militate against a construction of Section
113(f)(2) that would permit a disproportionate liability scheme. Such a
disproportionate liability scheme would allow the government to determine which
persons it wished to settle with on favorable terms and which persons it did not
wish to settle with on favorable terms, and arbitrarily allocate or apportion
liability for the response costs at the site among those persons through its
settlements. Accordingly, such a disproportionate liability scheme might
resurrect the problems with sweetheart deals and scandals that Congress was
seeking to eliminate when it passed SARA and prohibited settlements between
the problems of national magnitude resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second. Congress
intended that those responsible for poisons caused by the disposal of chemical pollution bear the
cost and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created.") (emphasis added);
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986); United
States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.Minn. 1982).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1995); United States v. Laskin, No. C84-2035Y, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4900, at *9-11, 16-20 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 1989).
141. See Frohman, supra note 76, at 734 (emphasis added). See also Mason, supra note 93, at
74-75, 77-78, 87-88, 103-04, 120-21 ("CERCLA's goal of compelling PRPs to pay for the harm that.
they have caused at a site means just that-PRPs should pay for the harm for which they themselves
are responsible at the site. It does not follow, however, that PRPs should have to pay for more than
that for which they are responsible. Because the UCATA approach forces nonsettlors to bear more
than their burden, it strays from Congress' purposes in enacting CERCLA.").
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the government and PRPs for less than the total of the PRPs' equitable shares of
.the response costs at a site. 42
Finally, the use of the UCATA approach to determine the effect of
settlements between the government and PRPs upon the liability of nonsettling
PRPs and the operation of the resulting disproportionate liability scheme would
be both unfair and inequitable." 3  Certain tenets of fairness and due process
142. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(), 9613(f)(3), 9622(eX3XE) (1995). See supra text
accompanying notes 57-66.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391,401-02 (W.D. Mo.
1985); Laskin, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4900, at "16-20; United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F.
Supp. 666, 679, 68687 (D.NJ. 1989); Neuman, supra note 93, at 10.300; Mason, supra note 93, at
120-21. See also the cases dealing with private party settlements cited in supra notes 76 and 79.
The courts have recognized that the disproportionate liability that can result under a pro tanto rule
would be unfair and inequitable in contexts ranging from admiralty to securities. See McDermott, Inc.
v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 212-16, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1467-69 (1994) (admiralty proceeding);
Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478,486-487 (3d Cir. 1995); T"G, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 F.3d 916,923
(10th Cir. 1994); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Ganrett, 954 F.2d 575, 578-79, 579
n.3 (9th Cir. 1992), affirmed 508 U.S. 286, 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993); Franklin v. Kaypro Corp., 884
F.2d 1222, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 498 U.S. 890, 1i1 S. CL 232 (1990); Smith v.
Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558,562(9th Cir. 1987); Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch,
637 F.2d 672.675 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963, 101 S. Ct 3114 (1981); In re Sunrise
Sec. Litig., 698 F. Supp. 1256, 1258-60 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (securities regulation proceedings).
In Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1989), the Second Circuit
employed a pro tanto approach to determine the effect of a partial settlement upon the liability of the
nonsettlors in a securities case. The court employed a pro tanto approach in that case to make certain
that the plaintiffs did not receive a windfall or double recovery as a result of the settlement. The
court apparently felt that the amount of the settlement exceeded the settlors' equitable shares of the
common damages, although it never actually stated that fact. Id.
The Second Circuit has more recently stated, however, that it would not necessarily employ a pro
tanto approach to determine the effect of partial settlements in securities cases in situations where the
amount of the settlement is less than the sum of the settlors' equitable shares of the common
damages. See In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 957 F.2d 1020, 1030-32 (2d Cir. 1992).
In fact, it indicated that, in cases of that nature, it might well hold that the settlement reduces the
liability of the nonsettlors by the amount of the settlement or the sum of the settlors' equitable shares
of the liability, whichever is greater-an approach that would ensure fairness to nonsettlors by
preventing disproportionate liability and preventing windfalls or double recoveries. Id.
In addition, in Bragger v. Trinity Capital Enter. Corp., 30 F.3d 14 (2d Cir. 1994), a securities case
decided after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in McDermott, Inc. v. AmCtyde, 511 U.S. 202,
114 S. Ct. 1461 (1994), the Second Circuit vacated a district court judgment declaring that the pro
tento approach would be used to determine the effect of a partial settlement upon the liability of a
nonsettlor. Bragger, 30 F.3d at 17. The Second Circuit indicated that the proportionate share
approach was probably the correct approach to follow in determining the effect of partial settlements
upon the liability of nonsettlors in securities cases, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
AmClyde. It declared:
Moreover, it would seem unwise in the present instance to leave standing the district
court ruling that any judgment against appellant be reduced on a pro tanto basis. We
think it imprudent in light of a recent unanimous decision of the Supreme Court holding,
after thorough analysis of the pro tanto and proportional judgment reduction methods, that
at least in admiralty suits for damages, the proportional reduction approach is best.
Id. at 17.
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are inherent in our legal system, or, at the very least, in our legal system as it
exists outside the context of CERCLA. That is why, as a general rule, contracts
are not binding on persons who are not parties to them. Similarly, that is why
judgments, including consent decrees, do not bind and do not affect the rights
and liabilities of persons who are not parties to the action in which the judgment
is rendered.'" However, if Section 113(f)(2) creates a disproportionate
liability scheme, CERCLA turns both of those propositions on their heads. If
Congress created a disproportionate liability scheme in Section 113(f)(2), it
created a statutory scheme that allows the government and persons settling with
it to extinguish the contribution rights of nonsettlors and alter or increase their
liabilities through agreements to which the nonsettlors are not parties and to
which they may strenuously object. It also created a scheme that gives the courts
the power to adjudicate the rights and liabilities of the nonsettlors in consent
144. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2184 (1989) ("All agree that
'it is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not
been made a party by service of process."). In Wilks, the United States Supreme Court held that a
group of white firefighters was not precluded from challenging employment decisions that were being
made by the City of Birmingham, Alabama, ard Jefferson County, Alabama, pursuant to consent
decrees that had been entered in connection with an earlier suit against them under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other federal laws. Id. at 758-59, 761-65, 109 S. Ct at 2183, 2184-86.
The court held that the white firefighters were not precluded from challenging the decisions that were
being made pursuant to the consent decrees because they were not parties to the proceedings in which
the consent decrees were entered. Id.
Congress has already attempted to limit the holding of Martin v. Wilks with respect to consent
decrees in employment discrimination suits under the United States Constitution or the federal civil
rights laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (1994); Rafferty v. City of Youngstown, 54 F.3d 278, 281
n.2 (6th Cir. 1995); Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1] 55, 1175-76 (6th Cir. 1994); Edwards v.
City of Houston, 37 F.3d 1097, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1994).
The holding of Martin v. Wiks-that a person can not be deprived of rights in consent decrees that
are entered in proceedings to which that person is not a party--remains valid in other contexts,
however, and casts real doubt upon the ability of judicially or administratively approved settlements
to validly extinguish the contribution rights of nonsettlors, where the nonsettlors are not allowed to
intervene in and are not made parties to the proceedings in which the approval of the settlements are
obtained. See, e.g., W11lks, 490 U.S. 755, 109 S. Ct. 2 180; Boomgaarden and Breer, supra note 76,
at 119; Neuman, supra note 93, at 10,304; Lorelei Joy Borland, Collateral Challenges To CERCLA
Consent Decrees, 19 Chemical Waste Litig. Rep. 258, 260-61 (1990).
It is unlikely that CERCLA will fall within the exception to the rule of Wilks which the Supreme
Court recognized for special remedial schemes that expressly foreclose further litigation by non-
parties, such as bankruptcy and probate. See Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762 n.2, 109 S. Ct. at 2184 n.2;
Boomgaarden and Breer, supra note 76, at 119; Neuman, supra note 93, at 10,304. Although
CERCLA is a remedial statute, it is not that kind of a remedial statute, and does not appear .to
foreclose further litigation in connection with consent decrees approving settlements. In fact, 42
U.S.C. § 9622(m) (1995) expressly provides as follows:
(m) Applicability of general principles of law
In the case of consent decrees and other settlements under this section (including
covenants not to sue), no provision of this chapter shall be construed to preclude or
otherwise affect the applicability of general principles of law regarding the setting aside
or modification of consent decrees or other settlements.
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decrees approving those agreements, and gives the courts the power to do so
without even holding an evidentiary hearing on the fairness of those settle-
ments-i.e., without even giving the nonsettlors whose rights and liabilities are
being adjudicated an opportunity to examine and present evidence in connection
with those settlement agreements.' Such a scheme is both unfair and
inequitable, and may also be constitutionally infirm.'4
145. CERCLA requires that settlements between the government and PRPs be administratively
or judicially approved. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d), (8)(4) (1995). The courts that have considered the
question have almost uniformly held that they are not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the
fairness and reasonableness of the settlements that are presented to them for approval under
CERCLA, absent unusual circumstances or a showing of particularized need. See. e.g., United States
v. Charles George Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d 108 t, 1085-86 (1 st Cir. 1994); United States v. Cannons
Ens's Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 94 (1st Cir. 1990); Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. at 686-87 ("In this case,
Rohm & Haas does not urge us to hold an evidentiary hearing, it merely asks us to review the paper
record ... and determine whether its view of that evidence is more plausible than that of the United
States. But even this we will not do.... [W]here a money settlement is shown to bear a reasonable
relation to some plausible estimate, or range of estimates, of the settling party's volumetric
contribution, CERCLA requires that such a settlement be accepted and entered as a consent decree.
Any unfairness to a non-settlor such as Rohm & Haas is a by-product of the congressional scheme,
about which a court may do nothing in the absence of harm rising to a constitutional level.").
146. The failure of CERCLA to require evidentiary hearings on the fairness and reasonableness
of settlements between the government and PRPs under the UCATA approach may rise to the level
of constitutional harm. It may be a violation of procedural due process. See Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 332-35, 341-50, 96 S. Ct. 893, 901-03, 906-10 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 260, 267-70, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 1016, 1020-21 (1970). See also In re Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746,
762-66 (5th Cir. 1995) ("CIGNA and Zale argue that NUFIC had a full opportunity to litigate the
issues surrounding its contract claims. We disagree. Indeed, the court frequently prevented NUFIC
and Feld from addressing the issues, calling them a 'sideshow,' a 'side issue,' and 'irrelevant.'
Moreover, the settlement proponents themselves argued that NUFIC and Feld's claims were not
before the court at the settlement hearing .... Also, the bankruptcy court refused to permit
testimony such as an adversary proceeding would require .... Alternatively, CIGNA and Zale
contend that the settlement hearing essentially was an adversary proceeding. Calling it an adversary
proceeding, however, does not make it one .... When third parties are affected, we scrutinize
carefully the fairness of the hearing afforded."); In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 957 F.2d
1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1992) ("We hold that contribution does not exist after a court approves a fair
settlement bar. Otherwise, settlements among fewer than all the parties would be difficult to reach.
However, third party participation in an evidentiary fairness hearing and court approval of the
settlement bar are necessary to protect the due process rights of third parties."); AmClyde, 511 U.S.
at 213, 114 S. Ct. at 1467-68 ("Courts and legislatures have recognized this potential for unfairness
and have required 'good-faith hearings' as a remedy. When such hearings are required, the settling
defendant is protected against contribution actions only if it shows that the settlement is a fair
forecast of its equitable share of the judgment .... [T]o serve their protective function effectively,
such hearings would have to be minituials on the merits .... '; Wilki, 490 U.S. at 761-63, 766-69,
109 S. Ct. at 2184-85, 2186-88; In re Masters Mates, 957 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1992) ("(A]
consent decree may not impose ... obligations (on a nonparty] without affording the affected
nonparty a meaningful opportunity to challenge the application of the decree to it." This language,
which appears in the Second Circuit's opinion in In re Masters Mates, was taken by the Second
Circuit from its original opinion in United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 948 F.2d
98 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter referred to simply as "Yellow Freight"]. Prior to the publication of
its original opinion in Yellow Freight, however, the Second Circuit revised that opinion and deleted
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IV. WHY THE UCATA APPROACH SHOULD BE REJECTED
A. The Disadvantages of the UCATA Approach and How Its Disincentives to
Settlement Outweigh Its Advantages
The courts which have held that Section 113(0(2) adopts the UCATA
approach have done so based upon the language of the pro tanto rule found in
Section 113(0(2) and their conclusion that the disproportionate liability that
might result from settlements under the UCATA approach will further Congress'
goal of promoting or encouraging settlements under CERCLA." 7 None of
those courts considered the other provisions of SARA, the scheme which those
provisions establish for settlements between the government and PRPs under
SARA, or Congress' other goals in SARA. Nor have any of those courts
considered the advantages and disadvantages of the UCATA approach.
The courts which have addressed the effect of private party settlements on
the liability of nonsettlors, however, have considered the advantages and
disadvantages of the UCATA approach. Those courts have identified two
advantages of the UCATA approach:
the language quoted in In re Masters Mates from that opinion. See Yellow Freight, 948 F.2d at 103,
108, and 108 n. I. In addition, the Second Circuit's decision in Yellow Freight was subsequently
vacated on other grounds by the United States Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the
Second Circuit with directions to dismiss it as moot. See Yellow Freight System. Inc. v. United
States, 506 U.S. 802, 113 S. Ct. 31 (1992). Nevertheless, the proposition set out by the language
quoted above-the language in the Second Circuit's original opinion in Yellow Freight that was
reiterated by the Second Circuit in In re Masters Mates-still appears to be a sound one, particularly
in the Second Circuit. See United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 3 F.3d 634,638-
39, 640, and 642 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 964 F.2d
180, 183-85 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Masters Mates, 957 F.2d at 1031; Yellow Freight, 948 F.2d at 102-
03 and 104 n.2. vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 802, 113 S. Ct. 31; United States v.
International Broth. of Teamsters, 931 F.2d 177. 180-87 (2d Cir. 1991).). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 9657
(1995). In this provision of SARA, Congress itself recognized that the extinction of the contribution
rights conferred on nonsettlors by SARA through the administrative approval of settlements might
constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9657 provides, in pertinent part:
If an administrative settlement under Section 9622 of this title has the effect of limiting
any person's rights to obtain contribution from any party to such settlement, and if the
effect of such limitation would constitute a taking without just compensation in violation
of the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, such person shall not be
entitled, under other laws of the United States, to recover compensation from the United
States for such taking, but in any such case, such limitation on the right to obtain
contribution shall be treated as having no force and effect.
The fact that no cvidentiary hearings arc held on settlements between the government and PRPs
under CERCLA does not matter if the UCFA approach is followed. The UCFA approach contains
built-in assurances of fairness to nonsettlors, and will not result in prejudice to the rights of the
nonsettlors or a determination of their liabilities.
147. See supra the cases cited in note 39. See also Boomgaarden and Breer, supra note 76, at
107, 109.
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(1) it promotes settlement because the settlors are discharged from all
liability for contribution; and
(2) it preserves the claimant's incentive to settle because it allows the
claimant to know the exact amount of the credit it is conveying and
assures the claimant that it will recover the full amount of its damages
or costs.1
48
Neither of these advantages offers any real reason for preferring the UCATA
approach over the UCFA approach in the context of settlements between the
government and PRPs under SARA, however. The UCFA approach, like the
UCATA approach, -discharges settlors from all liability for contribution. "9
Furthermore, the second advantage of the UCATA approach is not particularly
important with respect to settlements between the government and PRPs, because
SARA prohibits settlements between the government and PRPs for less than the
total of the settling PRPs' full equitable shares of the response costs at a site."
Consequently, the government is required to determine that the amount of the
settlement equals or exceeds the total of the settling PRPs' full equitable shares
of the response costs at the site before it can enter into the settlement.
Accordingly, the government will know the amount of the credit it is conveying
in its settlement. In addition, if the settlement is permissible under the statute,
the government will still be able to recover the full amount of the response costs
at the site, because the nonsettlors will remain jointly and severally liable for the
balance of those costs.
The courts which have considered the UCATA approach in connection with
private party settlements have also identified the disadvantages of that approach.
As articulated by the courts, the disadvantages of the UCATA approach are that:
(1) it is inconsistent with the policy of equitably distributing losses
among PRPs based upon proportionate fault, as the nonsettlors receive
pro tanto credit rather than proportionate credit based upon the settlors'
fault; '
'148. See. e.g., United States v. Western Processing Co., 756 F. Supp. 1424, 1430 (W.D. Wash.
1990).
149. See UCFA § 6, 12 U.LA. 147 (1996).
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(aX1) (1995). See supra note 58 for the text of the statute. For a
more detailed discussion of this provision, see supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
151. This disadvantage of the UCATA does not exist in connection with settlements between
the United States and PRPs under CERCLA, if Section 104(aXI) prohibits settlements between the
United States and PRPs for less than the PRPs' equitable shares of the response costs. If Section
104(a)(1) prohibits settlements with PRPs for less than the total of the PRPs' equitable shares of the
response costs, the pro tanto credit will always equal or exceed the total of the settling PRPs'
equitable shares of the response costs. In addition, because the settlors' contribution rights against
the nonsettlors are expressly preserved by 42 U.S.C. § 961 3(t)(3)(B) (1995), the settlors can recover
the difference between the amotnts paid in the settlement and their equitable shares of the response
costs from the nonsettlors, when the amounts paid in the settlement exceed the settlors' equitable
shares of the response costs.
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(2) it may act as an impediment to total settlement, since a nonsettlor
may count on the guaranteed credit he is entitled to receive under the
pro tanto rule and gamble on the verdict rather than settle;SZ
(3) it may encourage collusion between settling parties; and
(4) it fails to eliminate problems inherent in complex cases involving
multiple plaintiffs.'
Most of the courts which have considered the advantages and disadvantages of
the UCATA approach in the context of private party settlements under CERCLA
have concluded that its disadvantages and disincentives to settlement outweigh
its advantages, and have rejected the UCATA approach in favor of the UCFA
approach. '4
In addition, the disproportionate liability scheme that will result from the use
of the UCATA approach may actually prevent or delay settlements. The courts
which concluded that the recognition of a disproportionate liability scheme would
further Congress' goal of promoting or encouraging settlements apparently did
not realize that such a scheme can easily result in the imposition of dispropor-
tionate liability upon setlingPRPs as well as nonsettling PRPs.' ss
Consider the problem of successive settlements. For purposes of analysis,
assume that the government enters into a settlement with a group of PRPs for a
substantial portion of the cleanup costs at a site-i.e., a portion which signifi-
cantly exceeds the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at the site. If
the settlement is approved, the settlors will still be able to pursue the nonsettlors
for contribution. The settlors' rights to seek contribution from the nonsettlors
152. This disadvantage of the UCATA does not exist in connection with settlements between
the government and PRPs under CERCLA. The reason is simple. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (1995)
expressly preserves the settlors' rights to seek contribution from the nonsettlors. Consequently, the
nonsettlors do not receive guaranteed reductions in their ultimate liability for the response costs at
a site as the result of settlements under CERCLA. The nonsettlors receive a guaranteed credit only
insofar as their liability to the government for response costs is concerned. That credit, however,
does not prevent settlors who have paid more than their equitable shares of the response costs from
recovering the difference between the amount of the settlement and their equitable shares of the
response costs from the nonsettlors.
Under UCATA, settlors can not maintain actions for contribution against nonsettlors unless they
secure a release from further liability for the nonsettlors in the settlement. See UCATA § I(d), 12
U.L.A. 194-95 (1996) ("A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to
recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not
extinguished by the settlement ...."). Settlors do not ordinarily secure releases from further liability
for nonsettlors in the settlements which they negotiate. Accordingly, it is this provision of UCATA
that ordinarily allows nonsettlors to view the amounts paid by the settlors as guaranteed reductions
in liability which they will receive.
153. See United States v. Western Processing Co., 756 F. Supp. 1424, 1430 (W.D. Wash. 1990).
154. See the cases cited in supra notes 76 and 79. See also Frohman, supra note 76, at 716.
155. If Section 104(aXI)ofCERCLA does notprohibit settlements between the government and
PRPs for less than the total of the PRPs' equitable shares of the response costs at a site, the UCATA
approach can easily, lead to the imposition of disproportionate liability upon settlors as well as
nonsettlors.
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are preserved by Section 1 13(f)(3)(B).' 56 The settlors' rights to seek contribu-
tion from the nonsettlors, however, are specifically subordinated to the rights of
the government to recover the remainder of the response costs at the site from
the nonsettlors."'
Now further assume that, after approval of the first settlement, the govern-
ment enters into a second settlement with the remainder of the PRPs (i.e., all of
the PRPs who did not join in the first settlement) for the balance of the response
costs that have been or will be incurred at the site. If the second settlement is
approved, and it should be under the tests that the courts have employed for the
approval of such settlements, despite the fact that the parties to the second
settlement may be paying less than their equitable shares of the response costs
at the site, it will bar any claims for contribution by the PRPs who joined in the
first settlement against the PRPs who joined in the second settlement.
The reason is simple. The contribution bar found in Section 113(0(2) is
absolute. It does not insulate or exempt those who have previously entered into
settlements from its operation or effect. It provides, in no uncertain terms, that
parties who have resolved their liability to the government in a judicially
approved settlement, such as the parties to the second settlement, shall not be
liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.
Indeed, Section 1 13(f(3)(B) expressly provides that persons who have resolved
their liability to the government, such as the parties to the first settlement, can
only seek contribution "from any person who is not [a] party to a settlement
referred to in paragraph (2). '" s Consequently, the PRPs who joined in the
first settlement and agreed to pay more than their equitable shares of the response
costs will be left holding the bag. They will not be able to recover the
difference between the amount they agreed to pay in the first settlement and their
equitable shares of the response costs from the other PRPs.
The fact that settlors may be required to bear more than their equitable
shares of the response costs at a site, if they agree to pay more than their
equitable shares of the response costs in a settlement and the government
subsequently settles its claims for the balance of the response costs with the
remaining PRPs, is an obvious disincentive to settlement, and, in particular, to
settlements for more than the total of the settlors' equitable shares of the
response costs at a site."' The reason, again, is simple. The PRPs who come
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f(3)(B) (1995).
157. See id. § 9613(f)(3)(C).
158. See id. 9613(X3XB). See also United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1185
n.i 5, 1186, 1186 nn.16, 17, 1187 n.19 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Under CERCLA, one of the benefits of
settling with the government is that a party becomes immune from contribution claims 'regarding
matters addressed in the settlement ....' It appears that the statute allows the government to
immunize a late settlor from an early settlor's contribution suit by settling with the government.").
159. See Alcan Aluminum, 25 F.3d at 1186 n.1 7 ("If early settlors have no real opportunity to
protect their contribution right (i.e., no opportunity to intervene) we expect that PRPs may discount
the right to sue for contribution under Sec. 113(0(1). This may have the unfortunate effect of
removing an incentive to settle early.").
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forward and settle with the government have no assurance that the government,
which may be perfectly willing to sell out the interests of the nonsettling PRPs
in the first settlement, will not simply turn around and sell out the interests of
the settling PRPs in a subsequent settlement. After all, the government's only
interest is in recovering all of the response costs at the site while minimizing its
transaction costs. It is not required to concern itself "with the relative culpability
of [the] PRPs" ''  or the manner in which response costs are apportioned among
those PRPs under a disproportionate liability scheme. Fairness is relative and,
for the most part, immaterial under such a scheme.
Furthermore, the scenario described above is not merely a theoretical one.
The sequence of events described above actually took place in United States v.
Bay Area Battery.16 ' The initial settlors' contribution rights against the
subsequent settlors were extinguished when the subsequent settlement was
approved, and they were left with no recourse except to pay the amounts they
had agreed to pay. The initial settlors received only the credit toward those
amounts which the government unilaterally decided they should receive as a
result of the subsequent settlement-a credit which the initial settlors vociferous-
ly, and unsuccessfully, argued was inadequate. 6 '
Consequently, the disproportionate liability scheme which the courts have
read into Section 113(0(2) does not necessarily further Congress' goal of
promoting or encouraging settlements, as those courts suggest. It can result in
the imposition of disproportionate liability on parties who settle early, and can
actually frustrate Congress' goal of promoting or encouraging settlements.
These problems demonstrate that the UCATA approach offers no real
advantage over the UCFA approach with respect to settlements between the
government and PRPs under SARA,' 63 and is not as consistent with the other
provisions of SARA and the scheme which those provisions establish for
160. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 679 n.14 (D.NJ. 1989).
161. 895 F. Supp. 1524 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
162. See United States v. Bay Area Battery, 895 F. Supp. 1524, 1528, 1532, 1534 (N.D. Fla.
1995).
The problem of successive settlements also arose in Alcan Aluminum, 25 F.3d at 1178-79, 1186-87.
The Court in Alcan could not determine whether or not the second settlement would extinguish or
bar the contribution rights of the parties to the first settlement on the record before it, however,
because it could not determine whether the matters addressed in the settlements were the same. Id.
at 1186-87. The court therefore remanded the matter to the district court with instructions to make
that determination. Id.
Finally, the problem of successive settlements reared its head in United States v. Charter Int'l Oil
Co., 83 F.3d 510 (1 st Cir. 1996). The court in Charter did not have to determine whether or not the
second settlement extinguished or barred the contribution rights of the parties to the first settlement,
however, because it concluded that the matters addressed in the settlements were not the same.
163. See McDermott, Inc. v.AmClyde,511 U.S. 202,215-16,216n.24, 114 S. Ct. 1461,1469,
1469 n.24 (1994); Komhauser and Revesz, supra note 80, at 492.
For a more detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the UCATA approach, both
perceived and real, see Frohman, supra note 76; Komhauser and Revesz, supra note 80.
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settlements between the government and PRPs as the UCFA approach."
Consequently, the UCATA approach should be rejected in favor of the UCFA
approach.
B. The Application of the UCA TA Approach has Resulted in Procedural and
Constitutional Problems-Problems Which Will Not Exist Under the
UCFA Approach
An interpretation of Section 1 13(f)(2) which gives rise to a disproportionate
liability scheme will result in procedural and constitutional problems in
connection with the approval of settlements under SARA. Two such problems,
already adverted to, come to mind-problems with the nonjoinder of nonsettling
PRPs in actions for the approval of settlements under SARA and problems with
the approval of settlements without first holding evidentiary hearings on the
fairness and reasonableness of the settlements.
1. Problems With Nonjoinder of Nonsettling PRPs
As noted above, SARA requires that settlements between the government
and PRPs be judicially approved and incorporated into consent decrees. 65
Furthermore, the courts have held that a settlement between the government and
PRPs under SARA does not become effective until it has been approved and
incorporated into a consent decree. Hence, the rights and liabilities of the
nonsettlors with respect to the response costs at the site are not altered or
affected by the settlement until it is approved and incorporated into a consent
decree.
The approval of such a settlement and its incorporation into a consent
decree, however, necessarily constitutes an adjudication or determination of the
rights and liabilities of all of the nonsettling PRPs with respect to the response
costs at the site. It extinguishes their contribution rights, determines their
potential liabilities for response costs at the site, and may significantly enhance
or increase those potential liabilities.
164. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(aXI). 9613(f(I), 9622(e)(3XE) (1995); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 401-02 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Laskin, No.
C84-2035Y, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4900, at *16-20 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 1989). See also the cases
and authorities dealing with private party settlements cited in supra notes 76 and 79. C. AmClyde,
511 U.S. at 207, 213-17, 114 S. CL at 1465-67, 1470 ("The proportionate share rule is more
consistent with [the proportionate fault approach ofn Reliable Transfer because a litigating defendant
ordinarily pays only its proportionate share of the judgment. Under the pro tanto approach, however,
a litigating defendant's liability will frequently differ from its equitable share, because a settlement
with one defendant for less than its equitable share requires the nonsettling defendant to pay more
than its share.... In sum, although the arguments for the two approaches are closely matched, we
are persuaded that the proportionate share approach is superior, especially in its consistency with
Reliable Transfer.").
165. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a), (d), (gX4) (1995).
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Proceedings under CERCLA and SARA, including motions for the approval
of settlements and the entry of consent decrees, are not exempted from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'" Consequently, Rule
19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies to actions for the approval of
settlements under CERCLA, and controls questions concerning the joinder of
nonsettling PRPs in such actions. 6 '
Persons who are or may be jointly and severally liable are usually not even
necessary parties under Rule 19. Their joinder in actions against persons who
are or may be jointly and severally liable with them is not required because
complete relief can be accorded among those who are parties to the action
without their joinder and the disposition of the action will not, as a practical
matter, prejudice their interests or create a risk of inconsistent obligations or
multiple liability.""
166. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9607(a)-(c), 9613(0(1) (1995) ("Any person may seek
contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this
title, during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of
this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law."); Fed. R. Civ. P. I ("These rules govern the
procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases
at law or in equity or in admiralty, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 81.
167. Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible.
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the
court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the
person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party....
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible.
If a person as described in subdivision (a)l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the
court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded
as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent
a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the person or those
already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by
the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third,
whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
168. See. e.g., Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7, 111 S. Ct. 315, 316 (1990); Dayton
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Minerals Prods. Co., 906 F.2d 1059, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1990); 3A James
W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice, § 19.11, at 19-212, 19-216 to 19-219 (2d ed. 1996)..
These conclusions are a result of the joint and several nature of the obligation.'
This analysis under Rule 19 clearly applies to and controls claims or matters governed by the
UCFA approach, with its proportionate rule. Nonsettlors always receive a reduction in their liability
that is at least equal to the settlor's equitable shares of the obligation. They can only be held jointly
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Under the "disproportionate liability scheme" which the First Circuit has
read into Section 113(f)(2), however, that analysis can not be readily applied to
CERCLA settlements. Because the approval of a settlement between the
government and PRPs and its incorporation into a consent decree will not only
extinguish the nonsettlors' contribution rights, but operate as an adjudication of
the nonsettlors' potential liability and prejudice their interests by augmenting or
increasing that potential liability, the nonsettlors are, at the very least, necessary
parties to actions for the approval of such settlements.' 9 The nonsettlors have
interests in the approval of such settlements, and the approval of such settlements
in the nonsettlors' absence will, as a practical matter, impair or impede their
ability to protect those interests-it will extinguish their contribution rights and
determine their potential liabilities. Accordingly, a court to whom a settlement
is presented for approval may not be able to act on that settlement until all of the
persons who are or may be PRPs with respect to the site have been joined as
parties to the action, if any party objects to their nonjoinder and it is possible to
join them.
Moreover, it is possible that all of the persons who may be liable for the
response costs at a site should be considered indispensable parties to actions for
the approval of settlements between the government and other PRPs.' 0 A
judgment rendered in the absence of those persons will, by definition, be
and severally liable for the difference between the amount of the obligation and the settlors' equitable
shares of that obligation, and can still seek contribution from the other nonsettlors, to the extent that
they are compelled to pay more than their equitable shares of the obligation to the plaintiffs.
Consequently, under the UCFA approach, the potential liabilities of the nonsettlors are not increased
and the interests of the nonsettlors are not prejudiced by the approval of a settlement or the fact that
their contribution rights against the settlors will be extinguished.
169. See, e.g., Schlumberger Indus., Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 36 F.3d 1274, 1285-88 (4th Cir.
1994); Boles v. Greeneville Hous. Auth., 468 F.2d 476,478-80 (6th Cir. 1972); Shutten v. Shell Oil
Co., 421 F.2d 869, 873-75 (5th Cir. 1970); 3A Moore ct al., supra note 168, §§ 19.07-1[11, 19.07-
1[2-1], at 19-93, 19-103 to 19-104, 19-106 to 19-111.
170. See. e.g., Confederated Tribes v. Lujan, 928 F.2d 1496, 1498-1500 (9th Cir. 1991):
Rapoport v. Banco Mexicano Somex, S.A., 668 F.2d 667. 668-69 (2d Cir. 1982); Acton Co. of Mass.
v. Bachman Foods, Inc., 668 F.2d 76, 77-78, 80-82 (1st Cir. 1982); Doty v. St. Mary Parish Land
Co., 598 F.2d 885, 886-88 (5th Cir. 1979); Warfield v. Marks, 190 F.2d 178, 179-80 (Sth Cir. 1951);
Vasser v. Shilling, 93 F.R.D. 146, 148-51 (M.D. La. 1982), affd, 696 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1983); 3A
Moore et al., supra note 168, § 19.07-2[1], at 19-133, 19-133 n.2, 19-189 to 19-190, 19-190 n.3.
Q. United States v. Union Elec. Co., 64 F.3d 1152, 1155, 1159-70 (8th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Acton Corp., 131 F.R.D. 431, 432-34, 436 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that nonsettling PRPs can
intervene of right under both 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i) and Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in proceedings for the approval of a settlement between the government and settling PRPs
because the contribution rights of the nonsettling PRPs will be extinguished by the approval of the
settlement). C. United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1186-87 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding that the parties to an initial settlement with the government can intervene of right under both
42 U.S.C. § 9613(i) and Rule 24(aX2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in proceedings for the
approval of a s'ubsequent settlement between the government and other parties, ifone or more of the
matters addressed in the settlement are the same and approval of the subsequent settlements will
therefore extinguish or bar contribution rights of the parties to the initial settlement).
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prejudicial to those persons under a disproportionate liability scheme. In
addition, the court to whom the settlement is submitted cannot, by protective
provisions in the judgment or the shaping of relief, lessen or avoid that prejudice
w ithout violating the statute-the prejudice is a by-product of the statutory
scheme, if Section 113(f)(2) creates a disproportionate liability scheme.
Furthermore, the government can obtain complete relief with respect to sites
under CERCLA, whether any settlements which the government may have
negotiated with PRPs are approved or not. Both the potential settlors and the
nonsettlors will remain jointly and severally liable to the government for the
response costs which are incurred at the site, and, if time is a consideration or
urgent action is needed, the government can simply order the PRPs to take those
actions or can take those actions itself and file claims for the recovery of the
costs it incurs in doing so against the PRPs at the site.
The question therefore becomes whether the court can approve a settlement
between the government and PRPs, if all of the other persons who are potentially
responsible for cleanup costs at the site are not joined in the action. Under Rule
19 it appears that the court must postpone action on the approval of a settlement
until all of those persons are joined as parties to the action, whether any
objection is raised to their nonjoinder or not,'7 ' and that it may be required to
dismiss the motion for approval of the settlement if any of those persons cannot
be joined as parties to the action.
However, whether or not nonsettlors are considered to be necessary or
indispensable parties to an action for approval of a settlement under CERCLA
and SARA, it is clear that the nonsettlors will not be bound by any consent
decree approving such a settlement if they are not joined as parties in that
action.' Accordingly, they will remain free to challenge or attack that
171. See, e.g., Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111, 88 S.
Ct. 733, 738-39 (1968) ("When necessary, however, a court of appeals should, on its own initiative,
take steps to protect the absent party, who of course had no opportunity to plead and prove his
interest below."); U.O.P. v. U.S., 99 F.3d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1996); Pit River Home & Agricultural
Co-op. Ass'n v. United States, 30 F.3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir. 1994); CP Nat'l Corp. v. Bonneville
Power Admin., 928 F.2d 905, 911 (9th Cir. 1991); Greeneville Hous. Auth., 468 F.2d at 479, 479
n.4; 3A Moore et al., supra note 168, § 19.01-1 [2], at 19-23 to 19-25 ("A court cannot render a valid
judgment binding upon a person over whom it has not obtained requisite jurisdiction-in personam,
quasi in rem, or in rem, as the case may be, unless that person is in privity with or is adequately
represented by a party over whom the court has jurisdiction. To extend the Judgment in violation of
these principles and make it binding upon the person not before the court would constitute a denial
of due process as to the absent party. Such a judgment is not, as to the absent party, entitled to full
faith and credit. This being the case, a party who is before the court and whose rights would be
adversely affected by entry of a judgment without binding effect upon the absent party can raise the
issue of indispensability. When he fails to do so, however, on appeal it is proper to treat it as
foreclosed. On the other hand, when the judgment actually adversely affects the interests of
outsiders, the matter is viewed as so basic that the appellate court should raise it on its own
motion.") (emphasis added).
172. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 760-65, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2184-86 (1989); Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40, 61 S. Ct. 115, 117 (1940) ("It is a principle of general application in Anglo-
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consent decree in a separate action.'73 If the nonsettlors' challenge to the
consent decree is successful, the consent decree may have to be vacated or set
aside. And if the consent decree is vacated or set aside, the settlors will lose any
contribution protection which they may have received as a result of the initial
entry of the consent decree. Section 113(0(2) only bars claims for contribution
against parties who have resolved their liability to the government in an
"administrative or judicially approved settlement."
2. Problems With the Approval of Settlements and Due Process
The adoption of the UCATA approach also creates problems with the
approval of settlements. Under the UCATA approach, settlements must be
entered into in "good faith" to bar or extinguish the nonsettlors' rights to seek
contribution from the settlors."7" As a corollary of this requirement, a hearing
must be held under the UCATA approach to determine the fairness or "good
faith" of a settlement before that settlement will bar claims for contribution by
the nonsettlors against the settlors or determine the nonsettlors' liabilities.
Unlike UCATA, SARA does not expressly require that settlements between
the government and PRPs be entered into in "good faith" before those settlements
will bar claims for contribution against settling PRPs. SARA provides that only
settlements between the government and PRPs which have been judicially or
American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment In personam in a litigation in which he
is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.").
.173. See Riks, 490 U.S. at 760-65, 109 S. Ct. at 2184-86.
The nonsettlors should have standing to challenge the consent decree. The entry of such a decree
will, in effect, extinguish their contribution rights, limit the reduction in liability which they are
entitled to receive as a result of the settlement to the amount of the settlement, and determine their
liability for the response costs at the site. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f(2) (1995); Wilks, 490 U.S. at 758-
62, 109 S. Ct. at 2183-84. ("Although [there is] a 'strong public policy in favor of voluntary
affirmative action plans. . . [that] interest 'must yield to the policy against requiring third parties
to submit to bargains in which their interests were either ignored or sacrificed."'); Eichenholtz v.
Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 482-83 (3d Cir. 1995); Alumax Mill Prods. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d
996, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 1990).
The fact that the nonsettlors are not bound by consent decrees which are entered in actions to
which they were not parties raises another question: whether Congress can extinguish or bar the
nonsettlors' contribution claims under Section I I3(0(2) on the strength of consent decrees which
would not otherwise be binding upon the nonsettlors or affect their rights. A scheme which attempts,
by legislative fiat, to attribute to consent decrees effects which they could not otherwise have,
consistent with the dictates of due process, may itself be violative of due process. Treatment and
analysis of that question, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
174. Section 4 of UCATA provides that a settlement between a plaintiff and one or more'
tortfeasors bars claims for contribution against the settling tortfeasors and reduces the plaintiffs
claims against the remaining tortfcasors by the amount stipulated in the settlement or the amount of
the consideration paid for the settlement, whichever is greater, if the settlement was entered into in
"good faith." See UCATA § 4. 12 U.L.A. 264 (1996).
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administratively approved will bar suits for contribution against the settling
pRps.1
75
The courts, however, have held that settlements between the government and
PRPs under SARA cannot be approved unless they are fair, reasonable, and
consistent with the purposes and requirements of CERCLA and SARA.17 The
courts have also held that such settlements can be considered fair only if they
were arrived at in a procedurally fair manner (i.e., without collusion or bad faith)
and if they are substantively fair (i.e., if the amounts being paid pursuant to the
settlements bear a close enough relationship to the settlors' equitable shares of
the liability). 7 7  In light of this judicial construction, the requirement of
judicial or administrative approval which SARA imposes upon settlements serves
the same function as the substantive requirement of "good faith" under
UCATA.' s7  The manner in which the "good faith" requirement has been
175. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(0(2), 9622(d), (gX4) (1995).
176. See infra cases cited in note 186.
177. Id.
178. See e.g., H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 225 (Oct. 3, 1986) (Conference Report on H.R.
2005, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986), reprinted in I SARA Notebook,
supra note 58, at 113-2 ("Conference substitute-The conference substitute adopts the language of
the House amendment with clarifications and modifications .. . .. The conference substitute adopts
new section 113(f) as contained in the House amendments, and thus provides contribution protection
for those who enter into administrative settlement agreements with the government, as well as those
who enter into consent decrees for settlements."); HR. 2005, 99th Cong. § 11 3(b) (1985) (H.R. 2005
as passed by the House on December 10, 1985 (adding a proposed new Section 113(0(2) to
CERCLA)), reprinted in SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-4 to 113-5 ("A person who has
resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or Judicially approved
settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the
settlement.") (emphasis added); H.R. 2005, 99th Cong. § 135 (1985) (H.R. 2005 as passed by the
Senate on September 26, 1985 (adding a proposed new Section 1070X2) to CERCLA)), reprinted
in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-15 to 113-16 ("When a person has resolved its liability
to the United States or a State in a judicially approved good faith settlement, such person shall not
be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement.") (emphasis
added); H.R. 3852, 99th Cong. § 113(b) (1985) (H.R. 3852 (H.R. 2817 as agreed upon by House
Committees for purposes of floor consideration) as introduced on December 4, 1985 (proposing a
new Section 11 3(0(2) of CERCLA)), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-23 ("A
person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an administrative orJudicially
approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the
settlcment.") (emphasis added); House Comm. on Judiciary, Superfund Amendments of 1985, H.R.
Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 19 (October 31, 1985), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58,
at 113-48 ("The Judiciary Committee amendment to this paragraph deletes 'good faith' as an
independent requirement for obtaining immunity from contribution claims. The amendment
recognizes that judicial examination and approval of the settlement itself is adequate to protect against
impropei or 'bad faith' settlements."); House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Superfund
Amendments of 1985, H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 13 (Aygust 1, 1985) (proposing a new Section
i 13(gX2) for CERCLA), reprinted in I SARA Notebook, supra note 58, at 113-28 ("When a party
has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in a judicially approved good-faith settlement,
such person shall not be liable for claims for contribution or indemnity regarding matters addressed
in the settlement.") (emphasis added); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 678
n.1 3 (D.N.J. 1989):
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interpreted and applied under UCATA should therefore shed some light on the
manner in which the judicial or administrative approval requirement should be
interpreted and applied under SARA.
One of the first questions that arises with respect to hearings to determine
the fairness or "good faith" of settlements under UCATA and SARA is whether
those hearings must be evidentiary hearings. One would think that the fairness
hearings required in connection with settlements under UCATA and SARA
would be evidentiary hearings. The nature and purpose of the hearings would
appear to support that conclusion.
The nonsettling parties have almost no chance of establishing that settlements
which adversely affect their interests were collusive or were not entered into in
good faith if they are not allowed to call and examine witnesses, including, but
not limited to, the parties to the settlement, and to offer evidence. Fairness
hearings which do not allow the nonsettlors to offer evidence, but restrict them
to the self-serving paper record compiled by the settlors, do not provide the
nonsettlors with meaningful opportunities to challenge settlements which were
arrived at without their input and which adversely affect their interests, or to
establish collusion or bad faith on the part of the settlors.
The courts have consistently recognized in other contexts that evidentiary
hearings are necessary where questions of collusion or bad faith are in-
volved. "79 They have repeatedly declared that questions of collusion and bad
Section 113(0(2) does differ from the UCTA insofar as § 4 of the UCTA is applicable
to "good faith settlements." The CERCLA provision does not refer to "good faith
settlements" but rather "an administrative or judicially approved settlement." In fact, the
early bills that preceded the enactment of SARA provided that Section I I3(gX2) applies
to a "judicially approved good faith settlement." See H.R. 2817, § I13(gX2), 99th Cong.
1st Sess., and H.R. Rep. No. 253, Part 1, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 59 (1985). The reference
to "good faith" was deleted in the House Judiciary Committee amendments and in the
final legislation. The Committee explained: "The Judiciary Committee amendment to
this paragraph deletes 'good faith' as an independent requirement for obtaining immunity
from contribution claims. The amendment recognizes that judicial examination and
approval of the settlement itself is adequate to protect against improper or 'bad faith'
settlements. Before initially approving a consent decree under CERCLA, a court must
satisfy itself that the settlement is reasonable, fair and consistent with the purposes that
CERCLA is intended to serve. Because this process ensures that the 'good faith' of the
settlement is examined by the court, a supposedly separate requirement of good faith in
the contribution section would lead to unnecessary confusion, would cast doubt on the
availability of contribution protection under the section, and would lessen the incentive
for settlement created by such protection." H.R. Rep. No. 253, Part 3, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 19 (1985), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1986, p. 3042.
179. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 3681U.S. 464, 473, 82 S. Ct. 486, 491 (1962);
Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 795 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986); Hotel Restaurant Employees
And Bartenders Intern. Union v. Rollison, 615 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1980); S.E.C. v. Koracorp
Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1978); Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538
F.2d 180, 184-85 (th Cir. 1976); 6 (Part 2) Moore et al., supra note 168, §§ 56.15[4], 56.17 [27],
[31-1], [41-1], at 56-293 to 56-303, 56-478 to 56-482, 56-499, 56-526 to 56-531, respectively; Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56, Advisory Committee Notes, 1963 Amendment-Subdivision (e) ("Where an issue as
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faith are fact-sensitive questions, that the resolution of those questions turns upon
determinations of motive, intent, state of mind, and credibility, and that such
questions are usually inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment-i.e., on
the basis of affidavits or paper records.'
Consequently, one would think that a fairness hearing in connection with a
settlement under UCATA or SARA would ordinarily be an evidentiary hearing.
Anything less would not be a fairness hearing, but a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Settlements will almost always be found to have been entered into in good faith,
when they are insulated from meaningful attack or penetrating scrutiny--i.e.,
when nonsettling parties are prevented from looking behind the self-serving paper
record created by settling parties to justify their actions.'5 '
Only a few of the courts in states which have adopted the UCATA approach
have considered whether an evidentiary hearing must be held to determine if a
settlement was entered into in "good faith." Those courts have recognized that
it may sometimes be necessary to hold evidentiary hearings in order to determine
whether the settlement was made in "good faith." Those same courts, however,
have held that evidentiary hearings are not always or even usually required in
order to determine whether or not a settlement was reached in "good faith" under
the UCATA approach.'
Similarly, only a few courts have considered whether an evidentiary hearing
is required to determine the fairness and reasonableness of a settlement under
SARA. The courts that have considered the question, however, have held that
evidentiary hearings are not required under SARA, absent unusual circumstances
or a showing of particularized need. These courts have indicated that it would
to a material fact cannot be resolved without observation of the demeanor of witnesses in order to
evaluate their credibility, summary judgment is not appropriate. Where the evidentiary matter in
support of the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be
denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented. And summary judgment may be
inappropriate where the party opposing it shows under subdivision (f) that he cannot at the present
time present facts essential to justify his opposition.").
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 213, 114 S. Ct. 1461, 1467-68
(1994); In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 957 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1992).
182. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 877.6(b) (West Supp. 1996); Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-
Clyde & Assocs., 698 P.2d 159, 167 (Cal. 1985); Alvarez v. Fred Hintze Const., 617 N.E.2d 821,
825 (III. App. Ct. 1993); Lewis v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 600 N.E.2d 504, 512-13 (I1. App. Ct.
1992); Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 597 N.E.2d 750, 753-56 (111. App. Ct. 1992); Johnson v. Belleville
Radiologists, Ltd., 581 N.E.2d 750, 752 (111. App. Ct. 1991); Noycs v. Raymond, 548 N.E.2d 196,
198-200 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990); In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc. Secur. Litig., 718 F. Supp.
1012, 1015-23 (D.Mass. 1988); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Davidson, 811 P.2d 561, 562-563 (Nev.
1991); Mahathiraj v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 617 N.E.2d 737, 740-43 (Ohio.App. Ct. 1992),
motion overruled, 612 N.E.2d 1245; Hams v. Alexander Grant & Co., 572 N.E.2d 226,231-33 (Ohio
App. Ct. 1990).
The courts in most of the states which have adopted the UCATA approach have not yet decided
whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine the "good faith" of a settlement. The
question is still an open one in those jurisdictions.
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be contrary to the purposes of SARA to hold evidentiary hearings to determine
the fairness or reasonableness of settlements in the absence of such circumstances
or showings.' Under that approach, the courts which have been asked to
review and approve CERCLA settlements have uniformly refused to hold
evidentiary hearings on the fairness and reasonableness of those settlements or
to engage in any meaningful review of those settlements.' Thus, while
nonsettlors are apparently entitled to receive notice of motions for the approval
183. See United States v. Charles George Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d 1081, 1085-86 (1st Cir. 1994)
("Tle district court did not err in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing to delve into matters of
efficacy. Requiring hearings to review the reasonableness of CERCLA consent decrees as a matter
of course would frustrate the statutory objective of expeditious settlement .... Consequently,
requests for evidentiary hearings are, for the most part, routinely denied--and properly so--at the
consent decree stage in environmental cases .... While a hearing may be necessary or desirable
in special circumstances.... such cases are relatively rare. This case invokes the general rule, not
the tong-odds exception to it. The court had ample information before it, and-even without an
evidentiary hearing, the parties had 'a fair opportunity to present relevant facts and arguments to the
court, and to counter the opponent's submissions ... .' Moreover, appellants have pointed to
nothing out of the ordinary that would suggest a particularized need for an evidentiary hearing.");
United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 93-94 (lst Cir. 1990) ("Appellants complain that
the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the suitability of the consent
decrees. They are wrong .... We start with the proposition that 'motions do not usually culminate
in evidentiary hearings . . .' That being so, it rests with the proponent of an evidentiary hearing
to persuade the court that one is desirable and to offer reasons warranting it .... In general, we
believe that evidentiary hearings are not required under CERCLA when a court is merely deciding
whether monetary settlements comprise fair and reasonable vehicles for disposition of Superfund
claims .... As in other cases, the test for granting a hearing 'should be substantive: given the
nature and circumstances of the case, did the parties have a fair opportunity to present relevant facts
and arguments to the court and to counter the opponents' submissions?.'); United States v. Bliss, 133
F.R.D. 559, 568-69 (E.D. Mo. 1990); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666, 686-87
(D.NJ. 1989); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 717 F. Supp. 507, 519 (W.D. Mich. 1989); In re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1031, 1031 n.21 (D. Mass. 1989).
The United States Supreme Court has indicated in another context, however, that the courts may
be required to hold evidentiary hearings before they can approve settlements under the UCATA
approach, if the "good faith" requirement which UCATA imposes on settlements in order to protect
the interests of nonsettlors is to serve its purpose. See AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 213, 114 S. Ct. at 1467-
68 ("Courts and legislatures have recognized this potential for unfairness and have required 'good-
faith hearings' as a remedy. When such hearings are required, the settling defendant is protected
against contribution actions only if it shows that the settlement is a fair forecast of its equitable share
of the judgment .... Mo serve their protective function effectively, such hearings (must] be
minitrials on the merits .... "). The same rationale should apply with respect to the requirement that
settlements under CERCLA be judicially or administratively approved.
Evidentiary hearings may be necessary if the requirement that settlements be judicially or
administratively approved is to serve its purpose-i.e,, to prevent collusion, make certain the
government recovers all of its costs, and protect the interests of the nonsettlors by ensuring that the
settlors do not pay less than their equitable shares of the costs at a site. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(aXI),
9613(0(2), (3) (1995). After all, the requirement that settlements be judicially or administratively
approved was intended to serve the same purpose as the "good faith" requirement of UCATA-to
protect the interests of nonsettlors by making certain that settlements are not collusive, but are fair
and reasonable. See. e.g., RoAm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. at 678 n.13.
184. See supra cases cited in note 39.
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of settlements between the government and the settling parties so that they can
object to settlements which they believe to be collusive, unreasonable, or unfair,
they are not permitted to conduct discovery or present evidence to substantiate
their objections.
The nonsettlors' rights and liabilities with respect to the site are, in essence,
being determined in proceedings in which they are not afforded any meaningful
opportunity to challenge what is presented to the court by the government and
the settling parties. If that is in fact the statutory scheme, it may be constitution-
ally infirm. It may not satisfy the requirements of procedural due process."8 5
185. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,333, 96S. Ct 893,902 (1976) ("The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."'); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-66,268-70,90 S. Ct. 1011, 1018-20, 1021 (1970)
("[W]ritten submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision. The second-hand presentation
to the decisionmaker by [agency personnel] has its own deficiencies; since [agency personnel] usually
[gather] the facts upon which [the agency's decision] rests, the presentation of [opposing views]
cannot safely be left to [them].... [Wihere important decisions turn on questions of fact. due
process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses."); Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-99, 79 S. Ct. 1400, 1413-15 (1959). See also AmClyde, 511 U.S. at
213, 114 S. Ct. at 1467-68 (In this case, the court adopted the UCFA or proportionate share approach
to determining the effect of partial settlements upon the liability of nonsettlors in admiralty
proceedings. In discussing the UCATA or pro tanto approach, however, the court commented upon
the potential for disproportionate liability under that approach and the concomitant need for "good
faith hearings." The court indicated that such hearings would have to be evidentiary hearings in
order to serve their purpose. It declared: "Courts and legislatures have recognized this potential for
unfairness and have required 'good faith hearings' as a remedy. When such hearings are required,
the settling defendant is protected against contribution actions only if it shows that the settlement is
a fair forecast of its equitable share of the judgment. ... [T]o serve their protective function, such
hearings would have to be minitrials on the merits, but in practice they are often quite cursory.");
In re Masters Mates, 957 F.2d at 1031 ("We hold that contribution does not exist after a court
approves a fair settlement bar. Otherwise settlements among fewer than all the parties would be
difficult to reach. However, third party participation in an evidentiary fairness hearing and court
approval of the settlement bar are necessary to protect the due process rights of third parties.").
Both the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the district court in Cannons Eng'g rejected
substantive due process challenges to the creation of a disproportionate liability scheme in
SARA-i.e., arguments that Congress could not, under the due process clause, create a scheme that
might ultimately require parties to bear more than their proportionate share of the response costs at
a site. See Cannons Eng'g, 899 F.2d at 92 n.6; United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp.
1027, 1050 (D. Mass. 1989). The First Circuit and the district court did so on the grounds that there
is no federal common law right to contribution from joint tortfeasors, and that Congress had the
power under the Constitution to limit or abrogate any such right to contribution anyway, where it had
a valid legislative purpose for doing so. Id.
That substantive due process argument, however, has nothing to do with and no bearing upon the
procedural due process concerns raised here. Congress did create a right to obtain contribution from
other PRPs in CERCLA, and the courts consistently so found and held in the cases decided prior to
the adoption of SARA. See the article cited in supra note 5. Congress explicitly confirmed the
existence of that right in SARA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1995). The fact that Congress has created
and conferred that right on PRPs in CERCLA and SARA, however, does not mean that Congress or
the. courts can extinguish that right or deprive PRPs of its benefits in any manner they wish.
Congress and the courts can only do so in a manner that satisfies the requirements of procedural due
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In addition, the courts which have been asked to enter consent decrees
approving settlements between the government and PRPs have shown an almost
complete indifference to, and lack of concern for, the interests of the nonsettlors.
Each of those courts has held that, in reviewing and approving such settlements
and incorporating them into consent decrees, courts must determine whether or
not those settlements are fair, reasonable, and consistent with the goals and
requirements of CERCLA.' 6 Each of those courts has also indicated that the
effect of such settlements on the liability of nonsettlors and the fairness of such
settlements to nonsettlors is one of the factors that must be considered in
determining whether or not the proposed settlements are fair.187 After making
those statements, however, each of those courts proceeded to review the effects
of the proposed settlements on the nonsettlors' liability and their fairness to the
nonsettlors under approaches so deferential to the government and the settlors as
to constitute no meaningful review on behalf of the nonsettlors at all. 8 '
In fact, several of those courts have suggested that the proposed settlements
adequately protected the interests of the nonsettlors because they were the
product of protracted "arms-length negotiations" and bargaining between the
government and the settlors. Obviously, if that is all that is required to estabilsh
that the settlement was made in "good faith," then the requiremet of judicial
approval is an empty formalism. If Section 113(0(2) adopts the UCATA
approach to determining the effect of settlements between the government and
PRPs on the liability of nonsettlors and establishes a disproportionate liability
scheme, as those courts have held, no one can protect the interests of the
nonsettlors in connection with those settlements but the courts.
The government has no incentive to do so. Under a disproportionate liability
scheme, it does not even have an incentive to make certain that it is recovering
the total of the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at a site from the
settlors. If it does not receive an amount equal to the total of the settlors'
equitable shares of the response costs at a site in a settlement, it can simply
process. See, e.g., General Time Corp. v. Bulk Materials, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 471, 477 (M.D. Ga.
1993) ("Case law also supports the view that the statutorily created right of contribution is a property
interest, which cannot be extinguished without procedural due process of law."); C.P.C. Int'l, Inc.
v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1283 (W.D. Mich. 1991). That may mean that the
courts can not approve a settlement, where the approval of that settlement will extinguish or bar the
statutory contribution rights of third parties, without first holding an evidentiary hearing on the
termination of those parties' statutory contribution rights. See the cases cited in supra note 139.
186. See, e.g., Cannons Eng'g, 899 F.2d at 85-92; Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. at 681-97;
Cannons Eng g, 720 F. Supp. at 1035-46; In re Acushnel River, 712 F. Supp. at 1027-38.
187. Id. But see United States v. Acton Corp., 733 F. Supp. 869, 872 (D.NJ. 1990) (In this
case, the court suggested that the effect of a settlement on the liability of the nonsettlors and its
fairness to nonsettlors need not be considered, if the settlement is reasonable in light of other factors.
It declared: "The public interest deserves considerable weight .... If the proposed decree is
reasonable in light of these factors, the Court need not consider the fairness of the decree to
nonsettling parties.").
188. Id.
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pursue the nonsettlors for the deficiency. " In addition, the settlors have no
reason to protect the interests of the nonsettlors. Their interests are diametrically
opposed to those of the nonsettlors. Their goal is to settle their liability for
response costs at the site as cheaply as possible, and if that means they can settle
their liability for response costs at the site for less than the total of their equitable
shares of those response costs and shift a portion of their liability for the
response costs to the nonsettlors, they will do so. Finally, the nonsettlors
themselves cannot protect their interests in connection with those settlements, if
they are not afforded an opportunity to contest those settlements in a meaningful
fashion. And the courts have deprived them of any opportunity to do so by
holding that CERCLA does not usually require evidentiary hearings on the
fairness of such settlements and refusing to hold such hearings.
Consequently, as noted above, only the courts are in a position to protect the
interests of the nonsettlors and ensure that settlements between the government
and other PRPs are fair to the nonsettlors. The courts, however, have declined
to do so by reviewing those settlements for fairness in a manner that is so
deferential as to constitute no meaningful review at all. i9
189. In fact, the scheme encourages the government to do precisely that-settle with those most
at fault and pursue the nonsettlors for any deficiency-in order to maximize its overall recovery. See
supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
190. See cases cited in supra note 39. See Boorngaarden and Breer, supra note 76, at 120 ("The
court's level of intensity in reviewing consent decrees is often described as being greater than 'rubber
stamp' approval and less than de novo review. Yet in reality most courts lean towards rubber stamp
approval, granting substantial deference to [settlements] ..').
The author was able to locate only a few cases in which courts refused to approve settlements
between the government and PRPs under CERCLA. See, e.g., United States v. Montrose Chem.
Corp. of California, 50 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Town of Moreau, 751 F. Supp.
1044 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
In Montrose, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's approval of
a settlement between the United States and the State of California and a number of local
governmental entities for response costs and natural resource damages. The district court had
determined that the settlement was both procedurally and substantively fair, even though the district
court: (i) had not been provided with any information on and did not know what it would cost to
clean up the site and restore the natural resources; and (ii) could not possibly have compared the
amount of the settlement to the total costs of clean up and restoration to determine whether the
amount of the settlement bore any relationship to the proportion of the total costs atributable to the
settling parties. See Montrose, 50 F.3d at 745-48. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court
abused its discretion when it approved the settlement because the district court simply did not have
enough information to make an independent determination that the settlement was fair and reasonable
when it did so. Id.
In Moreau, the district court refused to approve a settlement between the government and PRPs
because the government and the settling PRPs were so inept or incompetent that they could not even
put together a self-serving record to support the proposed settlement. The record that was submitted
to the court in confiection with the settlement was incomplete, contained a number of omissions,
appeared to have been manipulated and/or selectively edited, and did not contain enough information
to allow the court to make the minimal determinations it had to make in order to approve the
settlement. The court therefore refused to approve the settlement and entered a consent decree on
that record. See Moreau, 751 F. Supp. at 1050-52.
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If Section 113(0(2) creates a disproportionate liability scheme, the
provisions of CERCLA and SARA which establish the procedures for securing
approval of settlements between the government and PRPs and the effect of those
settlements on the potential liability of nonsettlors are constitutionally suspect.
Those provisions never afford the nonsettlors a meaningful opportunity to be
heard on the settlements before their rights and liabilities are adjudicated by the
approval of those settlements.' 9'
. In addition, Section 104(a)(1) may require the courts to hold evidentiary
hearings in connection with the approval of settlements between the government
and PRPs. If Section 104(a)(1) of CERCLA means that the government is not
authorized to enter into settlements with PRPs for less than the total of those
PRPs' equitable shares of the response costs at a site, the courts can no longer
follow the approach which they have followed to date in reviewing and
approving settlements.
To date, the courts have been willing to engage in only the most limited and
cursory review of such settlements. They have consistently held that they are not
required to hold evidentiary hearings before passing upon the fairness and
reasonableness of such settlements,. absent unusual circumstances or a showing
of particularizedneed, have consistently refused to hold evidentiary hearings, and
have even refused to engage in any meaningful review of the paper record
submitted to them in connection with such settlements.'9" In short, they have
consistently failed or refused to apply the level of scrutiny to those settlements
necessary to achieve one of the objectives that Congress had in mind when it
required judicial approval of settlements-i.e., to ensure that those settlements
are not collusive "sweetheart" deals which will allow polluters to shift any of the
costs of correcting the harm caused by their activities to others.
However, if Section 104(a)(l) means what it says, the government cannot
grant discounts or special treatment to PRPs who come forward or are willing
to settle, and cannot enter into settlements with those PRPs for less than the total
of their equitable shares of the response costs at a site. If that is true, the courts
cannot approve settlements as "fair, reasonable, and consistent with the purposes
and requirements of the statute" until they have determined that the settlement
will require the settlors to pay amounts which equal or exceed their equitable
If these are the only types of situations in which courts will refuse to approve settlements, the
requirement of judicial approval does nothing to ensure that the government is receiving everything
that it should receive from the settling PRPs (i.e., that the settling PRPs are not avoiding liability for
a portion of the harm caused by their activities in "sweetheart deals"), and nothing to protect the
interests of the nonsettlors.
191. See supra notes 183-185 and accompanying text.
192. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 721 F. Supp. 666,687 (D.N.J. 1989) ("In this case,
Rohm & Haas does not urge us to hold an evidentiary hearing, it merely asks to review the paper
record (cashbooks, receipts, depositions, etc.) and determine whether its view of that evidence is more
plausible than that of the United States. But even this we will not do.").
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shares of the response costs at a site, and will have to take a much harder look
at those settlements.
The reason is simple. If Section 104(a)(l) means what it says, the courts
cannot approve a settlement without first establishing, with a much greater degree
of certainty, what it will cost to clean up or remediate a site, what the settling
parties' equitable shares of those costs are, and whether or not the settlement will
require the settling parties to pay amounts or perform work with costs which
equal or exceed the total of their equitable shares of those costs-determinations
which, in all probability, will require evidentiary hearings and a careful
evaluation of the facts, rather than blind acceptance of the representations of the
government and the settling PRPs. Otherwise, the courts cannot find or hold, in
light of the statutory mandate of Section 104(a)(l), that the settlement is
consistent with the goals and requirements of the statute. Section 104(a)(l)
therefore drastically alters the approach which courts must follow and the level
of scrutiny which the courts must apply in reviewing and approving major party
settlements under CERCLA.
V. CONCLUSION
The provision of Section 1 13(0(2) which declares that a settlement between
the government and PRPs "reduces the potential liability of the others by the
amount of the settlement" cannot reasonably be viewed as an adoption of the
UCATA approach or as the linchpin of any "disproportionate liability scheme"
under SARA. It simply does not make sense to interpret that provision in that
manner, in the context of a statutory scheme which:
(1) prohibits settlements between the government and PRPs for less
than the total of the settlors' equitable shares of the response costs at a
site;
(2) contemplates that the government will usually negotiate or enter
into settlements with PRPs for significantly more than the total of their
equitable shares of the response costs at a site; and
(3) does not provide for or permit an evidentiary hearing to determine
the fairness of settlements between the government and PRPs to
nonsettlors.'93
193. The absence of provisions requiring evidentiary hearings on the fairness and reasonableness
of settlements raises due process concerns and serious questions as to the constitutionality of Section
113(0(2), if it constitutes an adoption of the UCATA approach and a "disproportionate liability
scheme." See supra text accompanying notes 174-191. In the absence of provisions for evidentiary
fairness hearings, such an interpretation of Section 113(f)(2) creates a scheme under which the
government and the settling parties can dramatically alter the rights and liabilities of nonsettlors
through contracts or agreements on which the nonsettlors are not consulted and to which the
nonsettlors do not consent or agree. It also creates a scheme under which the courts can adjudicate
the rights and liabilities of the nonsettlors by approving such agreements without ever affording the
nonsettlors a meaningful opportunity to be heard in connection with those settlement agree-
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Furthermore, such an interpretation of Section 113(0(2) is at odds with the
legislative history of SARA, which indicates that SARA was intended to
ameliorate the harshness of the scheme that existed under CERCLA-not to
augment or exacerbate it.' 94
In addition, the great weight of authority indicates that the UCFA approach
to determining the effect of settlements between the government and PRPs on the
liability of nonsettlors is the approach that is most consistent with the objectives
and policies of CERCLA and SARA, and the approach that should be followed
to determine the effect of those settlements. Furthermore, the UCFA approach
is not inconsistent with Section 113(0(2), if the purpose of Section 113(0(2) was
to prevent the government from recovering more than the total costs incurred in
responding to the releases of hazardous substances at sites. And the other
provisions of SARA and the scheme which they establish for settlements between
the government and PRPs indicate that that was in fact the probable purpose of
Section 113(0(2). " Finally, the continued use of the UCFA approach will
eliminate several procedural and constitutional problems associated with the
UCATA approach. The UCFA approach's built-in assurance of fairness to
nonsettlors obviates any need to join the nonsettlors in actions for the approval
of settlements between the government and PRPs or to hold evidentiary hearings
in order to determine the fairness or reasonableness of those settlements.
Accordingly, Section 113(0(2) can most reasonably be viewed as a
modification to the UCFA approach for determining the effect of settlements on
nonsettlors designed to prevent windfalls or double recoveriesby the government
as a result of those settlements. Under the UCFA approach, as modified by
Section 113(0(2), settlements between the government and PRPs reduce the
potential liability of nonsettlors by the settlors' equitable shares of the response
costs at a site or the amount of the settlement, whichever is greater.
That interpretation of Section 113(0(2) is entirely consistent with the scheme
which SARA establishes for settlements between the government and PRPs. It
also furthers the goal of assuring full recovery of the costs of responding to
ments-i.e., an opportunity to examine and present evidence in connection with those settlement
agreements.
194. See Light, The Importance of "Being Taken", supra note 101. In that article, the author
suggests that the courts, by virtue of their piecemeal review and interpretation of the provisions of
CERCLA and SARA, have created a scheme that goes well beyond and is far harsher than anything
Congress intended or created.
195. CERCLA, again, is a cost recovery statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). It was not intended
to authorize or permit windfalls or double recoveries by the government, and Congress expressly
established that fact in 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b), which prohibits persons who have recovered response
costs under CERCLA from recovering for the same costs under other state or federal laws and
prohibits persons who have recovered response costs under other state or federal laws from
recovering for those same response costs under CERCLA. Section II 3(f(2) simply adds the final
piece of the puzzle necessary to implement the policy against double recovery with respect to the
government. It prevents the government from recovering for the same response costs more than once
under CERCLA.
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releases of hazardous substances from the persons who caused or contributed to
those releases, while ensuring that the costs of responding to those releases are
allocated or apportioned among those persons in a fair and equitable manner.
The courts should therefore hold that the UCFA approach continues to be
valid and should prevail in determining the effects of a settlement between the
government and PRPs upon the potential liability of nonsettlors. Section
113(f)(2) simply modifies that approach by establishing that nonsettlors are
entitled, at a minimum, to a reduction in their potential liability equal to the
amount of the settlement.
